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ABSTRACT
This study is an examination of the rhetorical 
strategies utilized by Boris Yeltsin during his rise to 
prominence and his role in the second Russian revolution. 
By borrowing concepts from the study of revolutions in 
science, the author contends that Yeltsin used three 
distinct rhetorical personae, or modes of public 
presentation, to forward his discourse between 1985 and 
1991. These personae include the revolutionary, the 
conciliatory, and the conservative. With this critical 
vocabulary, the author argues that Yeltsin's successes and 
failures hinged on his fitting use of rhetorical personae 
in relation to four exigencies during the late-Soviet era: 
the evolution of perestroika, the decline of progressive 
perestroika, the emergence of the Russian presidency, and 
the unfolding of the August coup of 1991. This study 
serves to supplement revolutionary theory which needs 
further investigations concerning the ways radical 
leadership negotiates the course of a revolutionary 
movement.
v
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I
I
CHAPTER ONE
A RHETORICAL EXPLORATION OF THE SECOND 
RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
INTRODUCTION
The second Russian revolution was a remarkable event. 
For over seventy years, the fathers and descendants of the 
Bolshevik uprising fought to establish the Soviet Union as 
the spearhead of communism's march to global dominance.
This aspiration to build a distinct society apart from 
capitalism's international influence created a myriad of 
geo-political alliances which shaped the course of 
twentieth-century history. The advance of Marxism, 
however, halted as the USSR failed to sustain itself. Out 
of the remains of this dead empire emerged an assortment of 
newborn countries struggling to establish stable, sovereign 
governments. And for the world's eminent nations, the 
Soviet challenge to liberal democracy and capitalism 
quickly perished. Thus, diplomats negotiated new 
alliances, and corporate investors swarmed to stake their 
claims.
Merrymaking over the Soviet Union's demise, however, 
is still carefully measured. As the fallout settles on the 
international front, the rebuilding of a sovereign, 
domestic Russia is in its early stages. Threats to 
stability remain. For this nation, the transition to a 
more representational form of government continues to 
present an abundance of difficulties. Within its borders,
1
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political organizations, social structure, economic 
control, and the once pervasive myths of state-supervised 
social order are still being torn down and reconstructed. 
Russia's transition represents an unparalleled and unique 
case. No other emerging, democratic state possesses such 
an unpromising legacy. Historically, Russia boasts limited 
experience with capitalism and democracy. Moreover, the 
heritage of Soviet domination is still smoldering as 
evidenced by the rekindled embers of communist political 
activity in the 1996 presidential elections.
Despite obstacles, the tenuous conversion advanced 
under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin. More than any one 
single person, he symbolized the revolution of 1991 and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union's communist regime. Prior to 
the revolution, as an aspiring leader working his way up 
through the party ranks, he demonstrated a flair for action 
when the party and state system were ineffective. While 
others moved cautiously or were limited in vision by 
ideological blinders, Yeltsin took bold risks which paid 
dividends after the fall of communism. As Mikhail 
Gorbachev became disgraced and discredited, Yeltsin emerged 
as the democratic movement's foremost captain.
Yeltsin's influence during the transition, however, 
was a mixed blessing. Following the coup of 1991, 
political disorientation erupted as Gorbachev became 
ineffectual and the plotters floundered in the coup's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
aftermath without a decisive plan of action. Yeltsin,
however, gathered up the fallen reins and, without inciting
violence, took control of the situation. Regarding
Yeltsin's acquisition of power, Sakwa (1993) notes, "Seldom
before had the world seen the destruction of an old
political order and the attempt to create a new one being
achieved with so little physical violence" (14). In this
light, Yeltsin might be seen as a savior. Ironically, he
was also a potential threat to the democratic movement
which he led. Giorgi Satarov, a member of the presidential
council, once noted Yeltsin's penchant for authoritarian
tactics. After Russia rose from the ashes of the USSR,
Satarov once remarked:
Like Gorbachev's perestroika, everything now in the 
development of democracy is being guided from 
above....It is very easy to slip into dictatorship. 
There are no checks. Monopolistic rule is responsible 
for checking itself, and this self-restriction has to 
hold somehow before there sure real checks and balances 
(in Remnick 1994, 536).
Questions remain regarding Yeltsin's methods as an
established institutional leader as do questions regarding
his rise to revolutionary power and his ascent to
institutional authority.
Given that the revolution was relatively bloodless and
Yeltsin's post-Soviet, presidential authority works
independently of many clearly-defined regulations, one
might conclude that Yeltsin's rise to power was a triumph
of his use of rhetorical strategies. That is, Yeltsin's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
success depended on his ability to negotiate and persuade, 
to acquire allies and appease rivals. In light of 
Yeltsin's accomplishments during the late-Soviet era, a 
provocative question emerges: what is the relationship
between rhetoric and revolution? It is to this question 
that I now turn.
RHETORIC AND REVOLUTION 
The theoretical focus of this study, the relationship 
between rhetoric and revolution, is infrequently explored. 
Paramount issues in the study of revolution tend to focus 
not on persuasion and leadership during times of political 
change, but on antecedent conditions which precede conflict 
and revolutionary outcomes. For instance, in anticipating 
the underlying causes of conflict, Karl Marx emphasizes 
incessant class struggle and competition for modes of 
production (in Tucker 1978, 164-165). Vilfredo Pareto 
underscores Darwinistic conflict between elites for 
positions of power, status, and wealth (in Hagopian 1974, 
52). And Hannah Arendt (1963) sees revolution in terms of 
a crusade for freedom by masses seeking liberation from 
oppressive circumstances (l).
other theorists look for general similarities which 
characterize revolutionary outcomes. Leon Trotsky defines 
revolution as a political movement striving to supplant one 
dominant group for another thus shifting the balance of 
power. For Louis Gattschalk, revolution is a popular
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
movement which attempts to initiate radical change in the 
governing structure of a given nation. And Sigmund Neumann 
defines revolution as an essential transformation in 
"political organization, social structure, economic 
property control and the dominant myth of a social order, 
thus indicating a major break in the continuity of a 
development" (in Blackey and Paynton 1976, 6-7). These 
definitions demonstrate significant utility, but, like all 
conceptualizations, bear weaknesses.
One such weakness is the tendency to use the above 
mentioned theories to create scientific, causal models of 
revolution. About this issue, Mark Hagopian (1974) claims 
that social scientists and historians may not invoke "laws" 
with the same certainty as scholars investigating natural 
sciences. He writes, "Historical situations present a 
multitude of interrelated factors whose relevance or 
irrelevance to the events we wish to explain is difficult 
to determine" (124). The implication of this claim is 
obvious. Universal, many covering-laws, and even multi- 
causal approaches to the study of revolution can be 
reductionistic. Further, they do not always account well 
for the chaotic transition period at the time of and 
shortly following a revolutionary crisis. This is a void 
that a rhetorical perspective on revolution aspires to 
fill.
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Rhetoric is, in its traditional sense, the art of 
persuasion. Rhetoric deals not only with pure reason, but 
with subjective inodes of influence as well. In the 
classical, Aristotelian conception of rhetoric, the 
persuasion of a given audience also deals with three 
interrelated factors: logos, appeals to logic; pathos, 
appeals to emotions; and ethos, appeals based on a rhetor's 
character. Given that this formulation includes logic, a 
rhetorical approach to revolution does not preclude or 
ignore the "facts" of history and the variables that 
constitute the building blocks of conflict. A rhetorical 
approach does, however, encourage and include the study and 
understanding of the extra-rational factors that contribute 
to revolutionary movements.
Expanding on Aristotle's conception of rhetoric, 
Farrell explains that rhetoric helps manage emerging 
situations in history. He writes, "urgent circumstances 
require that we act, even though we lack complete, reliable 
grounds for determining what the best action might be" 
(Farrell 1993, 278). A rhetorical culture, therefore, is 
one in which people recognize the responsibility of civic 
leaders to issue discourse aimed at conflict resolution. 
Here, Farrell seemingly echoes Vico's humanist position 
which asserts that humans are indeed born out of nature, 
but shape it. That is, humans are not entirely bound to 
strict behavioral laws. They can make active, and not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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necessarily instinctual, choices concerning action and can 
ascribe meaning symbolically to sense data; thus, they can 
interpret their world in an assortment of ways (Foss, Foss, 
and Trapp 1985, 133). Consequently, a rhetorical 
perspective assumes that humans are active agents who make 
meaningful, strategic choices about how to manage problems.
The rhetorical choices which manage crisis situations 
may take a variety of forms. For instance, following the 
American revolution's Boston Massacre, Kirt Ritter and 
James Andrews (1978) note the importance of illustrated 
handbills, sermons, newspaper essays, and broadsides (6). 
David Bezayiff (1976) even includes the courtroom oratory 
of John Adams as instrumental discourse aimed at 
challenging British authority. These forms of discourse 
are rather conventional artifacts for examination, but 
rhetoric has recently expanded its range of investigation. 
After the American civil rights movement in the 1960s, 
popular music, protest marches, and confrontation itself 
have all been studied as rhetorical forms.
Whatever shape rhetoric takes, it should be 
underscored that rhetors have the ability to influence 
people's attitudes toward seemingly "objective" events in 
history, including a variety of social, economic, and 
political conditions. For instance, in relation to the 
American revolution's Boston Massacre, Ritter and Andrews 
write, "The Massacre was, of course, a symbolic event in
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patriotic rhetoric. It was tactically necessary to enlarge 
upon it to make clear the real, and sinister, significance 
of the event" (7). In short, spokesmen of the revolution 
actively interpreted the event that their audiences might 
be reminded of the "oppressive” British government's "evil" 
designs.
While newspaper essays, speeches, and like modes of 
discourse can be used rhetorically, they do not necessarily 
stand on their own. Often, the author's identity is a 
contributing factor in the success or failure of a message. 
Two rhetorical terms describe this thought, ethos and 
persona. As noted previously, ethos concerns a rhetor's 
perceived character. According to Aristotle, the concept 
involves a rhetorical appeal which functions at the time of 
a rhetorical act. While ethos deals with the 
representation of one's personality, persona concerns 
itself with a constructed role that a person plays. Often, 
these roles develop in certain rhetorical conditions which 
demand that a rhetor assume a certain set of 
characteristics for audience acceptance. For instance, 
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1990) 
contend that presidential discourse in the United States is 
role governed (5). That is, genres of presidential address 
are associated with specific expectations, both public and 
institutional, which guide what can and cannot be said. Of 
course, a president's distinctive, personal style of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
presentation is always present. Nevertheless, for a chief 
executive to deviate too far from a genre's standards may 
dash audience expectations and, consequently, deunage his or 
her credibility.
The construction of perceived credibility for a 
leader's image is important in that it conveys an 
impression to an audience of a rhetor's potential for 
action. In The Rhetoric of Religion. Kenneth Burke writes 
that action "involves character, which involves choice— and 
the form of choice attains perfection in the distinction 
between Yes and No....action implies the ethical, the human 
personality" (in Lee and Andrews 1991, 25). Given this 
association between action and perceived character, an 
audience's belief in a message hinges, in part, upon the 
integrity of the source. Consequently, the success of a 
movement's ability to mobilize the masses depends on its 
leadership. This thought is not new in history. Robert 
Tucker (1973) once observed that the Bolshevik revolution 
might not have occurred without Vladimir Lenin's leadership 
(45). To support this hypothetical notion, Tucker cites 
Trotsky who, in his diary, writes that only he and Lenin 
possessed the leadership skills to drive the overthrow of 
the post-tsarist, provisional government (45-6). Without 
Lenin or Trotsky, therefore, the Bolsheviks may not have 
assumed control in 1917. If revolutionary leadership is 
important to the initiation and resolution of conflict.
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rhetorical studies may prove useful in explaining the 
phenomenon of revolutions by pointing out what particular 
rhetorical strategies or tactics make revolutionaries like 
Lenin or Trotsky successful.
A definition of revolution that recognizes humans as 
active agents is forwarded by historian of science I. 
Bernard Cohen. In the scientific context, he contends that 
revolution "implies a break in continuity, the 
establishment of a new order that has severed its links 
with the past, a sharply defined plane of cleavage between 
what is old and familiar and what is new and different” 
(Cohen 1985, 6). This break in continuity is characterized 
by two essential elements, newness and conversion. To 
explain the newness that revolutions provoke, Cohen employs 
Arendt's words to describe newness as, "an entirely new 
story, a story never known or told before" (8). Further, 
Cohen's notion of conversion recognizes that it is not 
enough that change is simply advocated or fought for, but 
it must be routinized and practiced— only then will the 
revolutionary process be complete. For change to become 
routinized and practiced, however, it must be argued for by 
leaders and accepted by a given audience. This entails the 
use of rhetoric.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
With Cohen's rhetorically-oriented definition of 
revolution as a critical perspective, this dissertation
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seeks to further unite the concepts of rhetoric and 
revolution. More specifically, it examines Boris Yeltsin's 
rise to revolutionary leadership and his appropriation of 
power as post-Soviet Russia's first president. In doing 
so, I will explore how he constructed various rhetorical 
personae which empowered him to become the chief commandant 
of Russia's second revolution. To explore this area of 
inquiry, I will address the following research questions:
1) What were the personae utilized by Yeltsin for the 
establishment of himself as an influential leader?; and 2) 
How was Yeltsin's strategic use of personae essential to 
the revolutionary process? In the process of answering 
these questions, I contend that: 1) Rhetoric is an
essential and influential element in the revolutionary 
process; and 2) There are certain rhetorical personae 
revolutionaries tend to adopt to fuel revolutionary 
movements.
JUSTIFICATION OF STUDY 
As a topic for the exploration of the relationship 
between rhetoric and revolution, Yeltsin provides an 
excellent case study for several reasons. First, his rise 
to power symbolizes a remarkable moment in Russian history 
which presented a number of curious exigencies. Boris 
Yeltsin's emergence as a leader came during an 
unprecedented juncture in Russian history. For the first 
time, government was to be accountable to a voting public.
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Previously, Russia's citizenship followed the lead of 
autocratic authority. In his work titled Political 
Culture and Soviet Politics, political scientist Steven 
White (1979) argued that autocracy is the defining 
principle in Russia's political history. In light of this 
tsarist-based heritage, White asserted that Russians 
developed a view of citizenship not as a legal expression 
of public interests, but as submission to a kind of 
patrimonial rule (White 1979, 22). Thus, despite being 
autocratic, tsarism was seen by many Russians as a 
legitimate form of government.
Even after the reign of tsars ended, Bolshevism 
perpetuated Russia's tradition of oppressive rule. 
Throughout its more them seventy-year life span during the 
Soviet era, the communist party operated as a self-centered 
entity despite claims that it represented the well-being of 
the proletariate and peasantry. Many of the party's elite 
indulged in heavy-handed measures to ensure the party's 
fortitude. Lenin himself believed in terrorist tactics, if 
necessary, to convince the masses of communism's 
"inevitability." In addition to terrorizing the Soviet 
Union, Stalin corrupted the nation's bureaucracy. This 
corruption, under Brezhnev's administration, blossomed into 
blatant forms of misconduct which served the interests of 
party members including, to name just a few, housing and 
traveling privileges. As this progression of unofficial,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
! 13
yet state-recognized debauchery unfolded, much of the 
public grew distant, indifferent, and cynical. In this 
difficult environment for constructive change, Yeltsin 
braved several demanding tasks.
First, under Yeltsin's leadership, post-Soviet 
government faced the task of building credibility in a 
political culture long guided by patriarchical dominance. 
This dilemma presented a weighty theoretical problem. The 
aggregate effect of centuries of autocracy was a 
disjunction between state allegiance and agreement with the 
practices of a reigning government or acceptance of that 
government as desirable (Tucker 1987, 202-203). This 
situation placed Russia in a condition that impedes the 
development of an aspiring democracy. In On Liberty. John 
Stuart Mill advocated individual rights but denounced that 
which keeps citizens from recognizing themselves as an 
active part of a greater whole; citizens must function as 
willing participants of a governed body.
Second, in addition to the theoretical, a practical 
problem also arose in the creation of Russia's civil 
society. The nation had no historical or cultural basis 
for democratic, participatory functioning in government. 
Therefore, encouraging the public to take part earnestly in 
civic affairs proved difficult. After the fall of the 
communist party, a vast number of avaricious political 
parties emerged. This development of partisan communities
i
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found itself poorly united with Russia's broad social 
interests and new political institutions (Sakwa 1993, 392). 
Further complicating the integration of public interest and 
government is the problem of economic reform. On this 
issue, Sztompka (1991) observed that a sturdy and equitable 
system of free trade demonstrates a link between individual 
interests and the public good (309). Thus, the unfinished 
construction of stable economic institutions weakens the 
opportunity for a coherent political party system's success 
(Weigle 1994, 267). with these ideas in mind, it is not 
difficult to hypothesize that a comprehensive democratic 
conversion is not yet complete or assured.
A second justification for this study is the 
opportunity for a close, contemporary examination of the 
role of leadership in revolution as it unfolds. In 
studying the relationship between rhetoric and revolution, 
the Yeltsin phenomenon demonstrates how one can use 
rhetorical actions to underscore social and political 
conditions, interpret them for a public, and construct a 
public sense of exigency. Put differently, the 
revolutionary leadership concerns the ability to create the 
precipitants of revolution. Hagopian (1974) defines the 
idea of precipitants by making an analogy to the field of 
chemistry. He explains that, "[A] precipitant is a 
substance which introduced in minute quantities causes 
another substance (the precipitate) which is in solution to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
leave that state" (Hagopian 1974, 166). That is, a 
precipitant provokes a drastic reaction among relatively 
stable ingredients. Thus, a revolutionary precipitant is, 
in Lyford Edwards' (1970) words, "some act, insignificant 
in itself, which precipitates a separation of the 
repressors and their followers from the repressed and their 
followers" (27). Leadership is the fundamental feature in 
the creation of precipitants, but one cannot create 
precipitants out of thin air. Precipitants must work in 
conjunction with precipates, "long-term" causes of 
revolution. These constitute the power keg which 
precipitants, like burning fuses, ignite. About 
precipitates, Marx writes that increasing misery drives the 
working class to uprising (in Tucker 1978, 165). Put 
differently, as the standard of living falls, chances for 
revolution increase.
During the late 1980s, with standards of living 
diminishing, conditions were such that the Soviet Union was 
ripe for revolutionary change. Perestroika had faltered. 
Gorbachev's "revolution within a revolution" sought to save 
the principal features of the Soviet system and retain the 
party's leading role in national affairs. However, even 
with democratization, glasnost, and the introduction of a 
limited market economy, perestroika failed to alleviate 
many of the Soviet Union's problems. In fact, the 
ambitious reform of communism only exacerbated a system
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already in a dire situation. Sakwa (1993) labels most of 
the development— political, social, economic— following the 
1917 revolution "misdevelopment" (16). Although great 
gains were made in the realm of industry, the empire's 
citizens' quality of life suffered. Empty shops, idle 
workers, and squalid housing— these circumstances 
characterized the lives of every-day people. All glasnost 
accomplished was to provide a means of expressing 
frustration, not solving problems. For many people, the 
only apparent solution seemed to be radical change.
To encourage such radical change during the 1980s, 
Yeltsin played the role of agitator with enthusiasm. As 
the Soviet system continued to crumble, Yeltsin's 
celebrated tirades became increasingly revolutionary. In 
his campaign for the Russian presidency, he became the 
first Soviet official to decry the national impulse to 
idealize and idolize Lenin and to commend Solzhenitsyn for 
his role in de-Stalinization. At this point, Yeltsin's 
intention became clearly obvious. He was not as much 
concerned with promoting the Soviet Union as he was 
concerned with the return of Russia as it was before the 
Bolshevik revolt. According to Petro (1995), "Like the 
nineteenth century Slavophile reformers Y. Samarin and D. 
Shipove, Yeltsin embraced change not for his own sake, but 
for the sake of restoring Russian greatness" (158-9).
While Yeltsin saw no future for the communist party, he
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believed in the reconstruction of a sovereign Russia's 
statehood.
Because Yeltsin is an influential revolutionary leader 
whose presence in office influenced Russia's future, it 
profits scholars to understand him. In Russia, according 
to Sestanovich (1990), Yeltsin helped make the difference 
between a relatively smooth transition and wide spread 
violence (3). During the Soviet Union's final days,
Yeltsin was seen as a threat to stability. But as a 
spearhead of the revolution, he set the tone for the 
establishment of a new Russia. His legacy will be an 
integral component of continued advancement toward some 
form of democratic management. To understand Yeltsin, his 
rise to power, and Russia's prelude to political 
transformation, an examination of his discourse should 
prove beneficial.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
To understand the guiding objectives and assumptions 
underpinning this rhetorical study of Yeltsin, it is 
necessary to review literature concerning the relationship 
between leadership and revolution. In this area of study, 
a number of different academic disciplines have done work 
including rhetoric, political science, psychology, and 
sociology. The forthcoming review will examine major 
concepts used in these fields and strengths and weaknesses 
of each respective approach.
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Social Movements
In the field of rhetoric, few contemporary studies
have associated ideas concerning leadership and political
revolution. The study of social movements, however, may
provide useful insights. Social movements are mass
crusades of advocates seeking improvement in institutions
or social practices that change slowly. In defining social
movements, Stewart, Smith, and Denton (1994) write,
A social movement...is an organized, 
uninstitutionalized, and large collective activity 
that emerges to bring about or to resist a program of 
change in societal norms or values, operates primarily 
through persuasive strategies, and encounters 
opposition in a moral struggle (17).
These movements function outside of settled, legitimate
institutions. Rather them overturn institutions, movements
seek to reform the practices of those in power like
legislators, governors, ministers, and industrialists.
Thus, social movements and political revolutions differ in
that the latter seeks the upheaval of institutions while
the former seeks only reform. Nevertheless, there are
ideas concerning rhetoric and leadership in social
movements one can appropriate that might serve scholars
well in the arena of revolutions.
Just as revolutions have a moral tone, so do social
movements. For a movement to justify its standing as a
significant and substantial enterprise, it must warrant
itself with what Oberschall calls an "elaboration of
systems of beliefs and moral ideas" (in Stewart, Smith, and
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Denton 1994, 11). Put differently, a social movement must 
demonstrate that it is seeking to better a public's 
welfare. Given that moral struggle is involved, Griffin 
argues that all movements are political and concern a 
conflictual drama which aims for a society's salvation (in 
Rueckert 1969, 456). Here, the idea of conflict is 
important in that one group alone does not produce a 
movement; movements involve a rhetorical struggle between 
an old and new over what practices and principles are 
beneficial.
In light of such moral conflict, leaders of social 
movements have meaningful responsibilities. The tasks of 
leaders are many, including organizer, administrator, and 
decision maker. Nevertheless, there is one function of 
leadership of particular importance to rhetoric, the 
leader's role as a symbol of a movement which represents 
its values. Certainly, leaders in social movements do not 
possess the same kind of mandate claimed by institutional 
leaders. Leaders in social movements command because they 
become identified with the group's cause. That is, the 
identities of the leaders and the movements merge (Stewart, 
Smith, and Denton 1994, 95). For instance, Martin Luther 
King became synonymous with the civil rights movement, 
Caesar Chavez came to represent the fight for migrant 
workers' rights, and Andrei Sakharov represented an 
archetype for Soviet nonconformists. For a leader to
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develop the kind of influence possessed by individuals like 
these, Herbert Simons (1970) suggests that leadership 
potential resides in his or her "capacity to fulfill the 
requirements of his [her] movement by resolving or reducing 
rhetorical problems" (2-3).
To solve the dilemmas faced by a movement and to be a 
symbolic leader, one must be a kind of prophet. Or, in 
Lessl's (1989) words, a leader must project either a 
"bardic" or "priestly" voice. In comparing the two, Lessl 
claims that "bardic and priestly communication share many 
features but are differentiated by virtue of the role- 
relations speakers and listeners manifest in each 
rhetorical type" (188). More specifically, bardic 
communication is nostalgic and may well suit the rhetorical 
needs of conservative or reactionary movements. It reminds 
people of their traditional values, aspirations, and 
convictions. Priestly communication, however, is 
transcendent in nature. It suggests to people that they 
might become something different and better. Lessl claims 
that using this vocabulary can aid a critic in drawing out 
some of the "posturing" involved in some kinds of rhetoric 
(188). And more importantly, this vocabulary helps explain 
the moral appeal of rhetors associated with progressive 
social movements.
Lessl suggests that with the use of the "priestly" 
voice comes authority which is largely divorced from the
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mainstream marketplace of ideas. That is, the priestly 
voice forwards ideas that are idealistic and untested.
This poses a risk in terms of seeking rhetorical success in 
that one might become estranged from their constituency. 
Gregg helps illustrate this possibility in his discussion 
of the "ego function" of protest rhetoric. He claims that 
protest rhetoric has a limited audience; those in power may 
refuse to listen. From this assumption, he argues that the 
provocateur may choose to address him or her self "and that 
regardless of his reasons for such behavior, this primary 
transaction of self may be properly designated rhetorical" 
(Gregg 1969, 71). In a typical rhetorical transaction, one 
assumes that the rhetor has a particular aim, like inducing 
action in or shifting attitudes of an audience. In Gregg's 
words, "The speaker is successful insofar as he can 
maneuver his listeners to assent the point of view, claims, 
or actions proposed by the speaker" (72). For the 
protestor, however, protest rhetoric may function simply to 
psycho-logically construct and affirm an individual's or a 
group's own position (74).
If protest rhetoric is, to some degree, ego driven, 
the line between the success and failure- of a movement may 
be thin. In other words, a subtle distinction exists 
between satisfying one's own needs and pragmatically 
satisfying the needs of a constituency. For instance, 
Eugene Debs was successful because his rhetoric made a
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difference for the constituency he represented. Debs was, 
in a sense, a marginal leader in that his supporters were 
few and his unattained goals were many— he did not, in four 
attempts, become president of the United States, and "he 
did not even see the creation of a vertically integrated 
industrial union in his lifetime" (Darsey 1988, 434).
Debs' efforts did, however, provide a moral foundation for 
reforms resulting in better treatment of workers who were 
once seen as mere cogs in the American manufacturing 
machine. Emma Goldman, however, was not as successful as 
Debs. Solomon (1988) argued that the anarchist firebrand 
of early 20th century America used rhetorical techniques 
that were self defeating (185). "Red Emma" Goldman was a 
better agitator than practical reformer. Therefore, while 
she pointed out social ills, she forwarded no feasible 
plans for reform and could not rally a coherent core of 
supporters. Thus, her consequence as a pragmatic activist 
was nominal.
How leaders like Debs come to the forefront of 
movements is uncertain. John Wilson writes that "the 
typical pattern of domination in the typical social 
movement is subsumed under neither the concept of power nor 
that of authority" (in Stewart, Smith, and Denton 1994,
92). The pathways to control are not well defined and the 
movement's support of a commander may be fickle at best.
In describing this precarious situation, Simons (1970)
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writes that a leader may manage am organized nucleus, but
wields little control over those at the periphery of the
movement (4). Without assured support from the movement's
fringes, Stewart, Denton, and Smith (1994) speculate that
leaders gain legitimacy through performing specific skills
like organizing or decision making "through costly trial
and error as the social movement unfolds" (92).
While conjectures exist about how leaders acquire
power in social movements, the importance of leadership is
clean:. Leadership is essential because the leader's
characteristics often shape the movement's activities. As
Sidney Hook (1967) once noted,
We cam tell that it [revolution] is coming, we cam 
predict its approach though not what particular event 
will set it off. We cam predict.. .the advent of a 
revolution or a war but not always what its upshot 
will be. That upshot may sometimes depend upon the 
characters of the leading personalities (154).
To understamd the kind of and importance of occurrence to
which Hook is referring, one must question the adequacy of
claiming that leaders arise through "trial and error.”
More research must be done to more fully understand the
strategies and tactics used by leaders to justify efforts
aimed at reform and revolt.
Charisma
Charisma has been a useful tool in the examination of 
revolutionary leadership in a wide variety of disciplines. 
The influential and foundational conception of the term was 
developed by Max Weber. He claims:
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The term 'charisma' will be applied to a certain 
quality of an individual personality by virtue of 
which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as 
endowed with supernatural, super human, or at least 
specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These 
are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person 
but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, 
and on the basis of them the individual concerned is 
treated as a leader (in Toth 1981, 19).
With this definition as a cornerstone in research
literature, charisma refers to a personality with magnetic
appeal, sense of timing, and the rhetorical skills
necessary to articulate what "others can as yet only feel,
strive towards, and imagine but cannot put into words or
translate explicitly into action" (Stewart, Smith, and
Denton 1994, 96-7). What makes some charismatic and others
not is sometimes difficult to discern as charisma is a
"gift of grace." Nevertheless, there appear to be two
elementary kinds of charisma, pure and manufactured.
Pure charisma deals directly with, to use the term
loosely, one's "actual" personality. It refers to an
innate charm, or magnetism, which moves people around the
charismatic individual to action. Thus, pure charisma's
claim to obedience is personal. Its impact occurs in
conjunction with the leader's ability to evoke the sense of
conviction, devotion, and allegiance (Bensman and Givant
1986, 32). In its earliest conceptions, charismatic
ability is associated with divine gifts. In fact, the
plural of the term, "charismata," blossomed out of the
Judeo-Christian tradition where it was associated with
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talents bestowed by the Holy Spirit (Boss 1976, 302). As 
charisma stemmed from divine influence, the charismatic 
individual operated outside of the bounds of formal 
legitimacy.
Because charisma operates without institutional mores, 
it is often viewed as revolutionary and is associated with 
the role of agitator. Eric Hoffer scoffingly comments that 
"chaos is his [the agitator's] element. When the old order 
begins to crack, he wades in with all his might and 
recklessness to blow the whole hated present to high 
heaven" (in Hagopian 1974, 331). According to Weber, pure 
charisma tends to arise during times of crisis when 
traditional power and institutional structures have broken 
down (Bensman and Givant 1986, 29). In this situation, 
Lasswell claims that audiences are vulnerable to agitation 
at the hand of one who places emphasis on emotional 
responses from the masses (Lasswell 1960, 78). While it is 
difficult to speculate about the exact personality 
attributes of charismatic leaders who can manipulate the 
passions of a public, one thing seems certain. During 
times of crisis, some provisional form of authority is 
needed as an alternative to sheer chaos. That provisional 
form might be characterized by pure charismatic leadership.
While pure charisma concerns "innate" abilities, 
manufactured charisma relies less on personality, and more 
on institutional legitimacy; it is part of what Weber
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calls rational-legal authority. According to Weber, once a 
charismatic leader comes to hold am official and secure 
office, a period of routinization follows in which a more 
lasting authority arrangement solidifies (Glassman 1986, 
181). In short, manufactured charisma is a component of 
the legitimization process in which a constituency consents 
to be led (118). Thus, the leader appropriates the 
trappings of office to add to his or her influence.
Manufactured charisma is a fixture in the modern, 
mass-mediated world. Especially in America, leadership 
elites often utilize advertising techniques to package and 
sell an image. Leaders are promoted strategically. At 
pre-arranged, special events including news conferences, 
rallies, and parades, the "charismatic" are surrounded by 
impassioned symbols— flags, swastikas, red stars, or 
whatever is contextually appropriate. Within this carnival 
atmosphere, the leader finds him- or herself well prepared 
to play a scripted part. Speech instructors, speech 
writers, and special consultants all contribute to the 
creating of a formulated persona, a carefully crafted image 
which appears larger than life (Glassman 1986, 122). 
Lighting, camera angle, makeup, distance, stagecraft— all 
of these factors contribute to the production of modern, 
manufactured charisma (Bensman and Givant 1986, 50).
The study of charisma, both pure and manufactured, has 
been a fruitful endeavor. Given that charisma is driven,
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in part, by creative, or extra-rational modes of proof, it 
is a concept ripe for rhetorical examination. Many 
scholars, like sociologist Talcott Parsons, believe that 
charisma, when astutely used, can identify key 
characteristics of influential leaders. He notes, 
"Charisma is not a metaphysical construct, but an 
observable quality of men and things in relation to human 
acts and activities" (in Boss 1976, 313). As Weber 
originally envisioned the term, charisma has several key 
determinants. First, the charismatic leader must be 
recognized by a constituency. Second, the leader's 
followers must have an emotional stake in a communal 
relationship. Third, for the leader to lose charismatic 
power, his or her "god" or "heroic" power must also fail. 
Fourth, economic considerations have no bearing on 
charisma. And, fifth, charisma is a revolutionary force 
(in Boss 1976, 301). In a summary of research literature, 
Boss claims that from Weber's conception, three dimensions 
of charisma have emerged: 1) qualities or traits
characterizing the person him- or herself; 2) the 
observable influence on the "listener-followers"; and 3) 
the exigencies indicated in the specific socio-political 
situation (301).
While the critical use of charisma as a critical term 
has been productive, its study has its limits. Charisma, 
as studied currently, has become increasingly difficult to
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use as a productive concept. Charisma is a popular term 
and is, thus, diluted in meaning. Of course, the term 
carries its foundational meaning. Nevertheless, McCrosky 
and Young (1981) warn that the core meaning has been 
obscured with continued study (24). Also, Boss claims that 
the concept's overuse has promoted a thinning of the idea. 
He writes, "So vague indeed is the referent for 'charisma' 
that scholars in the field of rhetoric have had only 
minimal interest in the concept, content to allow the term 
to be subsumed under the general rubric of 'ethos,' or 
ethical proof” (Boss 1976, 300). Perhaps the time is ripe 
for scholarly vocabulary concerning rhetoric and revolution 
to venture beyond charisma and to include additional, 
complementary concepts.
The Psvcho-Analvtic Approach
Freud's influence is pervasive in academia, and the 
study of revolution is no exception. Appropriating Freud's 
insights, a number of scholars have suggested that 
revolutionary leadership is fueled by personality. That 
is, certain psychological dispositions motivate potential 
leaders to action during times of political activity and 
conflict. In addition to Freud's own works, the efforts of 
Harold D. Lasswell and Erik Erikson, to name a few, have 
been influential in applying and explaining Freud's 
theories in relation to revolutionaries.
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To appreciate the psycho-analytic approach to 
leadership, one must start with a look at Freud and his 
landmark psycho-biography of Woodrow Wilson. In it, one 
finds the main tenets of the Freudian approach to political 
activity as expressed by three axioms. Freud's first axiom 
holds that, from birth, all men possess libido, an energy 
derived from Eros. The second axiom maintains that all 
human beings are bisexual, and this results in mental 
conflict. Accordingly, the degree of masculinity obtained 
by adult men corresponds to their childhood experience and 
conditioning. And axiom three claims that an inherent 
"Death Instinct" clashes with one's Eros. The result is a 
smoldering, internal aggression which either waits for 
provocation, or is the drive behind personal motivations 
(in Hagopian 1974, 321).
This Freudian troika of postulates may also be 
described in terms of Ego, Superego, and Id. Representing 
one's "common sense," the Ego may come into conflict with 
one's Id, a reservoir of primal, libidinal urges. Between 
the Ego and Id is the Superego which is the realm of 
consciousness and conflict, the root of which is the 
Oedipus complex. As a male child matures, Freud claims 
that he develops love impulses toward his mother. The 
child's father, however, presents an obstacle to love 
impulses and, therefore, becomes the aim of aggression. 
Ironically, the father is also an object of affection. How
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the child settles this paradox heavily influences his 
subsequent psychic development (Freud and Bullitt 1967,
42). Assuming that people suffer inner turmoil over their 
repressed urges and find no resolution, Freud suggests that 
political behavior is frequently an externalization of 
sexually-oriented difficulties troubling a leader during 
his youth.
Surveying literature grounded in the Freudian 
perspective, Lasswell suggests that all psychoanalytic 
approaches to politics have three basic steps. First, 
researchers attempt to understand a leader's private 
motives for his or her political endeavors. Second, 
researchers examine how one's private motives are manifest 
in public life. That is, they see how private motives 
influence public decision making. And third, researchers 
attempt to discern how leaders rationalize their decisions 
in terms of the public interest. In light of this 
procedure, Lasswell concludes that many scholars view the 
"political personality" as enthralled with the accumulation 
and use of authority. This urge stems from the Oedipal 
complex and functions to overcome feelings of inadequacy 
and loss (in Hagopian 1974, 320).
The psycho-analytic perspective has been applied to a 
number of political leaders and revolutionaries. Examining 
Julius Caesar, Cromwell, Robespierre, Hitler, and Stalin, 
Bychowski's (1969) Dictators and Disciples represents an
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orthodox, Freudian analysis. In this work, Bychowski 
concludes that "the leader's fanaticism, will-to-power, and 
paranoic suspiciousness stem from his failure to cope with 
the traumas of childhood and adolescence" (245). 
Wolfenstein's (1971) The Revolutionary Personality is more 
innovative in that it is not limited to an analysis of 
childhood experiences. Rather, as he studies Lenin,
Trotsky and Ghandi, Wolfenstein also explores personality 
in relation to historical circumstances. For instance, he 
claims that the manifestation of a revolutionary 
personality is contingent upon historical factors including 
"an established revolutionary tradition" (Wolfenstein 1971, 
21). In alternative settings, the would-be leader of a 
revolution might assume the role of criminal, outcast, or 
social deviant as a surrogate for political activity (23).
In examining the findings of Wolfenstein and 
Bychowski, Hagopian (1974) summarizes several 
characteristics of the "revolutionary personality.” First, 
the leader tends to suffer from the trauma associated with 
the Oedipal complex, but more strongly than average for his 
social group or culture. Second, the leader endures the 
mental conflict by sublimating instinctive yearnings and 
aggressive drives though laboring for a cause or 
revolutionary movement. Through this substitution a 
rationalization occurs which justifies behavior in terms of 
a revolutionary ideology. Third, as the revolutionary
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process blossoms, the emerging leader unleashes animosity 
against leading members of the old regime. This action 
gains ideological sanction which appeases his superego.
And, fourth, the leader, following the appropriation of 
power, often displays fanaticism and acute suspicions that 
suggest neurotic tendencies with deep-seated origins in his 
character (Hagopian 1974, 327).
The psycho-analytic approach to revolutionary 
leadership is productive, but limiting. Bychowski, 
Wolfenstein, and Freud take an individually-oriented 
perspective to the study of revolution. Indeed, the 
private dispositions of any influential human being 
inevitably affect behavior and, consequently, decisions 
which impel others. In this light, as Wolfenstein notes, 
it is difficult to distinguish between the psychological 
and sociological. Nevertheless, the rhetorical perspective 
is concerned not with one's thought process. Rather, its 
emphasis is on public performance. Thus, while psycho­
analytic study of a leader's thoughts invite speculation 
about that which is ethereal and psychological, the 
rhetorical study of a leader's discourse invites 
consideration of the creation of a publicly-viewed image.
CONCLUSION
Little research concerning leadership exists that 
explores the relationship between rhetoric and revolution. 
Certainly, there are some genres of investigation that
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provide a framework for the study of leadership in the 
revolutionary setting. Nevertheless, these studies have 
shortcomings concerning the persuasive strategies of 
revolutionaries: social movement investigations could be
more exacting; charisma studies may be losing potency; and, 
with regard to a rhetorical perspective, the psycho­
analytic approach overemphasizes tacit, personal aspects of 
leaders. In this labyrinth of knowledge, a need exists to 
develop theories which more clearly examine rhetorical 
strategies utilized by leaders in the revolutionary 
context. Toward this end, the present study seeks to 
provide a bridge over the research gap through the 
utilization and modification of theory concerning 
rhetorical personae.
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHOD 
RHETORICAL PERSONAE 
To broaden our understanding of rhetoric in a 
revolutionary setting, this study investigates Yeltsin's 
personae. Put simply, a persona is a "role" one plays, a 
publicly-constructed impression of one's self. It is not a 
self in the psychological sense. Rather, an advocate's use 
of a persona reveals only a strategic facet of his or her 
character for the sake of advancing a persuasive message in 
a community. From the study of revolutions in science, 
Keith and Zagacki (1992) suggest three different, ethical 
opportunities for the rhetor-scientist seeking to promote 
innovation— the revolutionary, the conciliatory, and the 
conservative personae— which may prove serviceable in the 
political realm.
First, Keith and Zagacki describe the revolutionary 
persona which, of the three, is the most dauntless. In 
announcing revolutionary findings, some scientists 
unabashedly declare the significance of their work. Keith 
and Zagacki claim that this posture may assume one of two 
forms. In the first approach, the researcher is 
inadvertently compelled to seek revolution (Keith and 
Zagacki 1992, 64). Here, the scientist claims to be merely 
doing his or her job— conducting research, recording 
findings, and, when necessary, determining that data can
34
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not be explained with conventional inodes of 
interpretation.1
The alternative approach, the "scientist seeking 
revolution," is more blatantly radical. This kind of 
revolutionary stance emphasizes the need to actively seek 
out alternative means of inquiry. Even though a current 
paradigm may be sufficient to answer many research 
questions adequately, the scientist seeking revolution sees 
danger in contentment. Not to question underpinning 
assumptions regarding scientific methods is to dogmatically 
accept theories which might not be able to explain 
anomalies in research findings (65-6). The scientist 
seeking revolution plays the role of agitator and savors 
provocative confrontation.*
Second, Keith and Zagacki discuss the conciliatory 
persona.. Occasionally, a lengthy delay occurs between the 
time revolutionary ideas are presented and the time these 
ideas are seen in practice. During this postponement,
lTo explain this kind of "reluctant revolutionary," 
Keith and Zagacki use the example of chaos theorist Ralph 
Abraham who, like many chaos scientists, confronted stern 
opposition to his ideas. Yet, in the name of innovation and 
creativity in science, he brooked disagreement and continued 
to advance his theories (64-5). In short, he did not 
necessarily want to be revolutionary, but did so in the name 
of scientific idealism.
2For instance, paleontologists Niles Eldridge and Steven 
Gould aggressively attacked Darwinism's reliance on induction 
and in a 1972 paper advancing the theory of punctuated 
equilibria (66). When challenged with new interpretations, 
Darwinists dogmatically invoked conventional explanations 
(66).
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obstacles hinder revolutionary progress including 
skepticism in the scientific community and testing 
procedures for the new theories. Delays like these present 
weighty rhetorical repercussions for the scientists 
involved. The point here is that uncharitable responses to 
revolutionary ideas prompt the innovator to switch from a 
radical stance to one more conciliatory which appeases a 
scientific community's requirements of acceptability.3
Third, the conservative persona serves to guard the 
status quo of science. Revolutionary progress can be 
deterred by disbelief and animosity. When these conditions 
are present, eminent members of the established order are 
afforded significant influence. These scientists often 
adopt a conservative persona which upholds the scientific 
community's prevailing methods and theories (67).
According to Cohen, new ideas in science tend to face 
resistance because every successful researcher and teacher 
has a discernable interest— intellectual, social, or 
economic— in maintaining theoretical stability. Further, 
Cohen writes, "If every revolutionary idea were 
welcomed...utter chaos would result" (in Keith and Zagacki
3For instance, initially, Newton faced stern resistance 
to his Qpticks. Consequently, he had to reframe his 
assertions in terms more agreeable to his colleagues. As 
Gross explains, Newton "employed a Euclidean arrangement to 
create an impression of historical continuity and logical 
inevitability" (in Keith and Zagacki 1992, 67). In the 
spirit of conventionality, Newton conducted an extensive 
number of experiments, piling detail on detail, to create a 
sense of need for innovation.
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1992, 67—8). When theories fail to demonstrate the 
validity necessary for acceptance, the conservative persona 
is employed to promote rigor and defend the reigning 
paradigm.4
Keith and Zagacki's concepts explain rhetorical 
personae well conceptually, but require further operational 
description. While no one has outlined in detail the forms 
these personae might take, a sound approximation may be 
produced by drawing further thoughts from political theory. 
On the use of a revolutionary persona, one might speculate 
that a radical uses idealistic reasoning and harsh 
commentary to debunk the status quo. Robespierre 
recognizes that revolutionaries seek to dethrone a 
prevailing, constitutional government and install a new 
administration. In this process, radicals appeal to public 
liberty rather than to traditional dogma (in Palmer 1970, 
267). That is, they base their arguments for 
transformation in utopian principles and optimistic visions 
of the future. To encourage such visions and to instigate 
rapid advancement, Hagopian (1974) claims that 
revolutionaries demean an established order's current
4 A helpful illustration of the conservative persona, as 
pointed out by Keith and Zagacki, involves the case of 
Velikovsky's radical cosmological physics and the stern 
critiques it faced. At an American Association for the 
Advancement of Science meeting in 1973, Velikovsky's system 
was mercilessly assailed. Six years after the meeting, 
astrophysicist Robert Jastrow commented that only three of 
Velikovsky's ten predictions were corroborated, the others 
were contradicted (68).
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condition. Hagopian states that revolutionary ideology and 
conduct is "hostile" to aspects of an antiquated regime and 
"willing to invoke the maxim that the end justifies the 
means" (201).
While the revolutionary seeks brisk transformation, 
those using a moderate, conciliatory persona, promote 
measured reform and demonstrate some degree of deference 
for the status quo. Thus, we might speculate that a 
conciliator uses appeals to an existing rule of law and 
invites predominant leaders of a reigning paradigm to join 
in a reform movement. According to the Edwards-Brinton 
model of revolution, moderates want to change fewer things 
than radicals and are satisfied with modifications grounded 
in an established political system (in Hagopian 1974, 195). 
Apparently, moderates wish to avoid the turmoil associated 
with revolution. However, they do act recklessly in some 
cases to coax change, as evidenced by the stifling of the 
Paris Commune in 1871. All perspectives considered, a 
moderate revolution might be best described as, in Pettee's 
(1938) words, "anarchy thinly covered by legal continuity" 
(106). Thus, the use of a conciliatory persona may entail 
extra-legal appeals to an existing system of legality; to a 
need to embrace change; and to a need for certain, unified 
progress.
Finally, the conservative avoids revolution and reform 
by appealing to the need for constancy. Thus, the style of
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reasoning associated with a conservative persona is likely
marked by a lack of inferential leaps. Conservatives serve
as guardians of a status quo's ruling class. As defined by
Dorso, a ruling class is composed of the "organized power
that has the political, intellectual, and material
leadership of society" which seeks to maintain order (in
Hagopian 1974, 93). Upholding this order is an eminent
concern, as inventive, hasty change is almost unthinkable
without some kind of coercive or authoritarian reaction
from the state.
The intermingling of theories from science and
politics seems, at first, dubious, but it is reasonable.
In Revolutions in Science. Cohen (1985) relates the two.
He notes that political and scientific revolutions differ
conspicuously in that the goals of political revolution are
more well defined than those of scientific revolutions. In
science, the aim of revolution is to perpetuate further
revolutions in a quest for empirical truths. Political
revolutions, however, seek a goal which is more limited—
the establishment of an innovative institutional order
(Cohen 1985, 14-16). Despite this important distinction,
the two possess similar characteristics. Cohen writes:
Political theories and events that involve rapid 
change in the social structure have had a pervasive 
influence on concepts of scientific revolution since 
the seventeenth century. Therefore we might 
profitably ask which specific features of political 
revolutions (and theories about them) have been 
incorporated into the concept of scientific 
revolution....A comparison of the two types of
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revolution reveals a closer degree of concordance than
might at first be imagined (Cohen 1985, 7).
This parallel between kinds of revolution is evident in 
Cohen's definition of revolution. As noted previously, 
revolution is characterized by newness and conversion. 
Newness refers to the elements of change inherent in a 
paradigm shift and conversion refers to the change involved 
in practice. Conversion is am intricate process. Cohen 
notes that in the scientific community, the publication 
standards, the educational order, and the positions of 
power must all be affected for conversion to prevail (11). 
Put succinctly, the successful revolution must eventually 
become institutionalized.
To explain the end goal of revolution, a consideration 
of rhetoric is required as both newness and conversion 
require persuasion. People must be convinced not only to 
abandon the familiar, but to embrace a future as conceived 
by revolutionary leadership. In terms of how innovative 
research is presented to an established, scientific 
community, a strong link connects the ideas of personae and 
of research breakthroughs. New discoveries often leave 
scientists facing technical uncertainties and questions 
concerning how unprecedented findings might be reconciled 
in light of previous, guiding studies. When this 
apprehension occurs, the innovator must decide what his or 
her stance will be in relation to unprecedented facts. In 
other words, scientists must summon and ethically promote
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particular topoi which confirm or deny the significance of 
their discovery. If Cohen's analogy is fruitful, Keith and 
Zagacki's personae may be productive in exploring the realm 
of political revolution. To more fully develop this 
contention, a more complete understanding of persona is 
necessary.
PERSONA
In the rhetorical context, persona deals with one's 
creation of a credible public image and draws a distinction 
between the speaker as a person and the speaker as a 
perceived source of persuasion. Harrell, Ware, and 
Linkugel (1974) describe persona as "not the person, but 
father [it] is the auditor's symbolic construction (and 
implied assessment) of the person" (251). This symbolic 
construction of the rhetor's image is a convergence of 
personal, ideological, and structural legitimacy variables 
which lend persuasive impact to the perceived credibility 
of a speaker.
The idea of the persona is typically familiar to 
students of literature and theater, in these contexts, 
dramatis personae refer to an implied voice or a fictive 
being suggested in a text (Campbell 1975, 391). Finding 
this textually embedded expression characteristically 
requires a careful reading of the given work in conjunction 
with knowledge regarding the author's intent or 
circumstances. in drama, actors who represent characters
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replace the playwrite's direct representation of persona 
with performative interpretation. As it is mediated to an 
audience, persona becomes self interpreting. Regardless of 
whether an author masks him- or herself with persona in 
lines on stage or words on the page, the auditor sees the 
narrativity. That is, the listener is aware that the words 
of the story belong to an identifiable author telling a 
story (Lyons 1985, 1).
Until several decades ago, Campbell (1975) claimed, 
the concept of persona was used sparingly by rhetorical 
scholars. In developing this claim, Campbell wrote,
"...perhaps it is so easy to assume that an essay or 
article or speech reflects an actual human being" (Campbell 
1975, 391). Such a position holds precedent in rhetoric's 
classical tradition. In ancient Greece, many pre- 
Aristotelian scholars and teachers of rhetoric assumed that 
the character of a speaker directly reflected his private 
character. Isocrates, for instance, claimed that "the 
power to speak well is taken as the surest index of a sound 
understanding, and discourse which is true and lawful and 
just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul" (in 
Baumlim 1994, xv). Also, ancient Roman theorists promoted 
the importance of a "good and faithful soul." Quintilian 
believed that the noteworthy orator is the "good man 
skilled in speaking well." According to Quintilian, a 
speaker's image was a product of rhetorical competence and
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the cultivation of an observable "essence" or "inner self" 
which was formed prior to a speech. Aristotle, however, 
challenged the notion of representational ethos.
Aristotle avoids placing ethos in the realm of 
representing actuality, as he emphasizes the importance of 
influencing audience perception. He argues that the speech 
itself is the only source of ethos because very few 
speakers would be well known enough prior to a speech to 
provide any basis for antecedent ethos. Thus, credibility 
must be negotiated at the time of a speech. In his 
Rhetoric. Aristotle claims that "trust [in a speaker's 
credibility] should be created by the speech itself and not 
left to depend upon an antecedent impression that the 
speaker is this or that kind of man" (1356a). Put 
differently, Aristotle believes that ethos should not be 
left to chance, assuming that the audience will be able to 
discern one "essential" self of a speaker. Instead, it 
should be negotiated at the time of the speech to optimize 
persuasive impact of a message. Thus, in Aristotle's 
words, "it helps a speaker to convince us, if we believe 
that he has certain qualities himself, namely, goodness, or 
good will towards us, or both together" (1366b). For 
rhetorical purposes, Aristotle might say it is not 
necessarily important for a speaker to be a good person. 
Instead, he might say the appearance as a good person is 
persuasive.
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This Aristotelian distinction between the public and 
private image of a speaker provides the foundation of 
persona, but with important differences. These differences 
rest with assumptions about audience. On this subject, 
Aristotle's suppositions were based on ideas concerning 
Athenian citizenship. As noted by Sproule (1988), the 
Athenian audience was an elite group with typically 
homogenous interests— its own well being. He writes in 
that Athens, the most democratic city state in ancient 
Greece, "the relevant political audience comprised only 
native, freebom males, approximately fifteen percent of 
the adult population" (Sproule 1988, 470-1). In such a 
limited venue, it is difficult to hypothesize that 
Aristotle's notions of rhetoric might be aimed at 
influencing a heterogeneous social mass.
The idea of persona makes the transition from focus on 
the classical, elite audience to the heterogeneity of the 
contemporary crowd. While classical rhetoric was idea 
centered, contemporary rhetoric in the mass-mediated age 
concerns itself more with conveying pre-packaged ideology—  
an "image" orientation. Again, Sproule notes that along 
with this image orientation, the importance of 
interpersonal attraction and social influence increases. 
Consequently, the contemporary audience expects "pseudo­
intimacy" from spokespeople wielding institutional 
sanction. Concerns regarding competence, character, and
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motive have been replaced by standards which appraise 
entertainment value (473). In light of this condition, 
Black (1970) remarks that the idealism of Aristotelian 
discourse is supplanted. Therefore, "We are more 
skeptical about the veracity of representation; we are more 
conscious that there may be disparity between the man and 
his image" (Black 1970, 111).
Persona accounts for this disparity and is concerned 
with the idea of a rhetor playing a rhetorical role. This 
idea of rhetorical role playing is appealing to the likes 
of Hart (1990) who sees the limitations of attempting to 
discern a speaker's "true" character. He writes that too 
often "critics become amateur psychoanalysts, searching for 
a speaker's psyche within the metaphors he or she uses.
This is a hazardous and unproductive game" (Hart 1990,
274). That is, Hart would question the benefit of 
understanding the soul of the speaker. The soul of the 
speaker does not have an impact on an audience. Rather, 
the representation of that soul persuades. Thus, Hart 
advocates understanding the verbal strategies that aid the 
construction of a "distinctive personal image" (272). 
Discerning this image might best be seen in Hillbrunner's 
(1974) definition of persona as the intersection of 
"signature"-*>the empirical characteristics of a speaker, 
and "archetype"— the deeply embedded worldview of a 
speaker.
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Signature concerns the choices made by and observable 
characteristics of a rhetor. Fielder describes signature 
as "the sum total of individuating factors in a work, the 
sign of Persona or Personality through which an archetype 
is rendered" (in Hillbrnner 1974, 171). This summation 
includes both personality as well as strategy. According 
to Hart (1990), everyone has a "personal rhetorical 
history" which includes, for example, a learned speech 
style and life experiences (273-4) Further, Burrchart 
(1985) claims discourse bears one's personal "rhetorical 
imprint," conscious choices made about the formation of 
rhetoric. Such choices include the invention of 
"arguments, ideas, themes, techniques, metaphors, images, 
stylistic devices, adaptation, ethos-building tactics, and 
so forth" (Burchardt 1985, 442). Certainly, a speaker is 
not free from restraints on what can be said, including 
social conventions and audience expectations, but in so far 
as free choice is possible, signature persists.
Archetype, however, seems to deal not with the 
observable, but rather with the tacit characteristics of a 
speaker which guide rhetorical decisions. According to 
Fielder, archetypes go "down through the personality of the 
poet, past his foibles and eccentricities to his 
unconscious core, where he becomes one with us all....In 
fantasy and terror we can return to our common source" (in 
Hillbrunner 1974, 172). With Fielder's thoughts in mind,
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it: might: be said that: archetype deals with a speaker's
values or worldview. This position seems to make the
assumption that there is some kind of "a priori place"
which is an issue more philosophical than rhetorical. But,
in dealing with this issue, Edwin Black implicitly
disregards the philosophical in favor of the rhetorical.
In his noteworthy article, "The Second Persona," he argues:
The critic can see in the auditor implied by a 
discourse a model of what the rhetor would have his 
real auditor become. What the critic can find 
projected by the discourse is the image of a man, and
though that man may never find actual embodiment, it 
is still a mem that the image is of (Black 1970, 113).
Thus, a critic can only speculate about an "inner" man in
relation to what is said as based in public discourse.
In short, performing persona is like playing a
dramatic role. A script is given which includes a social
"director's" expectations— ideology, culture, role
constraints and the like. At the same time, the rhetor's
character and personal choice inevitably shine through. In
part, persona concerns the relationship between human
character and discourse as it meets with audience
expectation. It is "the complex of verbal features that
makes one person sound different from smother" (Hart 1990,
272-3). Hart claims that persona rests between one's
personality and social expectations, maintaining social
obligations influence discourse, and one's individualized
image also helps to create rhetorical limitations and
possibilities (273).
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APPLICATION
Given the preceding commentary about the relationship 
between science and personae, one can see the importance of 
rhetoric in the "doing" of science. Paradigms guide 
behavior. They influence the way scientists conduct 
research, they influence what is seen as conventional 
research findings, and they influence how findings are 
presented. If science is rule governed, one must be able 
to perform and behave in socially allowable ways to be 
accepted as a member of the given scientific community. 
Bronowski claims that science depends on ethics and on 
"mutual trust on the work of other scientists..." (in 
Campbell 1975, 393). This is the case because research 
extends previous research. Thus, science is rhetorical in 
that it explicitly encourages practitioners to exercise 
specific behaviors and attitudes so that everyone might 
work in conjunction to preserve a given scientific 
community. Violations of these norms, including 
revolutionary activity, is seen as unethical.
The same is true in the political realm. As 
dramatized in Machiavelli's The Prince, certain behaviors 
become acceptable according to customs, and violations of 
these customs is seen as unethical. In this work, 
Machiavelli separates the difficulties associated with 
acquiring a state from difficulties associated with 
preserving one (Garver 1990, 191). This distinction
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connects the preservation of a state, the established 
paradigm, with standardized politics and ethics. The rise 
of a new prince seeking to claim the state for his own 
would most likely be seen as unethical, self interested, 
and fraudulent as he operates outside of accepted modes of 
behavior (190). Thus, the prince, much like the 
revolutionary scientist, must be strategic in forwarding 
his ideas to the "old" order.
In both revolutionary contexts, the political and the 
scientific, a rhetor may cloak his or her genuine 
orientations with a persona for the sake of influencing an 
audience. For instance, a legislator desires revolutionary 
change, but her peers in parliament and her constituency 
are nervous about radical reforms. Therefore, the 
legislator assumes the guise of a moderate. By utilizing a 
conciliatory persona, she seeks to avoid estranging her 
peers and to gradually build the public support necessary 
to effectively legislate change. That is, the legislator 
in this hypothetical example is politically radical but 
rhetorically conciliatory. The point here is that one's 
ultimate political goals and rhetorical strategies may 
appear, at times, disparate.
Similarly, Boris Yeltsin pursued radical change in the 
face of conservative opposition from communists. However, 
despite his revolutionary aspirations, Yeltsin occasionally 
utilized conservative and conciliatory personae.
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To address this seemingly paradoxical condition, one
must consider the rhetorical predicaments in which he
functioned because personae respond to circumstance. Put
differently, rhetoric is situational. According to Bitzer
(1968), discourse depends upon recognizing the "context of
meaning in which the speech is located" (3). From this
perspective, Bitzer develops his notion of the "rhetorical
situation." In defining this concept, Bitzer writes:
Let us regard the rhetorical situation as a natural 
context of persons, events, objects, relations, and an 
exigence which strongly invites utterance; this 
invited utterance participates naturally in the 
situation, is in many instances necessary to the 
completion of situational activity, and by means of 
its participation with situation obtains its meaning 
and rhetorical character (5).
In light of Bitzer's view, to claim that rhetoric is
situational means that discourse emerges in response to an
exigence which demands resolution. Therefore, to
understand the personae utilized by Yeltsin in his
revolutionary endeavor, an examination of the major
exigencies he faced is required. During his rise to and
routinization of power, Yeltsin managed four major
situations.
The first exigence examined by the present study is 
perestroika. In a sense, perestroika marked the beginning 
of the end for the Soviet Union and the communist party.
As originally conceived by the Kremlin's inner circle, 
perestroika was meant to be a return to a kind of Leninism 
which promoted empowerment of the people. "Democratic"
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reforms emerged that limited the authority of state and 
communist officials (Hoses 1989, 236). Replacing control 
by state-sanctioned officials included an increase in the 
power of local soviets. Rather than promote solidarity in 
the Soviet Union, however, the seeds of fragmentation were 
planted. G1asnost-induced criticisms became more manifest. 
Thus, the regime was being discredited, giving Yeltsin an 
opportunity to assert his influence. As a member of the 
party machine, how did he accomplish this without getting 
thrown into jail or worse? What kind of persona (e) allowed 
him to succeed during the revolution's incubation?
The second exigency examined concerns the end of 
progressive perestroika. In 1989, Gorbachev's reform 
effort became increasingly difficult to maintain. Because 
of economic disorientation, labor strikes, and ethnic 
unrest in the republics, the General Secretary could not 
permit the continuance of decentralization without risking 
loss of the party's prominence in the Soviet system. 
However, the newly-formed Congress of Peoples' Deputies 
gave voice to dissent. In this popularly-elected 
parliament, Yeltsin expressed his disapproval of 
Gorbachev's lethargic policy making and called for reform. 
How could he do this without reproach?
In the summer of 1991, a third exigence developed, as 
the Russian presidential elections were held. After the 
massacre in Vilnius, Lithuania earlier in 1991, Yeltsin
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determined that he could no longer work with Gorbachev. 
Thus, in the election race and during his first months in 
the presidential post, Yeltsin pushed for change. He 
openly advocated taking political power away from the 
Soviet government and transferring it to the republics' 
governments. Championing such an innovation took courage 
and savvy. Can the application of rhetorical theory help 
explain Yeltsin's strategy?
The fourth exigence examined concerns the demise of 
the communist party following the coup of 1991. During 
August of that year, reactionary elements of the party 
launched an inept conspiracy against Gorbachev. Kryuchkov, 
Pugo, Yazov, Pavlov, Shenin, Baklanov, Boldin— all of these 
men believed that Gorbachev was incapable of leading the 
Soviet Union from the brink of collapse, so they forcibly 
relieved him of duty (Remnick 1994, 450). Importantly, the 
end of Gorbachev was intertwined with the end of communism. 
In the wake of Gorbachev's absence, no one in the communist 
party picked up the reins of leadership. Chaos might have 
surely erupted, but Yeltsin, reigning president of the 
Russian Federation, took charge. On August 23, at a 
boisterous session of the Russian parliament, Yeltsin 
issued a fateful decree: the communist party's activities
in Russia were suspended.
To examine these exigencies and forward this study's 
contentions, I scrutinize a number a rhetorical artifacts.
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Yeltsin's own books including The Struggle for Russia and 
Against the Grain, while personal and reflective, will 
contribute insight into the dilemmas he faced in his rise 
to power. And, more importantly, internet resources and 
international news monitoring agencies provide a wealth of 
public speech texts from which evidence can be drawn. With 
these resources, I examine each exigence mentioned above in 
chapters three, four, five, and six. In chapter seven, the 
conclusion, I hope to fuse together results from preceding 
chapters and successfully support my argument that the 
creation and use of personae is an influential factor 
during revolutionary crises.
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CHAPTER 3 
YELTSIN AND EARLY PERESTROIKA 
INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines Yeltsin's early career in Moscow 
in relation to the exigence presented by perestroika 
between 1985 and 1989. These were foundational years for 
Yeltsin upon which the stability of his future political 
career in post-Soviet Russia would be built. During this 
time, Yeltsin employed a revolutionary persona, but was 
forced to adjust and adopt a more conservative one. When 
Yeltsin first arrived in Moscow, he was a proverbial bull 
in a china shop. Reckless, blunt, confrontational— he 
dared to assault the conventions of political conduct of 
Moscow's political culture. In 1986, as the novice leader 
of Moscow city's party apparatus, he gave several key 
speeches which unabashedly violated the conventional 
sensibilities of public address in the Soviet Union.1 His 
brashness reached its apex in 1987 when he accused the 
party of indulging in self-appeasing, cult-like reverence 
of its leadership. Simultaneously, he threatened to resign 
from his position as a candidate member of the Politburo. 
Because of this effrontery, Yeltsin was banished from the 
party's top council and lost his position as party leader
1Rhetoric in Soviet government was remarkably 
ceremonial. For example, in a special to the New York Times. 
Schmemann (1986) noted that deliberation at the Twenty- 
seventh Party Congress in 1986 was marked by characteristic 
"ritualized unanimity" and caution.
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in Moscow. Yeltsin might have fallen to the depths of 
political obscurity if he was banned from the party and, 
importantly, if he had not adopted a new rhetorically 
conservative stance toward General Secretary Gorbachev.
This stance was necessary until Yeltsin could attain a new 
power base outside of the party, a feat accomplished at the 
first Congress of People's Deputies of 1989. At the 
Congress of People's Deputies, he won the popular mandate 
of the voting public.
In the first section of this chapter, I examine 
Yeltsin's speeches during his first two years in Moscow as 
he assumed a revolutionary persona. Also, the first 
section frames Yeltsin's rhetoric in the context of Soviet 
political culture. In the second section, I examine the 
party's backlash against Yeltsin's revolutionary stance 
after his unprecedented speech to the 1987 Plenum of the 
CPSU Central Committee. Finally, in the third section, I 
explore how Yeltsin maintained his reformist intentions, 
but with a different mode of presentation, a more 
conservative persona.
A POLITICIAN WITHOUT TACT
Soon after Gorbachev became general secretary of the 
party in 1985, he initiated his bold and controversial 
reform program, perestroika. Calling it a "revolution 
within a revolution," perestroika was designed to add 
greater responsiveness to a failing Soviet economy and
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political system through glasnost, democratization, and 
limited marketization (Sakwa 1993, 1). At the same time, 
however, Gorbachev resolved to preserve the party's central 
role in the Soviet political machine. Initially, the plan 
appeared promising, but it was faced with influential 
resistance. Behind the Soviet Union's curtain of Marxist 
idealism, the levers of power were pulled by members of a 
social class referred to as the nomenklatura. Understanding 
this influential group in the USSR is essential for 
appreciating the defiance Yeltsin would confront in Moscow.
The term nomenklatura refers to a privileged class in 
Soviet society which tacitly ruled the nation without 
direct accountability to the public or to state sanction. 
The nomenklatura was a strata of society which sought its 
own perpetuation, and, before glasnost, its de facto power 
was never fully, officially recognized by the Soviet state. 
In a book on the subject, Nomenklatura. Voslensky (1984) 
points out that the term is noted in official Soviet 
literature, but only in benign ways. Prior to 1984, the 
term is not referred to by The Soviet Historical 
Encyclopedia or the Soviet Political Dictionary. One of 
the last editions of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia does 
define the word as a list, an index of names: "1. System
(totality) of technical terms and phrases used in a 
particular field of science, technology, etc.; 2. System 
of conventional signs that constitute power the most
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convenient way of designating certain things" (in voslensky 
1984, 1). Indeed, the denotative usage of nomenklatura 
relates to the idea of classification. However, the manner 
in which nomenklatura is officially defined fails to reveal 
its political nature and the stratification of the party's 
echelons. Though the general population knew the term 
well, the official lack of recognition appears strategic; 
it camouflaged the system of favoritism which controlled 
political appointments and other crucial civic functions in 
Soviet life.
In the USSR, the roots of the nomenklatura ran deep. 
Sakharov wrote that as early as the 1920s or 1930s, a 
distinguishable, party-bureaucratic stratum developed (in 
Voslensky 1984, 2). This class sought to maintain its 
status and the way of living which developed through an 
intricate system of patronage. Even before the 1920s, the 
nomenklatura's way of life was discernable during the age 
of tsars. Kennan (1986), in his article "Muscovite 
Political Folkways," suggests that the nomenklatura's sense 
of status quo, its protectionistic orientation, stems from 
old political traditions associated with the Muscovite 
principality. In this tradition, decision making was 
centralized in an oligarchical structure and was based on 
minimizing risks. For instance, if improvements in the 
group's way of life increased the risk of disaster, they 
were refused. In Kennan's (1986) words, "when faced with
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danger, the village [Moscow] would hunker down— or pick up 
and move on~rather than change time-tested ways" (125).
In Gorbachev's day, perestroika represented potential 
improvements. But, for the nomenklatura, perestroika stood 
as a threat to "time-tested ways" and their monopoly on 
power.
Gorbachev, however, wanted Russia's legacy of 
conservative self-interest expunged, and Yeltsin had a 
fitting resume for the job. Yeltsin's reputation for 
fighting corruption in his previous position was 
impressive. When he became party boss in the city of 
Sverdlovsk in the Urals, fighting perks and privileges was 
at the core of his reformist policy. According to Solovyov 
and Klepikova, Yeltsin perceived inequity in a socialist 
society in acute, personal terms. That is, Yeltsin 
believed that for a party leader to accept or insist on 
special privileges was an unpardonable disgrace, with this 
orientation toward exclusive benefits, Yeltsin once closed 
all specialty stores for party members in Sverdlovsk, 
though he did leave a special hospital alone for a time. 
Nonetheless, he insisted that the medical facility admit 
retirees and elderly citizens requiring special care 
(Solovyov and Klepikova 1992, 152). In short, many people 
in his region were impressed by the fact that a party boss 
could function so independently of ideological concerns; 
Yeltsin placed the interests of people above dogma.
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Given his attitude toward party privileges, the 
results of Yeltsin's move to Moscow were not entirely 
surprising. The party leadership sought security and 
insulation from social conditions. Yeltsin, however, 
sought reform in spite of "official" interests. Therefore, 
Gorbachev's recruitment of Yeltsin to Moscow was a 
dangerous proposition. Yeltsin was bound to face 
resistance. His self-proclaimed reputation as a fighter 
for "social justice" boasted a lust for "doing the right 
thing" rather than protecting the well-being of the 
politically and economically powerful. Thus, those opposed 
to Yeltsin saw him as irreverent and politically immature, 
labels not surprising as he imported his provincial 
leadership style from the Urals to the capital city of 
Moscow. A major part of his provocation of the party 
machine can be found in his reform policies and, 
importantly for my purposes here, the speeches he 
delivered.
Soon after his arrival in Moscow, Yeltsin began a 
campaign against waste and corruption that enraged orthodox 
party members and many leading citizens. For instance, 
Yeltsin initiated "Sanitary Fridays" which took idle white- 
collar workers from behind their desks and placed them, 
broom in hand, on the streets one day a week. Despite 
howling criticism, he insisted on meeting civic needs, 
citing a serious shortage of street sweepers and an
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abundance of managers and paper pushers (Solovyov and 
Klepikova 1992, 56). By initiating this program and others 
like it, Yeltsin rejected Moscow's traditional rules of 
social hierarchy. In place of these rules, he borrowed 
principles learned in the Urals. There, as opposed to 
Moscow, ideals were more pragmatic than dogmatic and the 
gulf between rulers and the people was less wide.
His policy of "Sanitary Fridays" is representative of 
Yeltsin's administrative style and hints at the nature of 
his revolutionary persona. During his first year of tenure 
as Moscow city boss, Yeltsin made two major speeches that 
would demarcate his rhetorical stance. Given only three 
months after taking office in Moscow, the first was an 
address to Moscow propaganda employees in the spring of 
1986. The second was given later in the year to the 
Seventeenth Party Congress, a bold speech that nearly led 
to the end of his political career.
In his first major speech of 1986, Yeltsin spoke about 
two themes, the practice of Moscow party officials down 
playing widespread problems and the interests of common 
people in the USSR. On the matter of whitewashing, Yeltsin 
frankly accused the city's leadership of valuing Moscow's 
image above solving problems. Rather than engaging in 
"window dressing," Yeltsin argued that they should more 
openly admit the city's difficulties and actively seek 
solutions. To support his contentions, Yeltsin
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categorically addressed Moscow's woes. For instance,
Yeltsin marveled at the fact that in a city of 8.7 million
people, 2.5 million lacked adequate housing. On the issue
of historical sites, Yeltsin quoted figures showing that
since 1935, 2,200 architectural monuments were destroyed
and many others required restoration. And speaking about
city transit, Yeltsin noted that, "Sixty kilometers of
subway lines need to be built [and]....[I]n 1985 for the
first time the subway operated in the red” (in Solovyov and
Klepikova 1992, 37-8).
Capsulating his points, Yeltsin spotlighted the heart
of his contention. He claimed that city officials
intentionally overlooked Moscow's evident problems:
We're getting too conservative here, city authorities 
were pulling the wool over people's eyes:
'everything's fine, we're the best in the world, let's 
not advertise our dirty laundry to the world.'
Whoever still feels this way should clear out his desk 
and leave. The City Council is nothing but red tape 
(in Solovyov and Klepikova 1992, 38).
Yeltsin's persona here, while stern, was measured. That
is, he declined to advocate the overthrow of whole
institutions as a pure, radical revolutionary might.
However, he fully advocated comprehensive change in the way
institutions carried out their business.
After taking his jabs at the party elite, Yeltsin
engaged in something characteristic of many of his public
presentations— he participated in a question and answer
session. Following his speech, Yeltsin replied to most of
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the 300 unedited, written questions presented by the 
audience. These notes were of two sorts. One kind 
concerned practical matters. For instance, one message 
addressed the issue of Moscow party officials' privileges 
and asked if Yeltsin understood the needs of common 
citizens. Yeltsin's reply included an account of a recent 
conversation he had with a young, female shop clerk. This 
woman, Yeltsin explained, told him of the system of 
kickbacks for the benefit of Moscow's privileged class 
operating in the trade network. Summarizing his view of 
corruption in Moscow, Yeltsin declared, "He dig and dig, 
and the bottom of the filthy well is still not visible..." 
(in Tucker 1987, 162-3).
The other kind of note concerned Yeltsin's personal 
ambitions and desire for change. One note read, "You have 
Napoleonic plans; what do you think you're up to?
Gorbachev simply needed his own man [to implement 
controversial reforms]. Go back to Sverdlovsk before it's 
too late!" Another stated, "Khrushchev already tried to 
make ordinary laborers out of us. He won't succeed and you 
won't either. He've stolen in the past and we'll steal in 
the future." To such statements, Yeltsin replied calmly 
and with words to inspire betterment through cooperation: 
"Comrades, we can only break this circle by our common 
efforts” (in Tucker 1987, 162). Evidently, the voice of 
the nomenklatura, set and comfortable in its ways, spoke
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through these nemos to discourage Yeltsin's efforts. 
Yeltsin, however, would not be easily dissuaded.
The tone of Yeltsin's speech and accompanying question 
and answer session represents the use of a revolutionary 
persona.. More concerned with reform and breaking with the 
past than protocol, Yeltsin dared to address issues 
traditionally hushed by party and state officials. For 
instance, the question and answer format, a favorite of 
Yeltsin's, made him seem more accessible and genuine to the 
"ordinary" citizen. While this approach increased 
identification with the general populace, it chagrined 
party officials who were eager to maintain their status 
quo. Further, Yeltsin's demand that party and city 
officials disclose and openly discuss the state of affairs 
in the USSR was truly revolutionary. Publicly, Yeltsin's 
forthrightness earned him the reputation as a populist. In 
influential communist circles, however, he became known as 
a maverick.
In his address at the Seventeenth Party Congress, 
Yeltsin also assumed a revolutionary stance to combat the 
practices of the CPSU and Soviet government. This speech 
occurred against the backdrop of a stunning Pravda article. 
Its title boldly revealed the copy's nature: "The
Cleansing. The Candor Talk." In this article, the party 
bureaucracy was attacked, a feat unimaginable during the 
Brezhnev era. The author accused the party of many
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cardinal sins including engaging in illegal activities,
negotiating unofficial pardons from judicial officers, and
enjoying undue social privileges (Shlapentokh 1988, 10-11).
This article was, a few days later at the seventeenth
congress, a central topic of debate (Tucker 1987, 160).
Prompted by this article, Yeltsin addressed similar issues.
In the speech, Yeltsin was blunt in his accusations
against apathy in the party. He implored the audience to
consider the repercussions of indifference in the realm of
social concerns:
Why has the obviously alien word 'stagnation' appeared 
in our party lexicon? Why for so many years have we 
failed to extirpate bureaucratism, social injustice 
and abuses from our life. Why even now does the 
demand for radical changes sink into an inert stratum 
of time-servers with party cards? in my view, a main 
reason is that some party leaders lack the courage to 
assess the situation and their own role objectively 
and in good time, to speak the truth, even if bitter, 
but the truth, to view each issue or action, their 
own, a work colleague's or higher leaders, not in 
terms of one's interest at the moment but politically 
(in Tucker 1987, 160)?
From members of his audience, murmurs arose which expressed
surprise and, from hard-line party members, outward
hostility. "Extirpate," "demand," "radical change," "lack
the courage"— these were words of revolutionary
transformation. In this speech, Yeltsin's persona was
obviously indifferent to the conventions of silence
concerning the inner workings of the party. To criticize
the party of "stagnation" was tantamount to
indicting its members of negligence and incompetence.
I
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Clearly, Yeltsin spoke as if he desired dramatic change for 
the party and the Soviet system of government.
Paralleling the Pravda article, Yeltsin echoed the 
newspaper's concerns, he but went further. Both the paper 
and the speech accused the party of stagnation, but Yeltsin 
did something never done before by a major player in the 
party. He denounced the party for its indulgence in the 
"cult of leadership," the party's excessive deference for 
its commanders. To add further insult to the party, he 
continued by attacking the social favoritism propagated by 
the privileges offered to party elites. Yeltsin demanded 
the elimination of all unjustified advantages of communist 
party leaders at all levels of government (Shlapentokh 
1988, 14).
To understand the reaction to Yeltsin's persona at 
this time, one must know about the political culture of the 
USSR. In the context of Soviet political culture, a myriad 
of tacit rules guided discourse and conduct. This 
conformity is well capsulated by an anecdote about two 
beggars gathering on street corner. As they sit, a third 
beggar arrives and begins playing a harmonica for alms. 
Aggravated, one of the beggars walks over to the third and 
begins hitting him on the head saying, "You can't do that, 
you have to beg the same way the rest of us do!" The 
would-be musician puts his harmonica away, apologizing 
excessively (in Rancour-Laferriere 1995, 207).
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This story embodies a typical pattern in Soviet 
politics, conformity over progress and efficiency, which 
has deep roots in Russo-Soviet political culture. Tucker 
(1987) defines political culture as everything in a 
society's way of life germane to government and politics 
(viii). This way of life, he argues, has deep roots in a 
nation's traditions, and Russia is no exception. Tucker 
writes that communism, in some ways, perpetuated Russia's 
pre-existing cultural ethos. This ethos, according to 
Kennan (1986), included a silent yet influential ruling 
oligarchy. The implication of Tucker's and Kennan's 
contentions is that the Soviet Union borrowed, in some 
form, the unique, oligarchical form of politics that 
influenced imperial Russia's governance.
The result of such leadership was a special kind of 
informal conformity which placed restrictions on political 
behavior and discourse. Gill (1985) claimed that four 
types of rules were observed in Soviet political culture: 
formal rules that served to produce a perception of 
legitimacy rather them to organization political 
proceedings; formal rules that were inflexible principles, 
always followed regardless of the situation; formal rules 
that were followed in some situations; and conventions, or 
informal principles, which were "only weakly reflected in 
formal rules, but which gain their real force through 
constant application" (214). The aggregate of explicit and
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implicit rules in the Soviet Union produced a unique system 
of political rationality.
Knowledge of the conventions of the Soviet system was 
essential for promoting outcomes acceptable to the party 
elites. Put differently, only those who played by the 
"rules of the game" survived in Soviet politics. The 
routinized practice of political conventions in the Soviet 
Union created an environment in which party sanction was 
essential for one's political career. Even in remote ends 
of republics, Moscow sent special appointees to represent 
the party's interests in the affairs of local governments. 
Thus, many political figures were under the watchful eye of 
the CPSU (Gill 1985, 217). In fact, all nomenklatura 
positions were controlled by the appropriate party 
committee. Because the central apparatus had so much 
authority, conformity stood above the need to be 
forthright, innovative, and outspoken. Thus, 
traditionally, those who spoke out were frequently 
disciplined.
For example, Khrushchev once tried to initiate change 
by bypassing the conventions of the Soviet decision making 
process. Once in command of the state, Khrushchev's style 
of leadership frequently pre-empted the "rules of the 
game." Occasionally, he announced policy decisions 
directly to the public or the Central Committee without 
first consulting the party's senior leaders. By inviting
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popular participation, Khrushchev effectively undermined 
the significance and competence of assorted institutional 
parts, both formal and informal, of the system. Further, 
without consideration of institutional sensitivities, he 
sought advice outside of the normal channels of 
consultation with favored advisors. For a time, Khrushchev 
engaged in this method unopposed because he had adequate 
support in the party machine to emancipate himself from the 
requirements of cooperative leadership (Gill 1985, 221).
Nevertheless, Khrushchev's independence from Soviet 
conventions and rules eventually worked against him. When
his reforms and policies fell apart, no institutional
protection, formal or informal, stood to shield him from 
his detractors. This, too, would be the case for Yeltsin. 
For a time, the party endured Gorbachev's apprentice.
However, in 1987, the party, as well as Gorbachev himself,
decided to stand firm against Yeltsin, the political 
maverick.
YELTSIN'S FALL
October 21, 1987 emerged as a pivotal moment in 
Yeltsin's career and the course of Soviet history. On this 
day, Yeltsin presented an ill-prepared, four-minute speech 
that would elicit the party's wrath. In Stalin's era, 
Yeltsin's discourse on this day would have resulted in his 
death. Instead, he faced a kind of civic execution in 
which he was humiliated by the party, stripped of
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privileges, and suffered a significant loss of official 
authority. From the perspective of conservatives, perhaps 
the party should have arranged his execution. Out of the 
compost of his decline, Yeltsin's influence among Russia's 
citizens grew stronger than ever.
Yeltsin's 1987 speech marks the same kind of unabashed 
revolutionary persona witnessed throughout 1986. In his 
address, he attacks the practices of the party. 
Specifically, he criticizes the slow pace of perestroika 
and its impact on public sentiment. Further, Yeltsin makes 
the dangerous decision to attack the tacit system by which 
the inner workings of the party operate. Put differently, 
he bemoans the party's concentration of power in its upper 
echelons and its inability to discuss new and innovative 
ideas.
But what makes this speech different than any of his 
previous discourse during 1986? In this speech, he asks 
the party to accept his criticism or accept his resignation 
as Moscow party chief and Politburo candidate. This bold 
demand represents an unprecedented and dangerous move in 
that right-wing forces in the party were looking for any 
excuse to be rid of this bothersome reformer. This speech 
provides conservatives with such an opportunity. Further, 
it would eventually mark Yeltsin's retreat from a 
revolutionary to a conservative persona. To develop this
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contention, let us examine the speech itself and the 
details of its aftermath.
To describe the context in which Yeltsin's speech was 
made, it should be noted that he was not officially 
scheduled to speak. The keynote concern of the Plenum of 
the Central Committee on October 21 was a review of
Gorbachev's commemoration speech of the seventieth
anniversary of the revolution. In it, Gorbachev planned a 
delicate foray into the reappraisal of Soviet history and 
perestroika's standing in that history. Before his 
presentation, Gorbachev distributed a 15-page outline of 
his speech for the audience's consideration. After 
speaking for nearly two hours, Gorbachev faced no comments 
or questions, apparently by advanced agreement. Then, with 
the session drawing to a close, Yeltsin demanded to make a 
statement. Gorbachev hesitated at this unexpected request, 
but yielded the floor (Bialer 1988, 30).
As Yeltsin took the podium, he was tense. By some
accounts of the event, Yeltsin was not certain if he was 
going to speak until the moment he stepped up to face the 
crowd. Further, as Yeltsin would admit later, he felt ill 
at the time of the presentation. Nevertheless, he forged 
ahead, presenting a personal speech which was, at times, 
disheveled and bitter. In his oration, he addressed two 
general themes: the pace of perestroika and the party's 
failure to debate crucial issues in an open, constructive
i
i
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manner. In conclusion, the topics addressed were
underscored by Yeltsin's stunning and unexpected
resignation announcement.
On the first theme, Yeltsin openly criticized the pace
of perestroika in terms of its effect on the public. He
claimed that at its current rate, reform would lead to
change too late. Yeltsin clearly blamed Gorbachev's
conservative rival, Yegor Ligachev, for this shortcoming.
Despite gains in perestroika during the past two or three
years, Yeltsin laments that, "now we're talking about
smother two to three years— all of this befuddles the
people and the party" (in Solovoyov and Klepikova 1992, 72-
3). That is, his concern was for the people with high
hopes who repeatedly faced disappointment. Yeltsin warned
that a lack of morale would "run the risk of finding
ourselves [the party], shall we say, with the party's
reputation lowered considerably" (73). Thus, Yeltsin
recommended that "we [the party] should be more careful
when we announce the time frame and the actual results of
perestroika in the next two years" (73).
After wondering aloud about the merit of the party's
ineffectual resolutions about perestroika, Yeltsin
addressed the issue of power in the party. Speaking in
cautious tones, he stated:
Another question. It's a hard one, but this is a 
plenum. I must say that in the last seventy years we 
have learned some hard lessons. We have had 
victories...but we also had to draw lessons from bad,
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heavy defeats. These defeats formed gradually; they 
happened because we had no collegiality, because we 
had different groups, because the party's power was 
concentrated in one hand, and because he— this mem—  
was isolated from all criticism (Solovoyov and 
Klepikova 1992, 73).
In short, Yeltsin was worried about placing too much power
in the hands of one mem— the general secretary. Without
checks and balances on power, Yeltsin claimed that
decision-making bodies lack rigor in deliberation.
In Yeltsin's comments were thinly-veiled attacks
against Gorbachev and his followers in the party. Yeltsin,
however, proceeded to make his indictments more explicit,
stating:
Something else concerns me. It's too bad here in the 
Politburo, one thing has grown— what I'd call paeans 
that some Politburo members— permanent members— sing 
to the General Secretary. I don't think this is 
permissible now (Solovoyov and Klepikova 1992, 73).
Justifying this contention about the Politburo, Yeltsin
argued that in the age of Soviet democratization, undue
genuflecting could not continue. Unlike the "old days,"
Yeltsin announced that confrontation must be accepted, not
shunned, as a part of the deliberation required for
beneficial reforms (73).
After a brief pause, Yeltsin concluded with an
unexpected twist, a bombshell that stunned his listeners:
I don't think I'm doing well in my Politburo job. For 
various reasons. Could be my inexperience, could be 
other things. Could be a lack of support from certain 
parties, especially, I would like to stress, from 
Comrade Ligachev— all this had led me to decide to ask 
you to relieve me from the duties of Candidate Member
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of the Politburo. I have already submitted an 
official request in writing; as for my duties of the 
First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee— well, it 
is for the Plenum of the City Committee to decide 
(Solovoyov and Klepikova 1992, 74).
In short, this announcement accomplished more them simply
to request his removal from the Politburo. It was, in
fact, an ultimatum: accept my criticism or relieve me of
my duties in the party.
The immediate reaction to Yeltsin's speech was stunned
silence. Gathering his wits, Gorbachev invited remarks and
questions. Silence ensued. Gorbachev repeated his
invitation. After a conspicuous pause, Ligachev rose and
took the podium. He refused to accept Yeltsin's
indictments against the party. Ligachev argued caustically
that if shortcomings did exist in the Moscow
administration, they were attributable to Yeltsin. As for
Yeltsin's harangue against excessive praise for Gorbachev,
Ligachev, often critical of the general secretary, labeled
these allegations as "disgusting" and "politically harmful"
(Bailer 1988, 30-1). Rather than blame, Ligachev claimed,
praise was due to Gorbachev for his efforts to unify the
party during trying times. After Ligachev's deluge of
comments, Yeltsin was relentlessly barraged with
denouncements from others at the podium for nearly three
hours (Bailer 1989, 95).
While comments directly after Yeltsin's presentation
were piercing, the worst was yet to come. The subsequent
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public humiliation of Yeltsin was delayed but brutal. The 
party announced the outcome of the Yeltsin debacle only 
after careful, strategic contemplation. News reports 
published the following day, October 22, revealed no signs 
of tension within the party's upper ranks. Pravda and 
Izvestia reported only the names of speakers, the theme of 
the plenum, and that Politburo and CPSU Central Committee 
member Aliyev announced his retirement. Concluding, the 
article stated, "The plenary session approved the basic 
propositions and conclusions set forth in M. S. Gorbachev's 
report and adopted an appropriate resolution on this 
question" fPravda and Izvestia 22 October 1987, 1).
After biding time to consider Yeltsin's fate, the 
Moscow city party committee announced his punishment. On 
November 11, by decree of the Politburo, this assembly 
officially met to deliberate the details of Yeltsin's 
punishment. About 250 full and candidate members of the 
committee attended. The meeting commenced with a one-hour 
report by Gorbachev which addressed three themes. First, 
the general secretary critiqued Yeltsin's expressed views 
and his performance as First Party Secretary of Moscow. 
Second, Gorbachev rejected Yeltsin's "baseless" claims that 
party factions, led by Ligachev, fought to derail efforts 
to improve economic conditions in Moscow. Third, Gorbachev 
attacked Yeltsin more personally, claiming that he lacked 
the organizational skills and the interpersonal ability to
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deal with his colleagues in a "comradely” manner (Bialer 
1989, 105).
Following Gorbachev's address, other condemnations 
ensued, some of which were published in major Soviet 
newspapers. For instance, Nikolai Ryzhkov, the Soviet 
prime minister, criticized Yeltsin for "developing an 
oversized ambition.” Vitalii Vorotnikov, Russia's prime 
minister stated, "it's like you [Yeltsin] had on some kind 
of mask... .Not happy about anything.. .everybody or 
anything." Viktor Chebrikov, KGB chairman, accused Yeltsin 
of demagoguery and dividing the party when unity was 
required to "march on bravely toward our objective that we 
set at the last party congress" (in Solovyov and Klepikova, 
1992, 64—5). Only Georgi Arbatov, head of an important 
government think tank, bothered to defend Yeltsin.
However, Arbatov's commentary was cursed immediately by the 
next speaker (67).
Yeltsin did get the opportunity to justify himself 
during the same meeting. In his personal defense, Yeltsin 
engaged in the time-honored. Stalinist ritual of self- 
criticism. Simultaneously, he attempted to reassert his 
commitment to the party's mission of restructuring 
(Tismaneanu 1988, 283). Belittling himself and addressing 
his alleged Napoleonic tendencies, he stated, "I give you 
my sincere party word that of course I had no ulterior 
motives and there was no political orientation in my
I
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action." Further, he claimed, "I agree with the criticism 
which has been voiced" (283). In short, he admitted that 
his personal ambitions may have clouded his judgment.
On the issue of continued support of perestroika, he 
gave his encouragement to the party for its further 
efforts:
The main thing for me now as a Communist of the Moscow 
organization is, of course, what decision to take to 
minimize the deunage [resulting from my 
actions].... [I]t will be very difficult for the new 
gorkom first secretary, for the bureau, and for the 
party gorkom to ensure.. .that work is done to heal it 
[the "wound"] as rapidly as possible (Tismaneanu 1988, 
284).
Me concluded his presentation with support for the party's 
efforts at restructuring. Yeltsin declared, "As a 
communist I am sure that the Moscow organization is united 
with the party Central Committee and that it has marched 
and will march very confidently behind the party Central 
Committee" (285). Whatever his true intentions or thoughts 
might have been, Yeltsin unequivocally endorsed unity with 
hope that perestroika would continue, even without him.
In this speech, Yeltsin shifts his persona.
Obviously, he could not continue to use his revolutionary 
persona without risking further reprimands. To save what 
was left of his political career, he shifted to a 
conservative persona. By supporting the efforts of the 
party, Yeltsin salvaged some semblance of a continuing 
political career.
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Yeltsin's apologies, however, meant little as complete 
protection against the consequences of his actions. He 
stood accused of grandstanding, panic mongering, and 
annulling the accomplishments of perestroika. Agreeing 
with these assessments, Gorbachev summarized the 
proceedings for Yeltsin by stating, "...Comrade Yeltsin, 
you got what you deserved" (Solovyov and Klepikova 1992, 
67). Yeltsin's discipline included removal from the Moscow 
Party Committee; he was replaced by Lev Zaykov. Further, 
according to the decision of a February 1988 Central 
Committee plenum, Yeltsin was removed from the Politburo.
The fall of Yeltsin marked a crucial moment in the 
progress of Gorbachev's perestroika. For conservatives in 
the Party, members of the orthodox nomenklatura, a major 
victory was won. Yeltsin's ouster sent an unmistakable 
signal to all of those thinking reforms were irreversible. 
Further, the situation may have frightened other reformers 
who sympathized with Gorbachev. Even liberal members of 
the Party, including Eduard Shevardnadze and Aleksandr 
Yakovlev, distanced themselves from Yeltsin. As he was 
linked with cutting-edge reforms, Yeltsin's demise might 
have been an irreparable setback for perestroika, but all 
was not lost. Because Yeltsin's replacement, Zaykov, was 
an ally of Gorbachev, the outcome of the Yeltsin situation 
did not necessarily mean a complete victory for 
conservative forces in the party. With Yeltsin gone,
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however, Gorbachev was faced with the prospect of 
confronting resistance in the party directly.
YELTSIN'S REBIRTH
After his fall from the party's top ranks in 1987, 
Yeltsin would return to prominence within two years. This 
section traces Yeltsin's remarkable rebound from the brink 
of obscurity back in to the foray of perestroika politics. 
In the process of returning, Yeltsin employed a special 
kind of rhetorically conservative persona. That is, rather 
than outwardly attacking politically orthodox forces in the 
party, he was more strategic in his approach. He carefully 
limited his political activities by allying himself with 
Gorbachev. That is not to say that Yeltsin became the 
General Secretary's servile lackey. In fact, the two still 
disagreed vehemently on a number of specific issues. On 
principles of democratization, however, Yeltsin supported 
Gorbachev and maintained an obvious degree of tact when 
talking about Gorbachev publicly. By employing this 
strategy, Yeltsin shielded himself from the ire of right- 
wing party members, letting hopes of reform continue. The 
Lazarus of Soviet politics found rebirth in, primarily, two 
important events: the Nineteenth Party Conference in June 
of 1988 and the first session of the first Congress of 
Peoples' Deputies in 1989.
The Nineteenth Party Conference, held in June of 1988, 
provided Yeltsin with a valuable opportunity to reassert
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his political clout. Prior to this event, Yeltsin failed 
to gain significant public exposure as he was bound by a 
domestic gag order. Thus, the Soviet press avoided 
publishing the interviews occasionally given to members of 
foreign press agencies. To return to the political fray, 
however, Yeltsin realized he needed some kind of press 
coverage. The conference in 1988 provided him with such a 
rhetorical opportunity.
At the conference, Yeltsin's very appearance caused a 
stir. Originally, he was not supposed to be at the event 
or to speak. His surprise showing at the proceedings was 
the result of an eleventh-hour nomination from the Karelian 
Automonous Republic on the Finnish boarder. His admission, 
however, did not assure him a speaking opportunity. During 
the first few days of the conference, Yeltsin pleaded for 
the podium with no avail. Without success via conventional 
requests, Yeltsin, on the final day of the conference, 
decided to storm the podium (Solovyov and Kleipkova 1992, 
93). Yeltsin's unannounced and daring advance at the 
assembly created a commotion. Astonished by Yeltsin's bold 
walk to the front of the assembly, Gorbachev hesitated, but 
he eventually allowed Yeltsin's imposition.
With control of the podium, Yeltsin bandaged his 
tattered political image. He began his speech by 
explaining the circumstances surrounding his address at the 
1987 plenum. Claiming that he was bedridden prior to the
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plenum, Yeltsin announced that he was forced to attend 
despite being heavily medicated. In fact, he claimed that 
party doctors, under order, administered liberal doses of 
medication. Therefore, Yeltsin was "incoherent" and not 
thinking wisely when giving his unprecedented speech. In 
giving this explication, Yeltsin did not condemn Gorbachev, 
though he would later blame the general secretary for 
forcing the doctors to drug him. Rather than accosting 
Gorbachev in his speech, Yeltsin turned Yegor Ligachev into 
a scapegoat with a number of criticisms (Solovyov and 
Klepikova 1992, 95).
After his introductory remarks and a brief assault 
against Ligachev, Yeltsin went on to his main points which 
concerned the progress of perestroika. Yeltsin credited 
the party for its initiation of perestroika, but he also 
criticized CPSU for failure to maintain the movement it 
started. In conjunction with this theme of inadequate 
effort, he spoke out against party privileges, the lack of 
elections for legislative positions, and term limits on 
party politicians. For instance, he placed particular 
emphasis on the fact that representatives for party 
conferences were still nominated by the party elites rather 
than through a democratic nomination process. Without 
mentioning Gorbachev by name, he placed the blame for this 
situation of political appointment on the party's general 
leadership (Solovyov and Klepikova 1992, 95).
I
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In addition to addressing the party's political
monopoly, Yeltsin spoke on the issue of terms limits.
Thus, Yeltsin stabbed at party incumbents and argued,
In a number of countries, when the leader steps down, 
he takes the rest of the leadership with him. In our 
country today, we're used to accusing only the dead, 
who cannot respond. Today we are told that Brezhnev 
alone was guilty of stagnation. Where does that leave 
those who spent ten, fifteen, or twenty years in the 
Politburo— and are still there (Solovyov and Klepikova 
1992, 95)?
Yeltsin's claim was that career politicians— self-serving
and conservative— hampered progress, dragging their feet to
preserve their status. By doing so, Soviet citizens
suffered. Yeltsin remarked,
In the last three years, we have failed to solve a 
number of tangible problems pertaining to the well­
being of our people, to say nothing of initiating and 
revolutionary transformations....We should set 
ourselves goals for every two or three years— a goal 
or two— and reach them for the people's benefit. We 
should not disperse our efforts in all directions, but 
focus on one, and commit everything— resources, 
research, manpower (96-7).
Finished with his main points, Yeltsin might have 
concluded. As a master of high drama and surprise, 
however, he abruptly introduced a stunning interjection: 
"Comrade delegates! I have a delicate question...regarding 
my personal political rehabilitation following the Central 
Committee's October Plenum" (Solovyov and Klepikova 1992, 
96). Again, commotion swept through the audience.
Alertly, Gorbachev interrupted him to announce that his 
time expired; all delegates at the conference were limited
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to 15-minute presentations. Nevertheless, the audience 
began heckling, demanding that Yeltsin receive more time.
In response, Gorbachev, well renown for his ability to make 
a bad situation appear the better, allowed Yeltsin to 
proceed. Yeltsin continued, "We're now used to 
rehabilitation after fifty years; it has had a positive 
effect on our society. But I would like to ask for 
political rehabilitation in my lifetime" (97). After the 
speech, Yeltsin's request was denied. Further, he was 
verbally assaulted by the same pack of accusers who 
censured him for the 1987 oration. However, Yeltsin got 
what he wanted, a chance to appeal not just to the party, 
but to the public listening to the broadcast proceedings.
How did Yeltsin manage to invade the conference 
without reproach? His conservative management of the 
rhetorical situation was vital for his success. Yeltsin 
demonstrated deference for Gorbachev by furthering his 
goals of the conference. Nowhere in his major speech did 
Yeltsin blame the General Secretary for any of 
perestroika's shortcomings; direct criticism was reserved 
for Ligachev, Gorbachev's conservative adversary.
Certainly, indirect stabs were taken at Gorbachev, as he 
was a member of the "party elite." Nevertheless, Yeltsin's 
commentary was cloaked in the grammar of Gorbachev's own 
reform agenda.
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The agenda of the conference was controlled by 
Gorbachev, who saw the event as a watershed moment in 
Soviet history. To ensure the success of the meeting, 
Gorbachev would take no risks with his agenda. He slated 
himself as the opening and closing speaker of the 
conference and he limited all speakers to no more the 
fifteen minutes at the podium (Bialer 1989, 215). To 
further protect his vision of the conference from 
conservative opposition, the event centered around the 
deliberation of ten "theses." Approved by the Central 
Committee and publicly published prior to the conference, 
these assertions called for significant changes. For 
example, recommendations included term limits on office 
holders like the general secretary himself. These 
resolutions also called for: the public elections of
legislative officials from a pool of candidates; the strict 
separation of state and party interests; "the granting of 
greater responsibilities and rights to trade unions; a 
speedy change in the legal system and in Soviet law" 
(Bialer, 1989 213).2
Such changes were important in that they safeguarded 
the progress of perestroika. In discussing the proposals 
at the conference, Roy Medvedev said that the changes 
proposed were not revolutionary, but they constituted one
2For a complete list of Gorbachev's proposals, see Barry 
1991, pp. 75—77 or Izvestia. November 30, 1988, p. 2.
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of the most important moments during Gorbachev's tenure as 
general secretary. As Medvedev puts it, "There was 
'socialist pluralism'; and a new law was introduced to 
establish the rotation of leaders. In other words, for the 
first time a mechanism was provided for the succession to 
positions of command" (Medvedev and Giuietto 1989, 238). 
What is more, the proceedings were broadcast live to the 
public, meaning the Politburo's hands were tied. With live 
broadcasts, the interest of the public was piqued, 
participation in government encouraged, and the Politburo 
faced public accountability. In short, Gorbachev took 
precautions to make sure that his reforms would not 
backslide.
In light of Gorbachev's strategy, Yeltsin's rhetoric 
fit the situation. While somewhat contentious, Yeltsin 
supported the theses of the conference and, therefore, 
General Secretary Gorbachev. Even Yeltsin's indirect stab 
at Gorbachev, by including him in the "unchanging" party 
elite, was appropriate. After all, Gorbachev's proposals 
recommended term limits even for his own office. In short, 
Yeltsin's return was facilitated by his risk taking, but 
also by his "playing by the rules" of Gorbachev's "game" as 
well.
Yeltsin's conservative persona also aided him at the 
first session of the 1989 Congress of People's Deputies.
At this inaugural meeting of the congress, Yeltsin strongly
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advocated pluralism in the Soviet political system, while 
Gorbachev was more conservative. Mot surprisingly, they 
clashed on a number of issues. Nevertheless, Yeltsin 
continued his conservative stance. He advocated the 
principle, if not the practice, of Gorbachev's ideas and 
even supported the General Secretary's bid for the 
presidency of the Supreme Soviet. Evidenced by his major 
speech at the congress and his statements to the press, 
Yeltsin's conservative persona aided his quest for 
political rehabi1itation. To more fully appreciate 
Yeltsin's discourse, one must know more about the congress 
itself.
The establishment of the Congress of People's Deputies 
was a major step in Gorbachev's endeavor to restructure 
Soviet government. As a result of proposals at the 
Nineteenth Party conference and constitutional amendments 
in 1988, the CPD represented a significant attempt at 
democratization. Exclusive functions of the congress, to 
name a few, included: adopting the USSR Constitution and
related amendments; selecting the USSR Supreme Soviet and 
its chair and first deputy; and electing the USSR 
Constitutional Oversight Committee (Theen 1991, xiv-xv).
For the first time in Soviet history, government— at least 
a small part of it— would be accountable to the public.
While Gorbachev wanted his reforms to root out 
lethargic elements of the nomenklatura, he also wanted the
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party to retain its eminence. To ensure this outcome, he 
stacked the elections. Of the 2,250 representatives at the 
CPD, two-thirds were elected popularly on the basis of 
territorial and national criteria. However, the remaining 
750 seats were reserved for party-sanctioned organizations. 
For example, 100 seats automatically went to the Communist 
Party, 100 to the trade unions, and 100 to cooperative 
organizations (Barry 1991, 90). To worsen this ratio, some 
observers suspected corruption among party-influenced 
officials counting the ballots. Yeltsin, a popularly- 
elected candidate, saw Gorbachev's scheme as nearsighted 
and spoke out.
On May 31, Yeltsin presented his major speech to the 
Congress which forwarded a guiding theme of pluralism in 
the CPD and other facets of Soviet political life. To 
underscore his thesis, he began by stressing the importance 
of the congress. He stated, "This congress is solving the 
main problems which will determine the future of our 
society. It is the question of power which must 
justifiably belong to the people represented by its 
legislative authority, i.e., the Congress of People's 
Deputies" (in Theen 1991, 230).
Given his assumption about the role of the congress in 
Soviet government, Yeltsin continued by criticizing the 
contradictory nature of the proceedings. Scolding
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Gorbachev indirectly, Yeltsin called for a "real transfer" 
of power:
Paradoxical though it night be, this congress, which 
must assume the power and responsibility for 
restructuring and the reorganization of society, has 
turned out to be hostage of the laws and resolutions 
passed by the preceding Supreme Soviet... .The most 
important problems of state power and management 
which, by the logic of the laws should be considered 
by the congress itself, were predetermined before the 
congress yet we are asked to vote for them (in Theen 
1991, 231).
Plainly, his main concern stemmed from the fear of 
conservative forces in the party conspiring to keep control 
of power.
As the party clings to power, Yeltsin argued,
conditions for the USSR's people worsened and must be
solved. He claimed:
Meanwhile, the situation in the country remains 
extremely alarming. Anti-restructuring forces have 
become stronger and more consolidated; the second 
economy and corruption are developing; crime is 
rising; the moral foundations of society are being 
eroded; the problems of young people, who need the 
political confidence of our entire society for the 
future belongs to them, are becoming aggravated (in 
Theen 1991, 231).
Here, he avers that for change to happen, people must be
encouraged to participate in civic affairs. If decisions
continue to be made from above, the gulf between government
and people will continue to worsen.
Yeltsin's recommendations for change were many. His
suggestions included: dismantling the Soviet command-
administrative system; allowing peasants in the countryside
to make decisions concerning farm management; providing
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increased freedoms for print and broadcast media;
permitting alternative candidates to run for new, elected
offices; and yielding more political rights to the
republics of the Soviet Union (Theen 1991, 232). Then,
Yeltsin concluded with his most radical call:
I believed that within the framework of building a 
rule of law state the present congress must create 
corresponding collectively operating mechanisms. I 
suggest.. .that we pass a law on an annual referendum 
on the subject of a vote of confidence for the 
chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet (233).
Here, Yeltsin demonstrates his distrust of Gorbachev to
ensure comprehensive reform.
At Yeltsin's criticisms, Gorbachev might have taken
offense. However, Yeltsin's conservative persona gives him
some leeway. On this issue, two distinct points come to
mind. First, in interviews with the press, Yeltsin openly
supported Gorbachev and the principles of his reform
efforts. Before attending the congress, Yeltsin said that
he would help Gorbachev's mission to battle conservative
elements in the party, and promote restructuring. And of
his relationship with Gorbachev, Yeltsin told reporters,
We have always had good, normal relations, maybe with 
the exception of a year ago when some members of the 
leadership helped relations grow colder....I think 
there is a warming between us, without a doubt. I 
always supported the strategic line of Gorbachev, and 
moreover I fought for it (Cornwell 1989).
And, during the congress, Yeltsin passed up the opportunity
to run against Gorbachev for the position of Supreme Soviet
president. Further, Yeltsin endorsed Gorbachev's race for
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the post, but not without stipulation. Yeltsin added that, 
for the sake of principle, alternative candidates should be 
permitted to run against him (Theen 1991, 724). In all, 
while Yeltsin didn't like everything Gorbachev was doing, 
he was willing to let the general secretary proceed. To 
attack Gorbachev would aid the conservative reaction to 
perestroika..
The results of the first session of the Congress of 
People's Deputies were a mixed blessing. On the negative 
side, despite Yeltsin's objections, Party prominence 
endured. Gorbachev intended to unsettle the complacency of 
the nomenklatura, but he wanted to ensure the party's 
continued dominance. Thus, the general secretary's attempt 
at democratization merely combined the party's 
institutional power and authority with a new variable—  
electoral accountability (McAuley 1992, 96). This 
situation presented a troubling question that would soon 
torment Gorbachev: What happens when the voting public
does not want to support party candidates and proposals? 
Without alternatives at the ballot boxes, Gorbachev 
preserved the party's status but fueled future protests.
Despite the negative, some good emerged from the 
congreiss. For instance, the Soviet Union's news media 
became invigorated and, occasionally, was willing to report 
infractions of the letter and spirit of the law's 
innovative arrangements. New political organizations
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including popular fronts and nationality movements 
discovered a voice in the Congress of People's Deputies. 
Indeed, Gorbachev's USSR in 1989 was still dominated by the 
party. However, it no longer possessed the unequivocal 
ability to cloak its labors behind the veil of secrecy 
(Barry 1991, 91). Many spectators regarded the 1989 
elections to the CPD a referendum on the CPSU. In these 
elections, party members failed in four out of five 
elections where they encountered non-party-member opponents 
(Kiernan and Aistrup 1991, 1054). In short, because of 
Gorbachev's reforms and the Congress of People's Deputies, 
the party became accountable to a voting public. Yeltsin's 
conservative persona allowed him to place himself in a 
position where he eventually found power in public opinion.
CONCLUSION
Yeltsin's first five years in Moscow were a time of 
adjustment. Initially, with a revolutionary persona, he 
advocated sweeping change. Yeltsin spoke out against party 
members' misuse of power and privilege, and he championed 
government's accountability to Soviet citizens. Despite 
his principled efforts, conditions were inappropriate for 
his brazen, reformist stance. The party stood firmly 
behind the levers of control, refusing to relinquish 
dominance. In 1987, the CPSU demonstrated its brawn and 
desire for a continued monopoly on authority by casting him 
out of the Politburo. Yeltsin then labored in political
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obscurity as head of the construction ministry with a 
dubious political future.
When Yeltsin made his daring return to the forefront 
of politics in 1988, he used a new rhetorical approach. He 
utilized a rhetorically conservative persona to ally 
himself with Gorbachev and to shield himself from the 
disapproval of politically conservative communists. Thus, 
Yeltsin was strategically "conservative” in his public 
presentation but not in his political orientation. By 
adhering to the dictates of Gorbachev's perestroika,
Yeltsin maintained his standing in the ranks of government. 
Consequently, Yeltsin stood ready to run for office in the 
Congress of People's Deputies. Yeltsin's popular support 
became the substructure upon which he face the next major 
challenge of his career.
During the closing months of 1989, Yeltsin would again 
shift to different persona. The next chapter examines 
Yeltsin's rhetorical strategy in relation to Gorbachev's 
growing conservativism. Commenting on Gorbachev's 
backsliding following the first Congress of People's 
Deputies, Yeltsin claimed, "Right now it's not Ligachev on 
the right wing— it's the general secretary himself. I get 
the impression that he led our society in to a political 
maze— but I don't know if he himself knows the way out" 
(Solovyov and Klepikova 1992, 103). To maintain the 
progress of reforms and to preserve his political career,
i
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Yeltsin utilized a conciliatory persona which was an 
important strategy in his race for the Russian presidency 
in 1991.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE END OF PROGRESSIVE PERESTROIKA 
INTRODUCTION 
After the first session of the first Congress of 
People's Deputies in the early summer of 1989, a new 
chapter in Soviet politics began. It was marked by the 
death of progressive perestroika and the birth of the 
party's struggle to retake lost political ground. McAuley 
(1990) writes that "Perestroika is best understood as a 
combination of policies put forward by the Gorbachev 
leadership during the period from the Seventeenth Party 
Congress in 1986 until the end of 1989" (90). But why does 
not McAuley include the period immediately after 1989? The 
answer is that the reform effort became unmanageable for 
Gorbachev. By 1989, the general secretary failed to match 
the pace of democratization and reforms of superministries 
with the pace of marketization and increased outputs of 
consumer goods. Further, Gorbachev became disheartened by 
perestroika, as he realized continued reform jeopardized 
the livelihood of the party. Thus, Gorbachev began 
backsliding.
As political conditions changed, so did Yeltsin's 
rhetorical persona. By 1990, Yeltsin pressed for 
unprecedented, liberal policies in his role as chairman of 
the Russian Supreme Soviet. Yeltsin sought greater 
autonomy for Russia apart from the Soviet Union so that the
93
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republic could stimulate reform. However, Yeltsin still 
demonstrated some deference for Gorbachev and a willingness 
to work with some party members if they supported the 
peaceful transformation of the Soviet Union into a more 
decentralized and economically progressive nation. To 
promote his vision of revitalized Soviet politics, Yeltsin 
employed a conciliatory persona.
This chapter traces the development of Yeltsin's shift 
in rhetorical strategies in relation to the exigence of 
perestroika's degeneration which occurred, approximately, 
between late 1989 and early 1991. The first section of 
this chapter examines the changing nature of the rhetorical 
situation in 1989. The second section examines the party's 
conspiracy to neutralize Yeltsin's growing political 
influence. Finally, the third section explores Yeltsin's 
reaction to the government conspiracy and the development 
of his conciliatory persona.
A YEAR OF STRAIN: 1989
After the first session of the Congress of People's 
Deputies, the rhetorical situation became urgent. While 
perestroika was characterized by a certain degree of 
optimism and progress during the mid-to-late 1980s, 1989 
marked the beginning of renewed pessimism. The economy, 
labor strikes, and the issue of the republics' autonomy 
were all exigencies that prompted Yeltsin's modified 
rhetorical strategy. To appreciate Yeltsin's conciliatory
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persona, one must: first recognize three features of the 
situation in which his rhetoric functioned.
The Economy
When Gorbachev assumed the role of general secretary 
in 1985, his foremost concern was economic reform. The 
fundamental impetus behind perestroika was to maintain the 
Soviet Union's status as a super power and to make it a 
well-developed, socially attractive state. In the early 
1980s, economic backwardness plagued the USSR. While most 
of the world's economic giants were well into the age of 
micro-technology, ninety-eight percent of the Soviet 
Union's engineering output produced iron and steel. Also, 
ten percent of the population's calorie consumption came 
from agricultural goods imported from non-socialist nations 
(Hanson 1991, 50). These figures alarmed leaders of the 
USSR, a nation struggling to compete with the world's 
superpowers for global supremacy. Thus, top Soviet 
officials insisted on constructing the appearance of 
financial well-being. Officially, the nation's foremost 
economists claimed that the Soviet union accounted for 
about twenty percent of the world's industrial production 
(49). This preposterous statistic, and other half-truths 
like it, would soon fail to mask the actual state of the 
Soviet Union's economic condition.
During the late 1980s, the Soviet veil of economic 
secrecy became translucent. By mid-1989, a number of
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Western companies and nations noticed that the USSR was 
failing to pay debts in a timely manner. For instance, the 
Soviets owed Hew Zealand $53 million, West Germany $600 
million, and Japanese companies $200 million (Goldman 1992, 
159). In addition to financial shortcomings on the 
international front, the Soviet Union struggled internally 
as its official shroud of confidentiality was no longer 
corroborated domestically. On March 30, 1989, Izvestia 
reported that the nation's acknowledged, real deficit was 
100 billion rubles (Barry 1991, 185). While this figure 
was low, it was much more realistic than anything 
previously disclosed. Prior to 1989, Soviet leadership 
maintained that deficit financing was never practiced. 
Allegedly, the budget was always balanced. As the 1990s 
approached, however, the Soviet economy finally stumbled to 
the brink of collapse and the myth of self-sufficient 
prosperity became palpably tattered.
To improve the USSR's economic conditions, Gorbachev 
attempted a number of reforms, but they only exacerbated 
difficulties. During perestroika, the centerpiece of his 
strategy for economic correction was the 1987 law on state 
enterprises. To make the Soviet economic system more 
responsive to consumer demands and to encourage 
productivity, the law allowed individualistic initiative at 
the micro-level of the economy. In other words,
Gorbachev's reform program reduced the role of central
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I 97
supervision in production planning. Soviet businesses 
still had to fill state orders according to this 
legislation. However, a certain amount of production 
resources could be set aside for shipments to profitable 
foreign markets. The advantage of this increased 
independence was that successful businesses would grow and 
reward their workers (Barry 1991, 182).
Unfortunately, Gorbachev's law on state enterprises 
worked poorly. Economic decentralization entailed a ripple 
effect that the general secretary did not anticipate or 
want. More independence for business meant self financing, 
marketing, and finding new sources for supplies. Under old 
arrangements, many enterprises were heavily subsidized by 
the state. Thus, the law on state enterprises created an 
abundance of dilemmas including decreased job security and 
increased strain on the economy in terms of supplies 
meeting demands (Barry 1991, 182). Pummeled by such 
unexpected effects of reform, Gorbachev became increasingly 
reactionary.
Gorbachev's retreat from progressive reform was 
clearly noticeable in 1989. In October, leading economic 
advisor Leonid Abalkin suggested a comprehensive, long-term 
schedule for moving the Soviet economy toward market 
principles. Despite this recommendation, General Secretary 
Gorbachev opted for recentralization. He followed 
Ryzhkov's lead which insisted that financial and
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legislative retrenchment were necessary before additional 
reforms could be advanced. Thus, the early 1990s were 
characterized by attempts at recentralization of economic 
control. The fallout of Gorbachev's vacillating economic 
reform included an escalated budget deficit, runaway 
inflation, and confused pricing methods (Sakwa 1993, 203- 
4). In short, during the disarray of economic 
restructuring, Gorbachev panicked and backslid to familiar 
principles. Thus, he did not take his reforms far enough 
to ensure comprehensive change. The result was public 
dissatisfaction which contributed to a number of paralyzing 
labor strikes.
Labor Unrest
Labor protests ravaged the Soviet Union during 1988 
and 1989. Because of the fallout created by Gorbachev's 
economic decentralization, many strikers protested the 
noticeable change in the quality of life. Shortages of 
consumer goods, food, and supplies for industry were 
conspicuous. According to Goldman (1992), "...as it became 
clear in 1989 that the stagnation or zastox of the Brezhnev 
era had become eclipsed by the zastox II of Gorbachev, the 
workers began to stir in an effort to prevent deterioration 
in their living conditions" (149). Certainly, ethnic 
conflict was an important impetus for many strikes.
However, economic well-being figured heavily into workers' 
decisions to instigate organized protests.
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In conjunction with deteriorating economic conditions, 
the first Congress of People's Deputies stimulated labor 
protests. In this legislature, representatives from 
industrial centers, including prominent coal-mining 
regions, spoke with unprecedented candor. Seeing frank 
dissent uttered by representatives at the congress, many 
miners concluded they could speak out themselves. The 
result of the miners' inference was a drastic increase in 
strikes. During the first half of 1989, an average of 
15,000 Soviet workers struck per day. After the Congress 
of People's Deputies, this figure rose to 50,000 workers 
per day in the second half of 1989 and 130,000 per day 
during the first five months of 1990 (Goldman 1992, 151).
Despite the magnitude of the labor strikes, the most 
salient economic goals of the workers were rather banal. 
Often, heavy industrial workers and coal miners went on 
strike not to demand higher wages, but to secure basic 
necessities. They had money but little to buy. In July of 
1989, over 500,000 Siberians and Ukrainians walked away 
from their jobs to protest a distressing lack of food 
products and soap. The fuel miners extracted from the land 
provided the Soviet economy with essential hard currency 
from foreign markets. Given this premise, protesters 
argued convincingly that their basic needs should be met in 
exchange for their efforts. The miners grieved that each 
worker only received one bar of soap every third month
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
(Goldman 1992, 150). Because of this predicament and many 
others like it, the strikers demanded that Gorbachev find 
the means by which consumer goods might be more quickly 
produced and appropriately distributed.
One of the most noteworthy results of the coal-miners' 
strikes was Moscow's decision to relinquish unconditional 
control of mine revenues. Many miners realized that Moscow 
did not always fulfill their promises for more consumer 
goods. Therefore, some strikers demanded more than 
assurances. In May of 1991, miners won control over 
approximately eighty percent of their earnings. This move 
entailed great risk for the laborers. without state 
subsidies, workers were not well protected from price 
variation and the threat of mine depletion. As miners 
faced new risks, so did Moscow (Goldman 1992, 152). With 
economic ties loosened between the center and the 
republics' local interests, political ties between the 
center and the republics loosened as well.
Nationalities
In addition to difficulties related to economics and 
labor dissension, the problem of nationalities and ethnic 
uprisings became increasingly pronounced in 1989. 
Traditionally, Marxist-Leninist teachings dictated that the 
historical march toward communism eradicates national 
hostilities. That is, the desire for economic well-being 
superseded affiliations of country or ethnicity. Until the
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late 1980s, Soviet leaders held their theorists' doctrine 
as fact. At the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1988, 
however, some leaders began to speak of a "negative 
phenomenon" regarding relations among the USSR's republics 
and ethnic groups— a phenomenon that had been ignored for 
decades (Barry 1991, 239). In January of 1989, Gorbachev 
himself publicly admitted that relationships between 
national groups constituted a major threat to the progress 
of perestroika. The friction between Armenia and 
A2erbaidzhan concerning Nagorno-Karabakh; violent riots in 
Kazakhstan and Moldavia; the energetic outspokenness 
demonstrated by Crimean Tartars; and the Baltic republics' 
quest for sovereignty— such problems threatened stability 
in the Soviet empire. Without resolution of these 
difficulties and others like them, the general secretary 
hypothesized that perestroika would collapse as the Party 
would be compelled to buttress its position (Nahaylo 1990, 
135).
Resolving ethnic tensions would not be simple as the 
roots of the problem ran deep in Soviet history. Since its 
inception, the USSR drew its borders for political purposes 
and without regard for cultural and linguistic 
considerations. Stability endured through the threat of 
force. For example, after the ratification of the Nazi- 
Soviet Pact of 1939, Soviet authorities brazenly asserted 
influence over the Baltic region. The display of national
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flags, public rallies, and other demonstrations of 
dissociation from Moscow were banned. Outspoken 
nationalists and critics of Soviet rule faced imprisonment 
or exile. In the stead of removed dissidents, Russian 
nationals were imported by communist officials to dilute 
the ethnic potency of the Baltic regions (Goldman 1992,
121).
The devastation of native cultures developed through 
political repression, but also through the exclusion of 
cultural practices. For years, the Russo-centric Soviet 
officials forced homogeneity by disallowing territorial 
languages in education, science, and most forms of public 
life. Moreover, the glorification of the Bolshevik 
revolution threatened to erase the cultural memory of some 
ethnic groups through a "distortion of history" (Nahaylo 
1990, 139). Because of Russification, many republics and 
ethnicities sought opportunities to pursue sovereignty.
Such opportunities were found in the late 1980s.
The candor invited by glasnost, the withering of 
communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the sense of self- 
reliance gained through Gorbachev's efforts at economic 
decentralization all encouraged the cauldron of 
nationalistic dissent to boil over. As late as 1987, 
outcries for resistance to Soviet domination resulted in 
imprisonment, and demonstrations induced police crackdowns 
(Goldman 1992, 121). But, by mid-1988, fear of retaliation
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faded and jingoistic protests called for increased 
autonomy. Such calls resulted in a number of important 
occurrences. For instance, in popular elections, 
candidates who held tolerant views about issues of autonomy 
were elected to legislative bodies. Also, proclamations of 
sovereignty were voiced including Lithuania's bold 
announcement of independence in December of 1989. In light 
of Lithuania's proclamation, the republics' quests for 
independence became a pressing issue for Gorbachev as he 
planned perestroika's fate in the 1990s.
Summary
In light of the economic, labor, and nationality
problems faced by the Soviet Union, late 1989 marked a year
in which the party's prominence fell into question. Of
course, the party was still in control, but it could not
evade open, public criticism, citizens wondered aloud
about the worth of the 1917 October revolution. In
November of 1989, Izvestia published a representative
article of appraisal which straightforwardly considered the
party's progress. It read,
The Bolsheviks promised us the moon— and many believed 
them. What was bound to happen happened; The social 
ideal of Marxism, which was utopian but attractive to 
the lumpenized masses, and what seemed to be amazingly 
simple methods for realizing that ideal means of the 
forcible redistributions of power and wealth according 
to the well-known formula "he who has nothing will 
become everything" fell upon exceptionally fertile 
Russian soil. The expectation of a miracle is a 
feature of our national character." In short, the 
dream of Bolshevism was never meant to be as promising 
as many thought (in Kiva 1989, 5).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Here, the author suggested that the Bolshevik era was at an
end and that new visions were needed for the future. Of
course, scrapping centralism was a dangerous proposition.
For some Soviet citizens, taking power away from Moscow
represented liberal attempts to agitate public hysteria
(Prokhanov 1990, 4-5). Either way, the controversy moved
into an open, public venue, hurting the party's appearance
of legitimacy.
Despite the media disputation concerning party
supremacy, Gorbachev still advocated pluralism in the CPSU
and the continuance of perestroika, but in a half-hearted
fashion. In a report the plenary session of the CPSU
Central Committee, Gorbachev made it clear,
Our [the party's] ideal is a humane, democratic 
socialism. Expressing the interests of the working 
class and all working people...the CPSU is creatively 
developing socialist ideas as applied to present-day 
realities... .In a society that is renewing itself, the 
Party can exist and perform its vanguard role only as 
a democratically recognized force (Pravda 6 Feb. 1990, 
1-2).
Despite Gorbachev's faith in renewal, conditions in the 
Soviet Union were worsening and he failed to respond with 
decisive measures. Yeltsin, however, sternly opposed a 
standstill in the progress of perestroika. Thus, the stage 
was set for conflict between Yeltsin and the vacillating 
Gorbachev and party conservatives.
THE PARTY VS. YELTSIN 
Against the backdrop of perestroika's decline, 
conservative elements in the party sought to reconsolidate
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power at the center. With control of the republics 
flagging, regulation of labor faltering, and regulation of 
the economy failing, the USSR faced dismal prospects. 
Reverting to time-tested ways, Soviet officials sought to 
regulate the nation's situation from above which required 
regaining their ability to direct the course of civic 
affairs. Thus, Gorbachev slowed the pace of progressive 
reform programs which delegated authority to local agents. 
Further, conservatives sought to neutralize the influence 
of the political left's principle protagonist, Yeltsin. To 
discredit Yeltsin and, therefore, commandeer public 
support, the party waged a smear campaign which centered 
around two events in 1989: Yeltsin's visit to the United
States and a rumor concerning Yeltsin's alleged 
"abduction." These two events greatly influenced Yeltsin's 
future rhetorical strategies.
On the first event, Yeltsin wanted to visit the United 
States to aid his reform efforts for Russia and the Soviet 
Union. Yeltsin realized that he could not forge a 
democratic-style government with instincts alone. For 
reasons he labeled "common sense" and "expediency," Yeltsin 
adopted the United States as a model for reform (Solovyov 
and Klepikova 1992, 168). In particular, he was interested 
in the legal status of minority opposition in the American 
Congress. Thus, with the eagerness of a novice politician, 
he concluded to journey to the United States for a first-
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prosperous.
Yeltsin organized his trip for the summer of 1989, but 
his plan faced resistance from party officials. In the 
U.S., Gorbachev's popularity with the citizens was high. 
Thus, party conservatives did not want Yeltsin's approval 
rating to grow in the U.S. because they feared that 
American approval could translate into increased domestic 
popularity. Consequently, despite Yeltsin's request for a 
two-week venture, the Central Committee only approved a 
one-week stay (Morrison 1991, 102). To further 
inconvenience Yeltsin, the Central Committee refused to 
give him status as an official representative of the USSR. 
Yeltsin was forced to travel as a lecturer sponsored by the 
Esalen Institute, a California group committed to fostering 
cultural exchange. With support from the Esalen Institute 
and with the media watching, the party could not hold 
Yeltsin back from the visit. They did, however, conspire 
to reinterpret the trip's events with advantage. This task 
was attempted on two fronts.
First, during the trip, Yeltsin became exhausted, as 
he was an inexperienced traveller. At the time of the 
trip, Yeltsin was in his late 50s, but the number of his 
trips abroad could be counted on one hand. While many 
other party members were well travelled, Yeltsin worked in 
a city, Sverdlovsk, that was closed to foreign visitors
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because of its involvement in Soviet military production 
(Morrison 1991, 101). Thus, his administrative duties did 
not require extensive interaction with or travel to far* 
away destinations. Consequently, when Yeltsin's 
opportunity to travel to the United States arose, he failed 
to anticipate the rigors of a trans-Atlantic jaunt and an 
eleven-cites-in-seven-days tour. The result of his 
inexperience was a public-relations debacle.
In America, Yeltsin was fatigued. Perhaps the most 
celebrated instance of his tiredness occurred in Baltimore, 
Maryland. During an early breakfast meeting at Johns 
Hopkins University, he appeared groggy and, at times, 
incoherent. Of Yeltsin's behavior, one journalist wrote, 
"Yeltsin came in. He clasped his hands like a boxing 
champion. He tilted, he rocked. He swerved. He 
careened.” In another report, the Baltimore Sun claimed 
Yeltsin was "not at his freshest” for the meeting: "Mr.
Yeltsin's gaze was sometimes vague, his grasp listless as 
the guest shook his hand." (in Morrison 1991, 104). Some 
reporters surmised that Yeltsin was hungover. Later 
reports claimed that after several sleepless nights, 
Yeltsin's aids persuaded him to take sleeping pills around 
four in the morning, several hours before the breakfast 
meeting. Consequently, they had difficulty waking him 
(104). Whatever the case might have been, the press 
interpreted Yeltsin's public appearance pejoratively.
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Second, the American press mistook Yeltsin's easy­
going, spontaneous style for buffoonery. In the United 
States, Yeltsin relished the experience of his visit and 
made no attempt to hide his sense of delight. Like a 
seasoned politician, he worked the receptive American 
crowds with an easy-going, "call-me-Boris" style. Yeltsin 
also used his casual demeanor in meetings with American 
officials. Some members of the press, however, interpreted 
his behavior as a lack of political manners. According to 
his staff, Yeltsin's impulsiveness was a conscious ploy to 
contrast him with the stiff, protocol-bound Gorbachev 
(Solovyov and Klepikova 1992, 175). However, his 
spontaneity, combined with rumors of his heavy drinking, 
took its toll in the media's accounts of his trip.
In the Soviet Union, the Kremlin used distasteful 
information about Yeltsin against him. As the visit came 
to a close, Pravda and Izvestia republished a damaging 
account of Yeltsin's travels from an Italian journal, La 
Repubblica. In this article, journalist Vittorio Zuccona 
(1989) details the escapades of Yeltsin by writing, "he is 
leaving behind a trail in the form of predictions of 
disaster, insane spending, interviews and, especially, the 
smell of the famous Jack Daniels Black Label Kentucky 
Whiskey....Yeltsin has a phenomenal ability to drink and 
spend money" (5). Put differently, Zuccona accused Yeltsin 
of using the profits from his lectures for merrymaking and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
109
extravagant spending. This allegation carried an enormous 
amount of weight, as it was leveled against a CPSU member, 
one dedicated to serving the needs of a theoretically 
selfless, socialist society.
While such allegations were largely fabricated and 
eventually discounted, the scandal frightened Yeltsin 
aides. They worried that poor press coverage could, at 
worst, severely damage Yeltsin's reputation and, at least, 
confuse his supporters. However, retractions appeared 
quickly. In America, papers recanted their accounts of 
Yeltsin's extreme drunkenness (Solovyov and Klepikova 
1992, 174-76). In the Soviet Union, Pravda printed an 
unprecedented apology to Yeltsin, admitting that Zuccona 
never checked his sources (21 September 1989, 7). Thus, 
after proper investigation, a different account of the trip 
emerged: Yeltsin was tired, not drunk; and Yeltsin spent
more them $100,000 of his earnings in the U.S. on 
disposable syringes to battle the spread of AIDS in the 
USSR, not to purchase American consumer goods (Solovyov and 
Klepikova 1992, 175).
Following Yeltsin's public-relations struggle 
concerning his trip to America, the Kremlin smear campaign 
did not end; conservatives continued their assault. In 
October, Yeltsin fell ill with pneumonia and failed to 
attend sessions of the Supreme Soviet. His absence fueled 
gossip of an attack or an assassination attempt. Rumors of
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the alleged attack began with a report from two militiamen 
guarding government dachas just west of Moscow. On 
September 29, the guards stated that a soaking-wet Yeltsin 
approached them and declared that an attempt was made on 
his life. Allegedly, Yeltsin told the guards that two men 
forcibly placed a bag over his head, pushed him into a car, 
drove him to a bridge, and plunged him into the river 
(Solovyov and Klepikova 1992, 178). Yeltsin wanted the 
matter kept confidential, but the story made its way 
through the chain of command to the Moscow rumor mill.
Hearsay spread quickly and prompted Gorbachev to order 
an investigation. When Yeltsin was well enough to return 
to the Supreme Soviet on October 16, he was met by an 
unexpected surprise. Gorbachev announced that the 
abduction rumor should be addressed immediately— during the 
Supreme Soviet session. The general secretary then asked 
interior minister Vadim Bakatin to read a prepared 
statement. From the rostrum, Bakatin told the audience that 
Yeltsin reported a kidnapping, but the story could not be 
verified. Further, he said that Yeltsin now denies any 
attack or complaint, stating, "maybe I was joking." 
According to Bakatin, Yeltsin claimed after the initial 
report that, "there was no attack on me, I didn't make any 
written statements, I didn't go to anyone for help, and I 
have no complaints against the internal affairs agencies. 
That's all I have to say" fIzvestia 17 October 1989, 2).
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Given the events which occurred in the previous 
months, Yeltsin's reticence was not surprising. Yeltsin 
refused to give his right-wing competitors and Gorbachev 
further information for them to manipulate in the state- 
controlled media. Clearly, Gorbachev wanted Yeltsin 
discredited as elections to the Russia Parliament and local 
soviets approached. In Soviet political culture, personal 
scandals were kept from the public's eye. Nevertheless, 
Gorbachev intentionally interrupted a session of the Soviet 
Union's most prominent decision-making body to discuss 
Yeltsin's private life. Further, Gorbachev ordered 
Isvestia to print the complete transcripts of the Supreme 
Soviet's session the following day (Solovyov and Klepikova 
1992, 178). By doing this, General Secretary Gorbachev 
hoped that Yeltsin would be so consumed with repairing his 
image that Gorbachev could enhance his own political 
position.
In the short term, the smear campaign against Yeltsin 
worked. He felt frustrated and blamed Gorbachev for his 
political inactivity, accusing the General Secretary of 
using "unprincipled moral and psychological methods to 
remove opponents instead of political means" (Solovyov and 
Klepikova 1992, 181). However, travel and "assassination" 
scandals later aided Yeltsin. In the public's eye, Yeltsin 
was seen favorably as a man who stood up to the party and 
endured. Further, the smear campaign served as a
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springboard upon which Yeltsin would become increasingly 
conciliatory.
THE RISE AND FALL OF CONCILIATION
Following his misadventures with the Party in late 
1989, Yeltsin felt and acted upon a sense of exigence 
concerning conservative resistance. Yeltsin believed that 
the party's backsliding, including Gorbachev's, on reform 
issues could be irreparable. Moreover, Yeltsin also 
believed that the Party's opportunities to serve the needs 
of the Soviet people were rapidly diminishing. At a plenum 
in early February, 1990, he warned that the party had one 
last chance to redeem itself, at the forthcoming Twenty- 
Eighth Party Congress in June (Morrison 1991, 118).
Clearly, this prognostication served as an aggressive, but 
conciliatory invitation to unite all fronts to avoid future 
conflict. Evidence of his persona was illustrated by 
Yeltsin's resignation from the CPSU at the Twenty-Eighth 
Congress and by his call for Gorbachev's resignation, after 
the Vilnius incident, in early 1991.
The Twenty-Eighth Party Congress was the stage upon 
which conservative members of the Party formally sought to 
thwart reforms and reconsolidate power. In June 1990, 
stalwart conservatives in Russia formed the Communist Party 
of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (CP RSFSR) 
as a fortification against Gorbachev's more liberal policy 
decisions. Once organized, the CP RSFSR battled Gorbachev
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
113
at the congress on the issue of the democratic party 
platform. Because of this struggle, the party appeared 
constitutionally unable to amend itself. Thus, reform was 
hindered in the Communist ranks and lagged behind public 
expectations (Sakwa 1993, 7). In short, the party became 
increasingly fractured and unable to productively champion 
reform.
Seeing the influence of the CP RSFSR, Yeltsin spoke
out at the congress against the lack of progressive policy
making. In a June 6 speech summarizing the work of the
Twenty-Eighth Congress of the CPSU, Yeltsin lashed out
against the party's conservatives:
After taking the defensive in the initial 
restructuring, the conservative forces have shifted to 
the offensive... .As the past few years have shown, it 
is not possible to neutralize the effect of the 
conservative forces in the party. They have begun a 
struggle against the economic reform, a struggle that, 
although timid and halfhearted, created a real threat 
to the party's full power... .This position has 
discredited those communists who are sincere and 
consistent supporters of changes (Current Digest of 
the Soviet Press vol. XLII (35) 1990, 11).
As he expressed his frustration concerning the right-wing
movement in the party, he was concerned with the effect of
that backsliding on the future efforts of party-led reform
in the Soviet Union.
Obviously, Yeltsin doubted the party's ability to
continue its leading role in national affairs. He asserted
that power was shifting away from the Party to alternative
agents of government. Commenting on congressional debates,
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Yeltsin stated that restructuring is no longer the central 
issue. Restructuring was being negotiated by the people, 
"beyond the walls of this building; it is being decided in 
the Congress of People's Deputies" (Current Digest of the 
Soviet Press vol. XLII (35) 1990, 12). The Russian 
congress, therefore, faced a different issue. Yeltsin 
declared,
This congress is faced first of all with the fate of 
the CPSU itself... .Will it [the CPSU] apparatus find 
the strength to decide on changes? Will it take 
advantage of this last chance that is being offered to 
it by the Congress? Either it will or it won't.
Either the Party apparatus, under the pressure of 
political reality, will decide on a fundamental 
restructuring of the Party, or it will cling to doomed 
forms and end up in opposition to the people, in 
opposition to restructuring (Current Digest of the 
Soviet Press vol. XLII (35) 1990, 12).
In essence, Yeltsin issued a conciliatory warning to
the party: soon, conservative party members would have to
decide to either play a role in reform or step aside. He
claimed that the country could no longer be faced with
orders, intimidation, and insipid promises. The nation
demanded results: "It [the nation] will support only a
political organization that does not summon them to a
distant prospect of communism beyond the clouds but that,
through its daily deeds, defends the interests of everyone
and helps make them and our country advanced, rich and
happy" (Current Digest of the Soviet Press vol. XLII (35)
1990, 12). Part of this change meant making room for
change, particularly change in the political order. As
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Yeltsin noted, "In a democratic state, a changeover to a 
multiparty system is inevitable" (12). Here, Yeltsin was 
rhetorically conciliatory, as conciliators do not force 
change but present an audience with the sense that history 
is simply following its natural course. In short, he 
provided party members with a final opportunity to work for 
reform. From Yeltsin's perspective, the time for change 
approached quickly.
Almost a week after his July 6 address, Yeltsin made 
an astonishing announcement. He shocked the congressional 
delegates by rejecting his membership in the communist 
party. Before the congress, the possibility of resignation 
passed through his mind, but Yeltsin had not intended to 
quit at the congress. He was prompted to act, however, 
because some representatives nominated him for a seat on 
the Central Committee. In light of this offer, Yeltsin 
determined that accepting the seat would create a conflict 
of interests between his Party affiliation and his role as 
Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet.
In March of 1990, Yeltsin was elected to the 
chairmanship in a highly-contested election. The race 
proved difficult for Yeltsin, as the public did not vote. 
Rather, the election was decided by the Russian Parliament 
in which about half of its members were Kremlin appointees. 
Pressing this advantage, conservative party forces 
introduced an exuberant anti-Yeltsin campaign during the
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election. In the media, at state-sanctioned rallies, and
inside the Russian parliament proper, efforts were made by
Kremlin conservatives to promote pro-party candidates
(Solovyov and Klepikova 1992, 198). Despite the party's
scheme, Yeltsin was elected in a close race on the third
ballot. Many of the delegates in the Parliament eventually
supported Yeltsin, as they were sensitive to the voices of
their constituents (204). Nonetheless, from the tone of
the election campaign, it was clear that the party
apparatus had successfully kept control of the selection of
delegates. Further, Yeltsin's struggles to promote reform
in the party were not getting easier. In other words,
party membership impeded Yeltsin's efforts for reform.
At the congress, on July 12, the nomination of
candidates for membership in to the Central Committee
served as an impetus for his decision to resign. In his
speech, Yeltsin expressed his stance simply and without
bluster. His election to the chairmanship of the Russian
SFSR; his tremendous obligation to the people of Russia;
and the Soviet Union's struggle to initiate a multi-party
system— Yeltsin used all of these considerations to justify
his departure from the party. In closing, he stated,
As head of the republic's supreme legislative 
authority, I must submit to the will of the people and 
their authorized representatives. Therefore, in 
accordance with the comments I made in the preelection 
period, I announce my withdrawal from the CPSU, so as 
to have a greater opportunity to exert an effective 
influence on the Soviets' activity. I am prepared to 
cooperate with all parties and public-political
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organizations in the republic" (Current Digest of the 
Soviet Press vol. XLII (35) 1990, 20).
After these renarks, he quietly gathered his notes and
descended from the rostrum.
Yeltsin's resignation address was conciliatory, as
there were sound reasons for him to temper his anti-party
rhetoric. Yeltsin did not want to antagonize the
influential communist bloc in the Russian parliament, whose
participation was indispensable to elect a functioning
government. According to Morrison (1991), n[L]ike many
other radicals, he [Yeltsin] chose to keep his lines of
communication open to those who were still in the ranks"
(123). Indeed, Yeltsin needed to handle carefully moderate
members of the party, some of whom were still sheepish
about reform. For instance, at the February 5, 1990
plenum, Yeltsin proposed a number of drastic reforms.
These reforms included the abolition of Article Six of the
Soviet constitution, a text that ensured the CPSU's
monopoly on political power. In the end, Yeltsin cast a
lone vote in opposition the leadership's draft platform for
the congress. Some participants at the plenum sympathized
with Yeltsin, but they lacked the fortitude to follow his
lead. About this situation at the plenum, Yeltsin told a
Danish interviewer:
The fact that there were no others who followed my 
lead does not mean that I was alone in being opposed 
to the platform. But it is not easy to raise your 
hand and vote again, when the whole Politburo is
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sitting there staring at you. Fear still sits deep in
your stomach (in Morrison 1991, 118).
In light of this statement, Yeltsin still believed he could 
work with some factions inside the party. Thus, he wanted 
to break with the CPSU as cleanly as possible.
After his speech, Yeltsin exited immediately from the 
Kremlin Palace of Congresses without confronting audience 
members. Isolated claps and whistles of disapproval 
escorted the stoic Yeltsin to the door. An Izvestia 
correspondent described Yeltsin's departure as gentlemanly, 
leaving "without slamming the door or giving vent to his 
emotions. Therefore, you start to think something in this 
spirit: He has a better view of things, he probably knows
something we don't" (Gonzalez 1990, 20). While the 
specific thoughts in Yeltsin's mind at the time were 
unclear, the guiet manner in which he departed was clearly 
strategic.
While the rhetorically conciliatory Yeltsin wanted to 
keep doors open for possible alliances with some party 
members, working with Gorbachev became increasingly 
difficult and, eventually, impossible. Yeltsin's growing 
ire with Gorbachev's reactionary disposition erupted into 
revolutionary rage after the Vilnius incident in early 
1991.
During the first month of 1991, Soviet paratroopers 
and tanks attacked the city's television tower to quiet the 
broadcasts advocating Lithuanian independence. Unarmed
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civilians protected the tower by placing their bodies in 
front of oncoming, Soviet tanks. The tanks did not stop. 
Thirteen civilians died, and 120 others were injured during 
the evening which came to be known as Lithuania's "Bloody 
Sunday" (Coleman 1996, 332). Gorbachev's explanation of 
the incident was a public relations debacle. While he 
regretted the loss of life, Gorbachev failed to take any 
responsibility. Further, no disciplinary action was taken 
against any miliary officers in command of the Soviet 
Union's troops. Seemingly, Gorbachev engineered a cover-up 
(333).
From Yeltsin's perspective, Gorbachev's explanation 
was a lie, and the attack in Vilnius, represented an attack 
against the progress of democracy. Never before was 
Gorbachev's contempt for perestroika's repercussions so 
blatant. Prior to the Vilnius incident, Gorbachev 
frequently vacillated on key principles concerning 
democratization. For instance, in 1990, he abandoned 
Article Six of the Soviet constitution, a text which 
ensured the CPSU's monopoly on power. In that same year, 
he also sent troops to Moscow to intimidate pro-Yeltsin 
demonstrators. However, for Yeltsin, the Vilnius incident 
was a defining moment for Gorbachev.
In a February 22 speech broadcast on Soviet 
television, Yeltsin spelled out his criticism of Gorbachev 
in two parts. First, he began by reviewing his past
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relationship with the Soviet leader. Yeltsin claimed
Gorbachev gave people hope for reform in the first two
years after 1985, but "he didn't have a very good idea
about how to fulfill those promises..." (Current Digest of
the Soviet Press vol XLIII (7) 1991, 1). Thus, Yeltsin
claimed that Gorbachev's recent reform efforts bore the
name of perestroika, but the associated policies were
reactionary, not reformist, in nature. After citing
supporting evidence for this claim, Yeltsin expressed
frustration concerning his relationship with the Soviet
leader, stating, "I will say frankly, with God as my
witness, that I made many attempts to really cooperate"
(1). However, in light of the Vilnius massacre, Yeltsin
implied that cooperation was a thing of the past.
Second, Yeltsin then called for Gorbachev to step
aside as the USSR's top executive. After lamenting the
fact that he put faith in Gorbachev, Yeltsin said,
...I consider the excessive trust I put in the 
President to be my personal mistake.... I dissociate 
myself from the position and policy of president [of 
the USSR], and I call for his immediate resignation 
and the transfer of power to a collective body— the 
Council of the Federation. I have faith in Russia, 
and I urge you, esteemed fellow citizens and esteemed 
residents of the Russian Republic, to have faith in 
our Russia. I have made my choice. Everyone must 
make his choice and define his position. I want you 
to hear and understand me. This is the choice I have 
made, and I will not turn off this road (Current 
Digest of the Soviet Press vol XLIII (7) 1991, 1).
This moment marked the end of Yeltsin's use of the
conciliatory persona. For Yeltsin, the lines were drawn
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and he would not reconsider his position. From this moment 
forward, Yeltsin developed a new rhetorical strategy— a 
revolutionary persona.
CONCLUSION
As perestroika ended, Yeltsin's conciliatory persona 
began. Gorbachev failed to address decisively important 
issues facing the Soviet Union in the late 1980s.
Economic, labor, and nationality problems were met with 
half-measures and backsliding. Consequently, Yeltsin moved 
to encourage reform by predicting monumental changes in the 
Soviet Union's near future. While his speeches and actions 
were aggressive, he sought to include moderates in the 
party. By taking this tempered approach to his rhetoric of 
reform, Yeltsin hoped to consolidate power with which 
decisions about the Soviet Union's future could be made. 
Unfortunately, the Vilnius incident persuaded Yeltsin that 
Gorbachev and the party could not be swayed. Thus, the 
foundation was built on which Yeltsin would develop a 
revolutionary persona. The coming chapter examines 
Yeltsin's new persona in relation to a landmark event in 
Russian history, the popular election of a president.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENCY 
INTRODUCTION
The months following the Vilnius incident were a 
pivotal time for Yeltsin's relationship with Gorbachev. 
Yeltsin alienated himself almost completely from Soviet 
President Gorbachev and the communist party. After his 
heated condemnation of Gorbachev's handling of the massacre 
in Lithuania, many questioned Yeltsin's risky decision to 
demand a resignation from Gorbachev. Fearing conservative 
backlash, the editors of Izvestia (20 February 1991) wrote 
that Yeltsin's speech may have "added yet another dangerous 
mistake...one that could have dangerous consequences not 
only for Russia, but the entire country" (1). However, 
Yeltsin believed that the time for cooperation had passed. 
In his autobiographical work, The Struggle for Russia 
(1994), he remarked, "By late winter and early spring of 
1991, Gorbachev was sick of perestroika. He clearly saw 
the dead end into which the country had run" (16). Yeltsin 
sensed Gorbachev engaged in reactionary power grabbing 
rather than pursuing progressive political and economic 
reform. In light of Gorbachev's change of course away from 
perestroika, Yeltsin shifted his rhetorical stance to that 
of a revolutionary.
Yeltsin's revolutionary persona was observable in his 
quest for the new Russian presidency in 1991. During the
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campaign, he insisted that a large portion of Soviet power 
should be meted out to the republics. In particular, 
Yeltsin argued for increased decentralization by advocating 
a new kind of Russian nationalism. This chapter traces the 
exigency created by the Russian presidential election and 
Yeltsin's corresponding development and utilization of a 
revolutionary persona. Specifically, this chapter will 
examine the circumstances surrounding the development of 
the Russian presidential office, the presidential campaign, 
and the election's immediate aftermath.
PRELUDE TO THE PRESIDENCY
Following the Vilnius incident, Gorbachev was in a 
precarious situation. He emerged from the episode with his 
political image badly damaged. Even though Gorbachev did 
not accept the blame for the incident, he defended those 
individuals directly responsible for the bloodshed. 
Consequently, during the month after the massacre, his 
approval rating in popular-opinion polls tumbled to 13 
percent. Yeltsin, however, enjoyed a 59-percent approval 
rating (Coleman 1996, 334). To heighten his popularity and 
to bolster the image of the party, Gorbachev scheduled an 
unprecedented referendum.
For the first time in the USSR's history, a Soviet 
leader placed a significant policy decision in the hands of 
his people. In March, 1991, the question on the referendum 
ballot involved the future of the Soviet Union: Should the
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union remain together rather than separate in to sovereign 
republics? If the empire's collective reply was yes, 
Gorbachev would show the world that the USSR endured 
because of consensus, not because of force. Gorbachev's 
referendum was a clever tactical maneuver. Despite the 
rebellious mood of many republics, the idea of "union" was 
still popular among many Soviet citizens (Coleman 1996, 
335). Therefore, the Soviet president's plebiscite 
promised the possibility of capturing a public-relations 
boon.
After the votes were tallied, the answer was "yes" to 
Gorbachev's question. In all, 112 million people out of 
147 million voters, or 76 percent of those who 
participated, cast their ballots in favor of preserving the 
union (Stepovoi and chugayev 1991, 3). Moreover, in a 
number of prominent republics, citizens supported the 
referendum question: 70 percent responded affirmatively to
Gorbachev's inquiry in the Ukraine; 70 percent in 
Belorussia; 94 percent in Kazakhstan; and 93 percent in 
Azerbaidzhan. In these regions, approximately 80 percent 
of register voters participated in referendum balloting
(3).
Such a seemingly fruitful response, however, was 
arguably inconsequential for two reasons. First, the 
authors of the question worded it strategically. The 
referendum question read, "Do you consider it necessary to
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preserve the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics as a 
renewed federation of equal, sovereign republics...?" 
(Parkhomenko 1991, 1). In examining this question, it 
seemed apparent that its authors assumed that the political 
center intended to mete out power to the fringes freely. 
With this assumption manifest in the question (i.e., 
"sovereign republics"), the question's authors steered the 
respondents toward the answer of "yes." Thus, the authors, 
who modestly hid behind an obscure notarization, "a group 
of lawyers," worked to downplay the possible political 
consequences of the plebiscite— further fragmentation.
Second, Gorbachev's "victory" seemed all the more 
shallow when considered in conjunction with a second 
question affixed to the Russian ballot by Yeltsin. His 
inquiry dealt with assessing people's attitudes toward the 
creation of a Russian presidency. By attaching this 
question, Yeltsin accomplished two tasks. First, by 
introducing a referendum question on the same ballot with 
Gorbachev, Yeltsin suggested that he was his rival's equal. 
Second, Yeltsin set the stage for direct competition with 
the Soviet power structure. If Yeltsin's referendum won 
favor with the public, he planned to run in the campaign. 
Moreover, if Yeltsin won the presidential election, he 
could boast that he held more legitimacy than Gorbachev, a 
politician who refrained from participating in popular 
elections. When the referendum results returned, Yeltsin's
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question was approved by 70 percent of voters (Coleman 
1996, 335).
In the fanfare surrounding the referendum's 
proceedings, the tension between Gorbachev's reverence for 
the Soviet dream and reform became increasingly evident. 
When garnering support for his referendum question, 
Gorbachev contradicted himself. On the one hand, he 
advocated pluralism and innovation. On the other, he 
criticized what he dubbed "so-called democrats" for their 
appropriation of Western ideas. According to Gorbachev, 
democrats used Western concepts like "marketization" as 
tools to break apart the Soviet Union. Rather than left- 
wing politicians, the "so-called democrats" were, in fact, 
betrayers who were allying themselves with separatists and 
fascists. Moreover, Gorbachev claimed that Western ideas 
served only as tools for a kind of psychological warfare 
against the political coherence of the nation (Morrison 
1992, 236). In short, Gorbachev was trying to slow the 
process of democratization and to keep reforms under his 
control.
Of Gorbachev's inconsistencies, Yeltsin grew weary and 
donned a revolutionary persona in response. On March 9, 
Yeltsin addressed a meeting of the Democratic Russian bloc 
and delivered a blunt message: democrats were to organize
an opposition party against the CPSU, as the time for 
cooperation with Gorbachev was over. During his invective,
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Yeltsin cast aside his prepared notes and labeled 
conservative communist party members "traitors" and 
"enemies." Furthermore, he ordered his supporters to "take 
the offensive" (Morrison 1992, 237). For these remarks, 
Yeltsin's aides chastised him for his impromptu 
performance. Consequently, he later regretted using words 
including "enemies" and "war" in his address. Several days 
after the speech, Yeltsin remarked, "I wrote it [the 
prepared speech] at night, and when I mounted the rostrum,
I realized that I couldn't just read out a speech in that 
auditorium. I said what I felt" (237). What Yeltsin 
"felt" was an undeniable feeling of frustration with the 
Soviet order. Like any revolutionary, Yeltsin knew that a 
break with the past must occur to make way for the future.
Russia's citizens, too, felt frustration with 
Gorbachev and the Kremlin. In support of Yeltsin's 
militant speech, crowds of people heeded his call for 
opposition and poured into the streets of the Soviet Union. 
On March 10, 200,000 paraded in Moscow, 70,000 in 
Leningrad, and 50,000 in Sverdlovsk. The demonstrators 
cheered for Yeltsin and chanted slogans including, 
"Gorbachev, get out!" (Morrison 1991, 238). After this 
demonstration, a month of rallies ensued which culminated 
after the referendum vote on March 28.
Most directly, the March 28 protests occurred in 
response to a March 25 resolution by the USSR's Cabinet of
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Ministers. This resolution introduced a state of emergency 
in Moscow from March 26 through April 15 which banned all 
public demonstrations. The Russian congress responded 
quickly to the Soviet government's proclamation by issuing 
a statement of protest signed by 220 RSFSR deputies. In 
this statement, the deputies affirmed their responsibility 
to their constituents. Further, they claimed that the 
Soviet's law impinged on citizens' constitutional right of 
free expression and served to pressure the Russian congress 
to take a more conservative stance (Demchenko and Shipitko 
1991, 3). In conjunction with this statement, the Russian 
congress urged citizens to march in the streets to protest 
conservativism in the Kremlin and the Ministers' resolution 
on temporarily suspending the holding of rallies, street 
processions, and demonstrations in Moscow.
Despite Gorbachev's deployment of 50,000 troops in 
Moscow, defiant citizens took to the streets on March 28.
As if to diminish the gravity of the protests, official 
news agencies downplayed the turnout by reporting spurious 
information. The Beacon radio station broadcasted that 
about 900 gathered in one square in Moscow; police measured 
protest participation in the tens of thousands. However, 
the rally's organizers, the Democratic Russia Movement, 
reported that by 7 p.m., about 700,000 demonstrators had 
gathered in Mayakovsky, Arbart, and Pushkin squares 
(Ardayev, Andreyev, et. al. 1991, 1). Fortunately, no
i
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
noteworthy violence occurred and, in the end, Gorbachev
recalled the troops.
The events surrounding the demonstrations and the
plenum constituted a major blow against Gorbachev's
credibility. By placing 50,000 troops in his own capital,
the result was widely seen as a self-inflicted political
defeat. As such, the Soviet president's intended show of
strength turned into a display of weakness (Morrison 1991,
242). Thus, Gorbachev's inability to work with political
opposition developed into an unexpected gift for Yeltsin.
Upon Gorbachev's shortcomings, Yeltsin furthered his use of
a revolutionary persona.
During the week following the March 28 demonstrations
in Moscow, Yeltsin sternly denounced Gorbachev and
advocated revolutionary change. For the congress, it was a
time of heated arguments. In a one-and-a-half-hour speech,
Yeltsin told the deputies that Russia faced a decision
between distinct political lines— further fundamental
reform or the perpetuation of an outmoded system disguised
by the word perestroika. Arguing for revolutionary change,
Yeltsin proclaimed:
The objective outcome of the past six years has shown 
that we were dealing not with perestroika, but with 
the last phase of stagnation. However, there are 
positive results. The country is now longer where it 
was. The main thing that has changed is the people; 
they have recognized the truth about the society in 
which they live, about its history, about life in 
other countries. Millions have awakened (in Morrison 
1991, 242).
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Yeltsin's revolutionary tone was evident in this address.
By reinterpreting events of the past six years as 
n stagnation," he set the stage for his crusade to 
decentralize political power in the Soviet Union. To 
promote the notion of an increasingly sovereign Russia, 
Yeltsin employed a revolutionary persona during the 
campaign for the Russian presidency.
THE RACE
June 12, 1991, was a monumental moment in Russia. On 
this day, the people of the republic elected a president, 
Boris Yeltsin, for the first time in its thousand-year 
history. The presidential post was created in late May, 
1991 by Russia's Supreme Soviet, and the legislation gained 
quick approval by the Russian Congress of Peoples'
Deputies. This law was particularly noteworthy because of 
its emphasis on a separation of powers among a legislature, 
an executive, and a constitutional court (Morrison 1991, 
259-60). In short, the Russian presidency marked an 
important point in the republic's progress toward a 
Western-style government and its struggle for greater 
autonomy.
The creation of the Russian presidency occurred within 
the context of the republic's pursuit of increased 
independence from the Soviet Union. Under Yeltsin's 
chairmanship, the Russian parliament formally declared the 
republic's sovereignty in June, 1990. While the meaning of
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"sovereignty" was ambiguous to most delegates, the 
declaration's implication was clear: Russia endeavored to
distance itself from the Kremlin's authority. During 1990, 
the Russian parliament straightforwardly passed laws at 
odds with Soviet law. Some of the parliament's laws 
ensured that tax money collected in Russia went directly to 
the Russian government rather than to Soviet authorities.
Of course, the Kremlin countered by claiming its laws took 
precedence (Coleman 1996, 335). The result of such clashes 
was a constitutional crisis in which the Russian republic's 
leadership attempted to prod Gorbachev toward more 
enterprising and faster reform.
Russia's separatist bearing was evident when the 
Yeltsin-led congress formulated its law on the Russian 
presidency. The executive position's basic specifications 
were rather orthodox. For instance, to be president in 
Russia, one was required to be a citizen of the RSFSR and 
be no younger than 35, but no older than 65. Once in 
office, the law dictated than an individual's term included 
five years, and an individual could not serve more than two 
consecutive terms. The law on the presidency, however, was 
unusually stringent regarding specific affiliations. Those 
holding office as a Peoples' Deputy, those holding posts in 
any state organizations, and those who belong to any 
political party were restricted from holding office as 
Russia's president (Sorokin 1991, 2). By eliminating the
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direct influence of political parties, one may speculate 
that the congress actively attempted to curtail the 
activity of the communist party in Russian presidential 
politics.
Despite precautions against CPSU influence in the 
election, conservative opposition was encountered during 
the campaign for Russia's first president. Of course, 
Yeltsin ran as the chief radical in the pack of contenders. 
His most formidable resistance came from Nikolai Ryzhkov, 
the prime minister and a man rooted in the past of Soviet 
tradition. Ryzhkov was supported by the CPSU and the 
state-sanctioned media. Even further to the right stood 
General Albert Makashov, an old-fashioned military 
conservative who gained notoriety in 1990 for his austere 
criticism of Gorbachev's foreign policy. Vadim Bakatin, 
the liberal interior minister, was perceived as the 
candidate backed by Gorbachev. Other, lesser known 
candidates included: Aman Tuleyev, a local politician from
the Kemerovo province in Siberia; and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 
a maverick right-winger who based his blustery campaign on 
appeals to Russian imperialism (Morrison 1991, 260). To 
help in his quest against these competitors, Yeltsin made 
an astute choice for a running mate.
Yeltsin selected Alexander Rutskoi as his vice- 
presidential contender. Rutskoi was well liked by many 
Russians, as he had earned a miliary hero's reputation
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during the Soviet Union's Afghan conflict. Further, he 
stood in opposition to Gorbachev on social issues and 
denounced the Soviet President furiously for dodging 
accountability for the bloodshed at the Vilinus television 
tower (Morrison 1991, 261). As a running mate, Rutskoi 
suited Yeltsin's needs well because he appealed to a wide 
range of voters, including miliary personnel, and he 
clashed with Gorbachev on a number of important campaign 
issues.
With all the candidates in place, the presidential 
race transpired at a vigorous pace. By American standards, 
the political contest was brief, lasting only three weeks. 
Nevertheless, Yeltsin made the most of his time. While his 
competitors griped about the campaign's brevity, Yeltsin 
took the path of an incumbent. Yeltsin made a number of 
"working visits" to not only evaluate the circumstances in 
Russia's furthest reaches, but to promote his radical 
ideas. He journeyed inside the Arctic Circle to Murmansk 
and to Severomorsk, a base for the navy's Northern Fleet. 
Yeltsin's path then led to Petrozavodsk in Karelia, to the 
heartland cities of Tula and Voronezh, and then to 
industrial cities in the Urals, including Perm,
Chelyabinsk, Orenburg, and Sverdlovsk (Morrison 1992, 263). 
By campaigning extensively in these regions, Yeltsin added 
to his allure as a "man of the people" and garnered grass­
roots support.
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During his campaign travels, according to Morrison
(1992), Yeltsin focused primarily on four issues: the fall
of the Soviet dream; economic reform; the promise of a
better life; and Russian nationalism. Concerning the first
issue, Yeltsin portayed the goals of Leninist-Marxism as an
experiment gone awry. Abstracting his views on the Soviet
aspirations, Yeltsin said:
The myths that oppressed millions over many decades 
have lost their illusionary attraction. The dynamic 
process of removing ideology from public awareness has 
been going on throughout this time. Sometimes, this 
is called a moral disaster. I disagree categorically. 
Renunciation of the false signposts that have led 
people into an impasse, ruined the lives of 
multitudes, and destroyed the centuries-old traditions 
of a great nation is not a disaster but the first step 
toward moral rebirth. It is founded not upon the 
ideology of a superclass to which all is permitted but 
on universal human values and norms of life (in 
Morrison 1991, 264).
By stating that the legacy of Lenin "led people into an
impasse," Yeltsin insinuated that the road to communism was
at an end. Consequently, Yeltsin provided his audience
with a basis for a revolutionary break with the past,
giving his audience a reason to embrace a new kind of
Russian political future— one based on equality, not on
party membership.
To further justify abandoning the ways of Communism,
Yeltsin expounded his views on economics during the
Presidential campaign. Yeltsin claimed that the Soviet
economy teetered on the edge of disaster; thus, a move to a
market-style economy was necessary. Anticipating
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resistance from those leery of capitalism, Yeltsin
attempted to circumvent controversy by promoting a
utilitarian view of economics. He refused to debate the
merits of capitalism over socialism:
I sun asked during my trips, 'Are you for socialism or 
capitalism?' I say: I am in favor of Russians living
better— materially, spiritually, and culturally....A 
healthier society is determined by how people live, 
how they work, and how they are provided for 
materially, culturally, and intellectually. As for a 
name [for the new economic policy], people will 
think one up (in Morrison 1991, 265).
Yeltsin presented his views of economics by tactfully
eschewing clashing with voters on sensitive, Marxist
principles. Nevertheless, Yeltsin clearly promoted the
abandonment of socialism and central economic planning,
central planks in the CPSU's platform. Often, Yeltsin
appealed to crowds' sense of suffering. In one speech, he
held up a ration card used to purchase consumer goods and
declared, "This is a constant humiliation, a reminder that
every hour you are a slave in this country" (265). In
short, Yeltsin argued in favor of finding innovative and
ideology-free economic policies that "worked.”
On the promise of a better life, Yeltsin declared that
his presidency would stimulate improved living conditions
for Russian citizens. During his travels, he made sweeping
promises to audiences concerning swift economic reforms
like privatization and land reform. Yeltsin guaranteed a
number improvements including better wages, a shorter work
week, and lower fares for rail travel. Further, he gave
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special attention to the welfare grievances of the armed 
forces, promising some form of "social protection” for 
handicapped and homeless veterans. To afford these social 
programs, Yeltsin argued that Russia could reduce its 
contributions to the central budget of the Soviet Union and 
spend more money internally. Yeltsin acknowledged the 
necessity of the Soviet Union's role in defense, railways, 
and power generation, as the republics were closely bound 
by infrastructure, nevertheless, he contended that 
decentralized republics could better provide for its 
citizens with local use of tax revenues than the Soviet 
Union as an all-encompassing, administrative giant. Here 
again, as with his views on economics, Yeltsin justified 
decentralization by appealing to practicality, not party- 
endorsed theory.
Finally, Yeltsin's most revolutionary theme promoted 
the "rebuilding" of Russia. Appealing to patriotism rather 
than ideological principles, Yeltsin promised devolution of 
the Soviet state, radical reform, and protection for Russia 
diaspora scattered throughout the USSR (Morrison 1991, 263- 
4). In light of events during the late 1980s and early 
1990s, Yeltsin deduced that the Soviet Union's size 
encumbered efficient administration. Thus, downsizing was 
advisable. In the Soviet Union's place, Yeltsin believed a 
new Russia would rise— a Russia built on national pride and 
history:
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It had become perfectly clear that patriotism lies not 
only in words about love of the Russian past, not only 
in empty admiration of the uniqueness of our national 
character, and not only in fencing ourselves off from 
the rest of humanity. Today the highest form of 
patriotism is to serve the cause of Russia's progress, 
to participate actively in the deep transformations of 
its life, giving the Russians a real right to be proud 
of their motherland (in Morrison 1991, 264).
Clearly, Yeltsin's stance was revolutionary. As noted
previously, Cohen (1985) argued that the central feature of
revolutions is "newness." Cohen further explained that
revolutions might be "links of transformation between the
old and the new" (8). Thus, it made sense that Yeltsin
believed that building Russian future meant borrowing from
the nation's pre-Soviet past.
With these four issues at the forefront of his
campaign, Yeltsin won by an impressive margin against his
five rivals. He needed at least 50 percent of the vote to
avoid a runoff. However, Yeltsin captured just under 57.4
percent on the first ballot. As expected by pollsters,
Yeltsin performed well in industrial cities, winning 72
percent in Moscow and 90 percent in Sverdlovsk. In all,
Ryzhkov placed second with 17.3 percent, excelling in the
conservative countryside. Zhirinovsky finished in a
surprising third place with 7.9 percent of the ballot,
demonstrating that his ultra-nationalistic message appealed
to a significant number of Russians. Finishing last in the
race were: Tuleyev with 6.1 percent of the vote; Makashov
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with 3.8 percent; and Bakatin, the candidate supported by 
Gorbachev, with 3.5 percent (Morrison 1991, 267).
Yeltsin's victory was decisive, but the public was 
still uncertain about Russia's move away from the security 
afforded by Soviet government. Between June 14-15, a post­
election survey of 1,500 voters measured attitudes toward 
campaign issues including economic and social concerns.
The survey revealed reluctant outlooks about revolutionary 
reform. About 36 percent of the respondents backed an 
"endeavor to reform the republic's economy by patterning it 
after developed countries of the west," but another 36 
percent backed an "endeavor to reform the republics 
economy, but without allowing it to become capitalist..." 
(Kuvaldin 1991, 3). On social concerns, 49.9 percent of 
respondents expressed a desire to preserve the state's 
responsibility for solving housing and other social 
problems. Concurrently, only 16.7 percent expressed a 
desire to move the responsibility of housing and other 
social problems to the private sector (3). From the 
results, it seemed that Russian citizens were apprehensive 
about moving away from the familiar Soviet system of 
government.
The survey's results also indicated public anxiety 
about political change. Twenty percent of respondents 
considered themselves supporters of the communist Party, 
seven to nine percent supported the Democratic Russia
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Movement, and four to seven percent supported various 
diminutive parties. The majority of voters, 60 to 70 
percent, did not support any one party (Kuvaldin 1991, 3). 
Even after Yeltsin won the election, slightly more that 51 
percent of those surveyed indicated a "readiness to 
cooperate with all parties and movements,” and only 11.8 
percent refused to support cooperation with the CPSU (3).
In light of the perceived need for political change, people 
recognized no clear allegiance to a party. The collapse of 
the old regime progressed faster than the rise of a new 
one. Nevertheless, on June 12, Russia passed the point of 
no return. There was no going back, as socio-political 
conditions required radical change and Yeltsin escalated 
his revolutionary rhetoric.
ELECTION AFTERMATH 
After the election, Yeltsin continued the use of his 
revolutionary persona during his second trip to America and 
during his inaugural address. Yeltsin again ventured to 
the United States immediately after his election. As if to 
erase the embarrassing memories of his first venture to 
America, Yeltsin returned for two reasons. First, he 
wanted to establish good relations with President Bush. 
Unlike his first trip, in which he was shunned by the 
American president, Yeltsin wanted to discuss the future of 
U.S.-Russian relations as equals. Second, Yeltsin wanted 
to use his post-election journey as a pulpit from which he
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could state his position on the progress of Russian 
domestic policy.
In America, Yeltsin's stance against Gorbachev was 
revolutionary. During an address at Andrews Air Force 
Base, Yeltsin attacked Gorbachev for his lack of commitment 
to steady reform. Yeltsin asserted that he did not want 
"halfhearted measures, halfhearted reform, semidemocracy" 
(Morrison 1991, 269). Instead, he claimed that the Russian 
people had voted for a market economy and privatization so 
that they might keep up with and join "all civilized 
countries of the world" (269). In an interview with 
American journalist Ted Koppel, Yeltsin warned, "If he 
[Gorbachev] holds up reform, if he makes halfhearted 
decisions, if he pressures the republics, including 
military pressure, I am his opponent" (269). Certainly, 
Yeltsin welcomed Gorbachev's cooperation in an effort to 
bring democracy and marketization to Russia. At the same 
time, however, Yeltsin professed that the days of Soviet 
socialism and international isolation were at an end. Of 
Gorbachev, Yeltsin declared, "There is no way for one man 
to preserve the Soviet Union....Slow, halfhearted change 
would be fatal" (270).
Yeltsin further expounded his views with a 
revolutionary persona, during his inaugural address. In 
this address, he asserted that Russia's near future 
included a new history, a reborn economy, and a new spirit.
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The introduction of the speech included an exclamation of 
wonderment and an explanation of Russia's newest 
aspirations:
It is impossible to convey in words my mental state at 
this moment... .The first President in the thousand- 
year history of Russia has taken a solemn oath to his 
fellow citizens. There is no higher honor that a 
people renders to an individual....For centuries in 
our country, power and the people were at opposite 
poles. Not finding the truth in life, people tried to 
find it in the skies and in dreams of a radiant 
future. For centuries the state's interest, as a 
rule, was placed above the individual, his needs and 
aspirations (2).
Here, Yeltsin quickly established for his audience the idea
that Soviet aspirations were, in fact, myths. A new
political future was at hand which integrated the needs of
the people with government. In Yeltsin's own words, he
announced a "rebirth of human dignity" (3).
Part of such rebirth included the uneasiness of
change. Concerning radical reform, Yeltsin claimed that it
would not come easily. Nevertheless, change was something
the Russian people chose when they elected him to the
presidential post. Commenting on his role as chief
executive, Yeltsin stated:
Radical reforms are the essence of the President's 
course. We have all made a choice in favor of 
peaceful, legal, and democratic methods of 
transformation. The purport of our policy is not mass 
self-sacrifice but the good of each individual and his 
interest. A worthy life is not granted from on high 
and does not come by itself. It is impossible to 
arrive at it drawn up in columns and blindly following 
orders from above. It will be based on the freedom of 
enterprises and geographic areas, on initiative and 
enterprise (in Current Digest of the Soviet Press vol. 
XLIII (28) 1991, 3).
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Yeltsin's explanation of his presidential role signified 
that he was a mandated agent of change. Accordingly, 
Yeltsin intended to be responsive to his constituents as he 
battled to ensure the rights of individuals rather than the 
communistic pursuit of mass utopianism.
Also in his inaugural address, Yeltsin explained the 
kind of character which would distinguish the new Russia. 
Yeltsin's Russia would be one concerned with its own 
affairs, relying on its own traditions to define its path. 
According to Yeltsin, apart from the USSR, Russia would no 
longer pursue imperial ambitions. Yeltsin claimed that the 
idea of "empire" was "profoundly alien to the political 
course chosen by the people" (3). Yeltsin's Russia 
intended to gain allies, not enemies, in the world 
community, thereby affirming "creative human principles-* 
freedom, property, legality, openness..." (3). Part of 
this process meant a return to traditional Russian values, 
including religion. Commenting briefly on the subject of 
Christianity, Yeltsin stated, "Russian Republic citizens 
will no longer renounce their past, present and future to 
suit dogma....The rebirth of our state will be based on the 
spiritual emancipation of people, true freedom of 
conscience, and complete rejection of any ideological 
diktat" (3). This statement was a truly revolutionary 
change, as the Soviet Union's official policies discouraged 
religious practices.
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Concluding, he encouraged his listeners to overcome 
present trials to rekindle the Russian spirit. Yeltsin 
invoked the glory of Russia's past to inspire his 
listeners:
The creative potential of the republic's peoples and 
of the Russian people is great. They have borne, with 
pain and honor, all the trials sent to them by fate, 
and they have managed, under very inhuman conditions, 
to retain a moral sense of faith in their Russia. The 
very rich and distinctive Russian culture, that 
tireless advocate of good, humanism and justice, is 
alive (3).
With his faith in the nature of his audience, Yeltsin 
believed that, "Great Russia is rising from her knees!”
(4). The rule of oppression was to be replaced by 
democracy and the rule of law. With these words, Yeltsin 
stood at the juncture between Soviet rule and the dawn of a 
new beginning.
CONCLUSION
After the Vilnius incident, Yeltsin promoted a 
reinterpretation of the Soviet experience to rhetorically 
create Russia's future. He concluded that working within 
the Soviet government's institutional framework was 
impossible. For over seventy years, the USSR's politics 
operated with the hope that a Marxist utopia was possible. 
Thus, people were to abandon self-centered desires and work 
toward the common goals of society. Concurrently, 
government Marxist-based theory predicted that forms of 
government would wither away as society would regulate 
itself. However, rather than utopia, an avaricious system
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of bureaucracy developed. In this arrangement, the 
nomenklatura held the levers of power in a stratified 
society supported by the labors of the masses. Yeltsin 
spoke for the abandonment of such practices in his quest 
for the Russian presidency.
In the name of a "new Russia," Yeltsin sought sweeping 
changes. Yeltsin demonstrated the signs of revolution in 
his discourse during his handling of the CPSU's ban on 
street demonstrations, during his presidential campaign, 
and during the election's aftermath. By subordinating the 
USSR's authority to that of Russia, he provoked radical 
institutional change. Further, among Russia's citizens, he 
wanted to encourage grass-roots efficiency and individual 
initiative. Certainly, Yeltsin gave opportunities to 
Gorbachev for participation in innovations. Nevertheless, 
Yeltsin abandoned hope in the CPSU's ability to manage 
Russia's future. In reaction to the progress of Yeltsin's 
assault, the party reacted with a startling coup in August, 
1991, that would precipitate the end of the Soviet Union.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE END OF AN EMPIRE 
INTRODUCTION 
The aftermath of Yeltsin's Russian presidential 
victory marked a dire moment for Soviet conservatives. In 
the months following the election, it became clear that the 
USSR was involved in a vigorous process of transformation. 
Citizens gained an awareness of the importance of their 
participation in elections and of their ability to guide 
civic affairs. Gorbachev became increasingly liberal, as 
he meted out political power to the republics. And 
Yeltsin, in his new position, outwardly advocated the 
diminished prominence of the central government in 
political decision making. If conservatives intended to 
maintain their status in the Soviet Union, drastic measures 
were necessary.
Conservatives took such measures by launching a 
reactionary coup. This situation was strikingly similar to 
another predicament that occurred about 20 years earlier in 
Prague. When Soviet tanks entered the Czechoslovakian 
capital, Brezhnev's military aimed to beat back the reforms 
that threatened communism. On August 19, 1991, Soviet 
tanks rolled once again to maintain the legacy of Lenin. 
This time, however, the tanks were not driven to another 
country. This time, the tanks moved through Moscow in a 
desperate mission to save some semblance of the status quo.
145
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This chapter traces the coup and Yeltsin's rhetorical 
management of the reactionary coup. Specifically, coverage 
will include reasons underlying the coup, Yeltsin's 
response to the uprising itself, and his struggle to 
extinguish the dying, smoldering embers of Soviet authority 
in Russia after the coup plotters' failure. Further, 
Yeltsin's utilization of a revolutionary persona will be 
examined.
CONCEPTION OF A COUP 
Events during the first half of 1991 gave conservative 
forces in the communist party good reasons to fear for 
their political lives. Democratization and 
decentralization threatened the status quo to which many 
had grown accustomed. Primarily, three reasons provoked 
the conservative backlash which incited the August, 1991 
coup.
The Yeltsin Factor
First, Yeltsin's success in promoting Russia's 
sovereignty created an air of anxiety among hardline 
conservatives. During and immediately after his 
presidential campaign, Yeltsin beamed with confidence and 
was frank in presenting his desires for Russian self* 
sufficiency. On Russian soil, Yeltsin desired the ability 
to direct the republic's affairs according to the "will" of 
the voting public. Thus, he demanded the transfer of a 
number of Soviet powers into Russia's hands: management of
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economic reform; command of nuclear arms; and authority to 
negotiate relations with foreign countries (Coleman 1996, 
338). Yeltsin also wanted to cut defence spending, openly 
admitting that Russia no longer wanted to be a world 
superpower (Morrison 1991, 278). In essence, Yeltsin 
pursued the idea of Soviet decentralization with 
unprecedented verve.
To encourage such a process of increasing republic 
power, Yeltsin badgered communist party activity in Russia. 
On June 20, Yeltsin ordered a ban on party operations in 
the administration of the Russian state. In his decree, 
Yeltsin expressed his commitment to ensure the equal rights 
of all political parties and mass, public movements. To 
accomplish the goal, he believed that the hegemony of party 
influence needed to be broken. Thus, he suspended the 
participation of parties— including the communist party— in 
Russian government. Yeltsin proclaimed that the 
"indication.. .of membership in a political party or mass 
public movements in official documents presented to state 
agencies, institutions, and organizations is forbidden" 
fSovetskava Rossia 23 July 1991, 1). Put succinctly, 
Yeltsin stopped short of completely prohibiting party 
activity in Russia, but it was banned within the workings 
of Russian government. This extraordinary decree 
represented a monumental hindrance for the communist party; 
however, the worst was yet to come.
i
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Several days after the Russian president's decree,
Vice-President Rutskoi called for the total eradication of
the Russian communist party. At a Communists for Democracy
meeting, Rutskoi announced that communist politics had no
role in the Russian Republic:
We are building a new republic party that is not 
an alternative Russian Communist Party, and we call 
for the abolishment of the Russian Communist 
Party... .We must draw dividing lines on the basis of 
ideological convictions, and my ideology is simple—  
the ideology of an ordinary person (Izvestia 24 July, 
1).
Rutskoi wanted to focus the Russian government's efforts on 
reform, not on settling quibbles in the party.
Clearly, Yeltsin and his camp were committed to 
rooting out Communist authority. While Russia was not yet 
an independent country, it was well on its way to being out 
from under CPSU influence. From the Communists' 
perspective, the potential loss stood as a great threat. 
Russia composed two-thirds of the USSR's land mass, held 
half of its population, and most of its mineral resources 
(Coleman 1996, 337-8). Without Russia under its control, 
communism faced ruinous future prospects.
Ttie_g7— P.Ian
Second, Gorbachev's negotiations with the "Group of 
Seven" (G7) provided conservatives with serious concerns.
In July, Gorbachev was invited to London to participate in 
an economic summit between the world's seven richest 
nations— the United States, Britain, France, Germany,
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Italy, Japan, and Canada. Gorbachev's participation was an 
honor, as he was the first Soviet leader to participate at 
this exclusive event. The event, however, provided 
Gorbachev with more than distinction; it provided him with 
opportunity. Gorbachev saw the meeting as a chance to 
encourage foreign investment in the Soviet Union to 
revitalize its staggering economy. Realizing that many 
nations would be reluctant to finance a cold-war 
antagonist, the Soviet president concocted an inventive 
plan.
In a confidential document distributed to G7 leaders, 
Gorbachev proposed the exchange of investment in the USSR 
for Soviet military secrets. He suggested that the G7 
nations contribute business expertise and investment 
capital for a $30-40 billion program to convert the Soviet 
Union's miliary machine into profitable enterprises. In 
return, Gorbachev intended to give participants in his 
strategy access to elite defense and manufacturing 
facilities. Further, Gorbachev was also prepared to offer 
generous tax incentives and licensing agreements (Coleman 
1996, 339). This plan was extreme, and Gorbachev realized 
the likelihood of opposition. Nevertheless, he also 
realized his nation could not survive by continuing to 
subsidize unprofitable industries and failing to provide 
its citizens an adequate supply of essential consumer 
goods.
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Not surprisingly, the few military and political 
leaders aware of Gorbachev's plan reacted to it with 
resentment. To them, the entire idea was inconceivable.
The Soviet Union toiled for decades to create one of the 
world's most potent military forces. Soviet defense plants 
were guarded with such secrecy that workers were forbidden 
to reveal factory sites. Frequently, friends and family of 
factory workers knew only a loved one's post office box, 
never their exact location. After all of the secrecy and 
effort invested in creating the Soviet miliary machine, 
Gorbachev wanted to give everything away. He proposed 
allowing "spies" to enter miliary facilities and "steal" 
their secrets. To this, leading conservatives said "no," 
though they could not formally persuade Gorbachev 
otherwise.
A New Union Treaty
Third, the negotiation of a new Union Treaty stoked 
further the fire of Gorbachev's impending demise. As with 
the G7 negotiations, the Union Treaty threatened to take 
power away from the USSR's guiding institutions. The 
defining objective of the Union Treaty was to move 
important decision making power from the Kremlin and give 
it to the Soviet Union's 15 republics. The final draft of 
the treaty recognized each republic as a sovereign state 
with the ability to resolve "all questions of their 
development, guaranteeing equal political rights and
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opportunities for social, economic, and cultural 
development to all peoples living on their territories"
(12vestia 15 August 1991, 1). With increased authority in 
the hands of those guiding the republics, the USSR would be 
reduced to an emasculated coordinating body (Coleman 1996, 
335). In light of the proposed transfer of power, Kremlin 
politicians and constituents of the USSR's nomenklatura 
understood they would become increasingly irrelevant.
Gorbachev realized that the terms of the treaty would 
infuriate the nomenklatura, but his hand was forced. The 
republics openly demonstrated in favor of increased 
sovereignty. In early March, a nation-wide miners' 
walkout crippled the country. The protesters' demands were 
economic and political in nature, including calls for the 
resignation of Gorbachev; the resignation of Pavlov, a 
former minister of finance who maimed the economy by 
printing excessive amounts of currency to keep pace with 
inflation; and the disbanding of the USSR's Supreme Soviet 
(Sakwa 1993, 9). To appease the miners' demands and the 
public's sentiments, Gorbachev turned to the democratic 
forces for support, which was earned by drafting a new 
Union Treaty. Gorbachev made concessions reluctantly, but, 
regardless of the political sacrifice involved, he intended 
to ensure the preservation of the union. Initial outlines 
of the treaty were penned in April, but the definitive 
draft was scheduled for formal ratification on August 20, a
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date coup plotters considered when planning for their 
insurgence.
Obviously, Kremlin conservatives felt threatened by 
the liberal activities during early-to-mid 1991. The 
impending signing of the Union Treaty, Gorbachev's G7 
negotiations, and Yeltsin's forthright advocacy of 
decentralization all marked the USSR's advance toward a new 
era— an era in which the Kremlin and the nomenklatura would 
hold only a cursory role. Increasingly, conservatives 
realized that the old rivalry between Yeltsin and Gorbachev 
was a bogus confrontation, as the two shared similar, 
liberal visions. The actual battle raged between old 
institutions of power, including the KGB, the communist 
party, and the military, and the emerging, nascent forces 
of democracy and capitalism (Morrison 1991, 275). In light 
of this struggle, some reactionary members of the USSR's 
old guard decided to create an opportunity to check the 
nation's progressive course.
The -gsw
Conservative putschists took control of the Soviet 
Union with an ill-prepared, short-lived coup on August 19. 
The principal conspirators in the scheme included Pavlov, 
the Prime Minister; Vladimir Kryuchkov, head of the KGB; 
Dmitrii Yazov, the Minister of Defence; and Yanaev, the 
Soviet Vice President. Their immediate goal was to 
obstruct the signing of the Union Treaty which was
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scheduled for the following day, August 20. Moreover, they 
sought to take back lost political ground, as the coup 
embodied an effort to settle the crisis of power and the 
conflict of opposed ideologies (Sakwa 1993, 11). To 
accomplish their goals, the coup plotters needed to 
neutralize Gorbachev.
On the day prior to the takeover, August 18, the 
conspirators directed a delegation of representatives to 
detain Gorbachev in his holiday home in the Crimea. The 
delegation's task was to present the vacationing Soviet 
President Gorbachev with an ultimatum: support a 
reactionary state of emergency or step aside as leader of 
the USSR. By agreeing to a state of emergency, Gorbachev 
would have participated in a revolt against progressive 
reform and a return to authoritarianism. By stepping 
aside, Gorbachev would have willingly allowed a return to 
authoritarianism. Gorbachev refused to accept either 
demand. Consequently, the plotters' delegation and 
Gorbachev's treasonous security staff confined the Soviet 
Union's chief executive and his family to the vacation 
home's grounds, cutting them off from communication with 
friends, the USSR, and the rest of the world.
With the Soviet president sequestered, the plotters 
moved to take formal control of the country. Toward this 
end, a series of decrees were issued. Vice-President 
Yanaev printed a brief proclamation in Soviet newspapers
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which claimed that Gorbachev was "ill." Accordingly,
Yanaev assumed the duties of acting president of the USSR, 
citing relevant passages of the Soviet constitution fPravda 
and Izvestia 20 August 1991a, l). Simultaneously, a newly- 
formed State Committee for the State of Emergency asserted 
its authority. The committee was comprised of the four 
original plotters, plus Pugo, Baklanov, Alexander Tizyakov, 
and Vasilii Starodubtsev. They claimed the USSR's 
stability was threatened by Gorbachev's absence.
Therefore, a state of emergency was declared to "prevent 
society from sliding toward a nationwide catastrophe and to 
safeguard legality and order...for a period of six months" 
fPravda and Izvestia 20 August 1991b, 1). However, it 
would soon become apparent that the committee planned to do 
more than simply appropriate control in Gorbachev's 
absence. They took this opportunity to promote their 
reactionary movement.
The emergency committee made its views about the 
Soviet President's leadership quite clear. They claimed 
that the reforms initiated by Gorbachev led the USSR to the 
brink of disaster and that corrections must occur. On 
August 20, the committee published an "Appeal to the Soviet 
People" in newspapers. The article reflected reactionary 
views, stating that "[f]or a number of reasons, the policy 
reforms begun at the initiative of M. S. Gorbachev.. .has 
reached an impasse. The initial enthusiasm and hopes have
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given way to unbelief, apathy, and despair" fPravda and 
izvestia 20 August 1991c, 1). Thus, the committee assumed 
leadership to reestablish expedient political conditions 
and to restore the "pride and honor of Soviet people" (1).
Realizing that such a reactionary transition might be 
disputed, the committee ordered the military into the 
streets of Moscow and other key cities. Officially, the 
justification for this decision was the protection of the 
citizens. They claimed that, in the nation's current 
condition, "people's basic personal safety is increasingly 
under threat. Crime is growing at a rapid rate and is 
becoming organized and politicized" fPravda and Izvestia 20 
August 1991c, l). Because of this "threat," the committee 
argued that a temporary deployment of troops was necessary 
for the citizens' protection. "Protection," however, also 
included curbing potential democratic opposition. As 
miliary forces entered Moscow, a detachment of 50 tanks 
surrounded the Russian "White House," the headguarters of 
the Russian SFSR Supreme Soviet. Also, key democratic 
leaders faced intimidation: Priest Gleb Yakunin and RSFSR
People's Deputy Bella Denisenko were threatened with 
arrests (Malash 1991, 1); and a team of commandos stalked 
Yeltsin.
Given the circumstances surrounding the committee's 
takeover, it soon became evident that the situation was not 
temporary. Conservatives aimed to take back control of the
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Soviet Union. Though the coup was poorly planned and 
poorly managed, it presented a serious threat to the 
progress of reform. Thus, Yeltsin moved quickly to ensure 
the advancement of progressive policy.
YELTSIN'S REACTION
Yeltsin's response to the coup favored the return of 
the Soviet president to office, as Gorbachev was, at this 
point, part of the Russian president's revolution. In 
light of past problems between the two leaders, one might 
have assumed that Yeltsin wanted to be rid of Gorbachev. 
Events during mid-1991, however, modified Yeltsin's view of 
the Soviet president. Yeltsin expressed a positive opinion 
of Gorbachev's work on the new Union Treaty in a late-July 
interview. He commented, "I personally feel certain that 
now Gorbachev is finally going to stop dashing from one 
side to the other, that he is now irrevocably set on 
reform" (Alimov 1991, 2). If Gorbachev stood as an ally of 
revolutionary change against conservatives, the Russian 
president was to gain a tactical advantage by having him 
restored to office. To hasten Gorbachev's return, Yeltsin 
utilized an interesting variation of the revolutionary 
persona.
Against the coup and for Gorbachev's return, Yeltsin 
grounded his arguments in an appeal to the rule of law. In 
a printed statement issued on August 19, he called the 
emergency committee's actions illegal. Yeltsin claimed,
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"Whatever reasons are used to justify this removal, what we 
are dealing with is a right-wing, reactionary, 
unconstitutional coup" fMeaapolis-Express 19 August 1991, 
1). On the surface, this statement failed to reflect the 
use of a revolutionary persona, as he appealed to order and 
law. Nevertheless, Yeltsin's rhetorical approach satisfied 
the needs of a revolutionary's purpose. If the goal of his 
revolution was, to use Cohen's term, "conversion," and if 
development of Soviet law supported the process of 
conversion, it made sense for Yeltsin to invoke 
constitutionality.
Yeltsin's legalistic condemnation of the coup 
indicated that he believed the USSR was in the process of 
conversion. In the previously mentioned newspaper 
statement, Yeltsin implied that the law favored the 
development of change, as he cited the liberal Union Treaty 
as a leading cause for the putschists' rebellion. Yeltsin 
charged, "This development of events [the events leading up 
to the signing of the Union Treaty] aroused the animosity 
of reactionary forces and drove them to irresponsible, 
adventurist attempts to solve very complicated political 
and economic problems by methods of force" fMeaapolis- 
Express 19 August 1991, 1). Yeltsin believed the changes 
in the USSR were natural and mandated by the public when he 
stated "We call on the citizens of Russia to give the 
putschists the response they deserve and to demand that the
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country be returned to normal constitutional development" 
(1).
Yeltsin's persona here, while grounded in the realm of
"constitutionality,” was, nevertheless, revolutionary. In
condemning the coup, he summoned words like
"unconstitutional," "illegal," and "return to normalcy."
Still, these terms were utilized in a way to condemn
defenders of the old status quo and to ensure the progress
of conversion— the end goal of a revolution. However, the
success of Yeltsin's appeal to constitutionality was
threatened by the fact that the putschists believed they
maintained a firm handhold on legality. As they took
control of the USSR, the plotters, too, invoked the Soviet
constitution. Thus, Yeltsin discerned the necessity to
separate further from the remnants of the previous
political paradigm.
In smother decree issued on August 19, Yeltsin broke
allegiance with the Soviet government. He commandeered
absolute control over all Soviet power and resources on
Russian soil. Again, Yeltsin intoned the illegality of the
emergency committee's actions. The Russian president then
went on to announce his sweeping appropriation of power:
Until an extraordinary Congress of USSR Peoples' 
Deputies is convened, all USSR bodies of executive 
power, including the USSR State Security Committee, 
the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the USSR 
Ministry of Defense, that operated on RSFSR territory 
are to be shifted to direct subordination to the 
popularly elected President of RSFSR....The RSFSR
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State Security Committee, ...Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, and the...State Committee on Defense 
Questions are to temporarily exercise the functions of 
the corresponding USSR bodies... .All RSFSR agencies, 
officials, and citizens are to take immediate measures 
to rule out the implementation of all decisions and 
orders of the unconstitutional Committee for the State 
of Emergency... (Kuranty 19 August 1991, 2).
Yeltsin's decision to issue this decree was a prudent risk.
By asserting control of defense, of internal affairs, and
of government in general, Yeltsin attempted to undermine
the authority of the plotters, and, therefore, he defended
against further threats from the emergency committee.
Despite the centrality of the committee in the coup,
perhaps the most immediate threat was posed by the armed
soldiers choking the streets of Moscow.
Yeltsin appealed directly to military personnel in his
famous "tank speech." As long as armed soldiers lined the
streets and were oath-bound to the Soviet state, the
potential for violence existed. Yeltsin took action to
placate this volatile predicament. At noon on the 19th,
Yeltsin mounted a T-52 tank to address a small crowd in
front of the Russian White Mouse. Despite the relatively
meager size of the gathering, enough reporters were present
to cover Yeltsin's address and to help make it an enduring
symbol of the revolution. Yeltsin's objective was to
persuade soldiers to ignore orders from their right-wing
superiors. Further, he wanted the troops to abstain from
any brutality against their fellow citizens. Toward these
goals, Yeltsin subverted the Soviet military commanders'
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
160
authority and asserted his own republic's control over
USSR's military forces.
To discredit the putschists, Yeltsin called their
activities treasonist and deceptive. He claimed:
The Vice President of the USSR, the Prime Minister of 
the USSR, the Chairman...have become members of as 
unconstitutional body, thereby committing high 
treason— a very grave crime against the state. The 
country is threatened with terror. The 'order' that 
the latter-day saviors of the fatherland are promising 
us will end in tragedy— the suppression of dissent, 
concentration camps, nighttime arrests. 'A better 
life' will remain a propaganda fraud fKuranty 20 
August 1991, 1).
Here, Yeltsin asserted again the illegality of the coup.
Further, he stressed the counterproductiveness of the
conservatives' goals. To accept the plotters' perspective
was tantamount to accepting the false hopes promoted by
party dogma in the Soviet past.
Upon such a foundation, Yeltsin built his appeal to
the soldiers to curb violence. The Russian president
feared that the putschists might resort to violence to
advance their objectives. Thus, he directed the soldiers
to keep the peace and to do what was "right":
Soldiers and officers of Russia! ...Do not let 
yourselves get caught in a web of false promises and 
demagogic talk about your military duty! Do not 
become a blind instrument of the criminal will of a 
group of adventurists....
Soldiers! I appeal to you. Think of your loved 
ones, your friends, your people. At the difficult 
moment of choice, do not forget that you have taken an 
oath of loyalty to the people. The people against 
whom they are trying to turn your weapons.... There is 
no return to the past, nor will there be. The
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conspirators' days are numbered (Kuranty 20 August
1991, 1).
Here, Yeltsin argued that the putschists' actions were 
driven by archaic, self-serving doctrine and not by concern 
for the nation's citizens. Therefore, Yeltsin encouraged 
the soldiers to think for themselves during this pivotal 
crisis rather them to take orders without adequate 
contemplation.
To strengthen his appeal for temperance, Yeltsin 
asserted his government's supreme control over Russia. He 
proclaimed that General Konstantin Korbets, a chairperson 
of the RSFSR Committee on Defense Questions, was now 
commander of all military forces in Russia. Rather than 
listen to "conspirators," Yeltsin claimed that soldiers 
should listen only to Korbets. To influence further the 
soldiers, Yeltsin concluded his address by stating that, 
"Dark clouds of terror and dictatorship have gathered over 
Russia and over the whole country." However, he predicted 
these clouds would not become "an eternal night”; The 
soldiers would decide against staining the "honor and glory 
of Russian arms” with the blood of the nation's own people 
(Kurantv 20 August 1991, 1).
Yeltsin's revolutionary persona during his speech in 
front of the White House was essential in framing the issue 
of legitimacy during the turbulent days of the coup. Of 
course, Yeltsin's vocabulary was critical of the 
putschists, as he assigned vilifying labels, calling them
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"conspirators" and "traitors." The truly prominent force 
of his appeal, however, stemmed from his ability to argue 
for his own government's legitimacy, even as he called for 
revolutionary change. Yeltsin's supplication rested on the 
premise that reforms in the Soviet Union (i.e., the Union 
Treaty) was part of a natural course of voter-mandated 
transformation. To return to the ways of the outmoded 
Soviet system was an invitation for catastrophe, 
characterized by "dissent," "concentration camps," and 
"arrests.” Therefore, Yeltsin concluded that the soldiers 
had little choice but to revoke their allegiance to the 
Kremlin's conservatives and to become vanguards of a new 
era.
THE END
In a few days, the reactionary coup sputtered to a 
halt. The successful counter coup inspired by Yeltsin not 
only disparaged the putschists, it also heralded the fall 
of the Soviet power system. At Yeltsin's urging, anti­
communist demonstrations ravaged the USSR. After his 
speech atop the T-52 tank, over 100,000 demonstrators 
flocked to the White House to defend it against Soviet 
troops. Elsewhere in Moscow, thousands of people 
threatened to storm the CPSU's headquarters. One after 
smother, republics throughout the Soviet Union declared 
their independence (Sakwa 1993, 13). By August 22, less 
than a week after the coup began, the reactionary crusade
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collapsed. The Soviet era ended with a number of 
monumental events, including Gorbachev's resignation as 
party general secretary on August 24 and the disbanding of 
the communist party in early November. During these 
proceedings, Yeltsin's rhetoric seemed largely ceremonial, 
as the death of the communist party's Soviet Union appeared 
to be a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, his statements 
and orations served to ensure the passing of the old Soviet
paradigm and marked the birth of a new Russia.
Soon after his return to Moscow, Gorbachev
relinquished position as chief of the communist party. His
resignation was precipitated by a special session of the 
Russian parliament on August 23. At this meeting, Yeltsin 
humiliated Gorbachev by forcing him to read aloud a 
transcript of the gathering at which the coup was planned. 
On this transcript, two of those expressing support for the 
plan were government ministers appointed by Gorbachev 
himself. By requiring Gorbachev to read the statement, 
Yeltsin suggested that the soviet president was responsible 
for allowing the coup to occur. As he was disgraced by 
Yeltsin and his party was in shambles, Gorbachev knew what 
had to be done.
Gorbachev presented his resignation address on August 
24. In light of his underlings' roles in the coup, he 
recommended that "the CPSU Central Committee must make the 
difficult but honorable decision to dissolve itself"
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(izvestia 26 August 1991, 2). Despite the effects of the
coup on the Party's credibility, he believed that Communism
still had a future in the Soviet Union. He stated,
I believe that the democratically-minded communists 
who remained true to constitutional legality and the 
course aimed at the renewal of society will call for 
the creation, on a new basis, of a party that will be 
capable of actively joining, together with all 
progressive forces, in the continuation of fundamental 
democratic transformations in the interests of the 
working people (Izvestia 26 August 1991, 2).
Despite his imminent resignation as general secretary,
Gorbachev believed that some semblance of the party would
survive and continue making contributions to Soviet
government. In other words, Gorbachev was aware of his
party's present failure, but he floundered to discern the
pending collapse of the Leninist-Marxist paradigm. He did
not realize his party's fate.
On November 6, after months of deliberation, Yeltsin
banned the communist party. In his decree, he argued that
the CPSU should not continue to exist, as it was never
actually a party. Yeltsin stated that the communist
organization served to shape political power by "fusing
with state structures or making them subordinate to the
CPSU” (Rossiiskaya Gazeta 9 November 1991, 2). By
commandeering government influence, the party functioned
only as a self-serving body for hoarding power and wealth.
On this premise, Yeltsin asserted that the CPSU was never a
legitimate institution. He supported his claim by
explaining:
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The activity of these structures was clearly 
antipopular and unconstitutional in nature and was 
directly linked to the incitement of religious, social 
and nationally-based strife among the country's 
peoples and to the infringement of basic human and 
civil rights and liberties that sure recognized by the 
entire international community (Rossiiskava Gazeta 9 
November 1991, 2).
Yeltsin interpreted the past from a new, paradigmatic
perspective. That is, the once "acceptable" events of the
past were now obsolete and reprehensible.
In light of the party's avaricious and underhanded
nature, Yeltsin feared the possibility of lingering
problems. Yeltsin noted that since the coup's end, the
CPSU continued resisting participation in the USSR's
democratic transformation, as the nomenklatura persisted in
grasping to preserve influence and wealth. Thus, Yeltsin
outlawed the party by stating, "It has become obvious that
as long as the CPSU structures continue to exist there can
be no guarantees against another putsch or coup..."
(Rossiiskava Gazeta 9 November 1991, 2).
Yeltsin's revolutionary persona in this address was
uncompromising, as he reinterpreted past history from a new
perspective. Throughout over 70 years of existence, he
claimed that the Communists accomplished no more than the
"infringement of basic human rights." Yeltsin's rhetorical
stance was indicative of the revolutionary persona, as
revolutionaries frequently assert the existence of natural
and self-evident principles. By taking such an unequivocal
perspective, he emphasized the CPSU's shortcomings and
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provided an argumentative foundation for the acceptance of 
a new political paradigm.
Shortly after Yeltsin's address concerning the CPSU's 
discontinuation, the Soviet state fell. The end of the 
USSR was more in the Ukraine's hands than Yeltsin's. On 
December 1, the Ukraine scheduled a referendum to 
substantiate its declaration of independence during the 
August coup. This referendum was a pivotal moment. If the 
Soviet Union's most massive, most wealthy, non-Russian 
republic withdrew from the union, little would be left to 
hold the USSR together (Coleman 1996, 353). Hopes for 
support of the union in the Ukraine, however, were 
negligible and the vote led to the republic's final 
decision to cede.
The Ukraine's decision then encouraged Gorbachev to 
resign as the President of the USSR. On December 25, 1991, 
the Soviet President spoke to disagree with the 
dismemberment of the union but also to recognize the 
progress of events. He stated lamentfully, "A policy line 
aimed at dismembering the country and disuniting the state 
has prevailed, something that I cannot agree with" 
(Rossiiskaya Gazeta 26 December 1991, 1). Nevertheless, he 
admitted that he could not turn the tide of circumstance. 
Thus, as he was uncertain about the future, Gorbachev bid a 
nervous farewell to his role as Soviet president: "I am
leaving my post with a feeling of anxiety. But also with
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hope and with faith in you, in your wisdom and strength of 
spirit....I wish all of you the very best" (2).
The era of the Soviet Union was over. With the fall 
of the Party and the fall of the union, the old system's 
institutions lacked a firm base of power. Of course, 
conservative remnants of the Party, the KGB, and the 
miliary were still able to exert influence on the events 
subsequent to Gorbachev's resignation. Nevertheless, the 
Soviet manner of thinking was bankrupt. In the public's 
eyes, and as Yeltsin made it clear, there was no way that 
the communists' oppressive ideology and discredited model 
of economics could compare with the promise of a more 
Western style of government (Coleman 1996, 355). Communism 
faced the decision between reform and revolt. It chose 
revolt and suffered with the results.
With the death of Soviet communism, Yeltsin began the 
work of building Russia's future. In Cohen's (1985) terms, 
Yeltsin reached the "post-revolutionary" stage, with its 
own assortment of rhetorical problems. Thus, the events 
following Gorbachev's resignation were many and lie beyond 
the scope of this study. Nevertheless, Yeltsin's January, 
1992, speech to the United Nations provided the world with 
a representative glance of his vision of Russia's post- 
Soviet future.
In his speech, Yeltsin proclaimed the beginning of a 
new epoch in world history. With the fall of the Soviet
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Union and communism, he asserted that a global "opportunity 
has appeared to finally put an end to despotism and to 
dismantle the totalitarian system, in whatever form it may 
exist" fRossiiskava Gazeta 3 February 1992, 1). Thus, 
Yeltsin acknowledged the supremacy of democracy in Russia 
and the world: "Democracy is a highly important gain of
human civilization" (1). With the era of communism in the 
past, Yeltsin believed that Russia could viably enter into 
productive relations with the rest of the world. As he put 
it:
Russia sees the US, the West, and the countries of the 
East not merely as partners but as allies. This is a 
highly important prerequisite for, and, I would say, a 
revolution in, peaceful cooperation among the states 
of the civilized world. We rule, out any subordination 
of foreign policy to ideological doctrines or a self- 
sufficient policy. Our principles are simple and 
understandable: the supremacy of democracy, human
rights and liberties, legality and morality 
fRossiiskava Gazeta 3 February 1992, 1).
In this statement, Yeltsin echoed appeals found in other
revolutionary declarations throughout his rise to
prominence. The idea that human rights were more important
than doctrine was a common theme in his revolutionary
rhetoric.
His recommendations for Russia's foreign policy 
highlighted the comprehensiveness of Russia's 
transformation. For decades, the Soviet Union pursued a 
Stalinist policy of isolation aimed at developing communism 
within the nation's boarders. In spite of this history, 
Yeltsin advocated a bold and innovative direction. He
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announced Russia's participation in the world community as 
an ally of democracy and a confederate in the global 
economy.
CONCLUSION
The events surrounding the end of the Soviet era 
transpired at a dizzying pace. Prompted by Gorbachev's 
liberal transformation and Yeltsin's unflagging progress 
toward empowering the republics, reactionary forces 
responded quickly but ineptly. Leaders of the coup had no 
substantial plan for seizing control; they simply assumed 
that the masses would be swooned by patriotic invocations 
and a show of miliary might. However, Yeltsin's actions 
provided a convincing counter to the putschists' awkward 
plea for a return to the Kremlin's conservative values.
Yeltsin's use of a revolutionary persona was essential 
to his endeavor to fend off the coup. Frequently, 
revolutionaries utilize a vocabulary of blatant criticism 
and appeals to loosely-defined, natural human rights. 
Indeed, Yeltsin's rhetorical approach fit roughly these 
criteria. His pleas for the return to the rule of law was 
a seemingly conservative approach. However, Yeltsin 
fashioned these arguments for order on the assumption that 
the Soviet constitution was not a static document. That 
is, he believed that Soviet law could reflect change and 
the will of the people. When it became clear that Soviet 
conservatives might also invoke the constitution for their
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purposes, Yeltsin quickly circumvented their authority by 
snatching power away from them by decree. Yeltsin's daring 
risk paid dividends, as the coup plotters were too 
unorganized to respond convincingly to the Russian 
president's strategy.
i
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
REVIEW OF STUDY 
Boris Yeltsin's rise to power during the Soviet 
Union's decline was an extraordinary happening. In 1991, 
after decades of repressive political conditions, one man 
finally emerged to facilitate the USSR's break from the 
communist path. Yeltsin's role was undeniably instrumental 
in expediting the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise 
of a more Westem-style government in Russia. One might 
call Yeltsin's achievement unlikely, as his demeanor was 
often termed brash, impertinent, and ungraceful. However, 
as a revolutionary leader, he honed a remarkable rhetorical 
sense of timing and savvy. It was this sense that aided 
the advancement of his reformist and revolutionary agendas.
This study promotes a rhetorical approach to the 
analysis of revolution to explain Yeltsin's influence as a 
revolutionary leader. Existing theories of revolution 
freguently feature the examination of antecedent conditions 
for confrontation or of predicted outcomes. Certainly, 
these perspectives are important, as they explore the 
social, economic, and political variables that constitute 
conditions for insurgence. However, complementary 
explanations need to be produced which illustrate how these 
variables are interpreted for persuasive affect by the 
leadership of a revolutionary movement. What rhetorical
171
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strategies do revolutionaries use to advocate change? How 
do some leaders succeed in gaining the support necessary to 
guide a revolutionary movement? To produce answers to such 
questions, the rhetorical study of revolutionary discourse 
is beneficial.
To illustrate the development and effect of Yeltsin's 
public discourse between 1985 and 1991, this study utilizes 
concepts borrowed from the investigation of revolutions in 
science. Keith and Zagacki (1992) posit that scientists 
use one of three rhetorical personae to advocate claims in 
a scientific community. First, a scientist using a 
revolutionary persona openly seeks change. While the 
degree of zeal may vary, the use of this persona is 
exercised to champion an immediate modification in the way 
scientists conduct experiments and theorize about research 
findings. Second, a scientist using a conciliatory persona 
realizes that a paradigm shift may not occur immediately. 
Anticipating resistance from the status quo, the 
conciliator seeks to foster gradual reform, rather than to 
promote radical transformation. Third, a scientist using a 
conservative persona supports the preservation of the 
status quo. When a scientific community's interests—  
intellectual, social, and economic— are firmly rooted, 
change may not be welcomed. Thus, researchers may employ a 
conservative persona to encourage critical rigor and to 
defend against the influence of "second-rate" advances in
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theory and practice. The present study argues that these 
three personae can be adapted for analysis in the political 
context.
Keith and Zagacki's conceptualizations explain the 
personae in a general sense but do not expound the forms 
these rhetorical strategies may take. However, 
complimentary ideas about form may be garnered from 
political theory. Based on the writings and theories of 
Robespierre, Brinton, and others, this study suggests that 
the use of various rhetorical personae in the revolutionary 
context may work in conjunction with certain appeals. 
Plausibly, the revolutionary persona relies on appeals 
which support the idea of "natural" public liberties. 
Further, revolutionaries tend to frame the accomplishments 
and conduct of the reigning paradigm in pejorative terms. 
Use of the conciliatory persona hinges on the use of 
appeals to order and continuity to foster reform. By 
encouraging inventive adaptation of an established 
paradigm's laws and institutions, the conciliator hopes to 
include members of the status quo in the process of paced, 
yet certain, transformation. The conservative persona is 
used to avoid change. Its use entails a lack of 
inferential leaps and support of a paradigm's reigning 
leaders and practices. With these adaptations to Keith and 
Zagacki's concepts, this study examines Yeltsin's 
revolutionary discourse.
j
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RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This study endeavored to address two research 
questions: What were the personae utilized by Yeltsin for
the establishment of himself as a principal revolutionary 
leader? How was Yeltsin's strategic use of personae 
essential to the revolutionary process?
To answer the first question, this study isolated and 
examined four exigencies to which Yeltsin responded. The 
first exigence was created by the commencement of 
perestroika. As conceived by Gorbachev, perestroika was an 
attempt to correct shortcomings of the Soviet economic and 
political system with glasnost, democratization, and 
tightly regulated marketization. With these innovations, 
Gorbachev hoped to decentralize Soviet bureaucracy, making 
it more efficient. However, the success of perestroika 
required that members of the USSR's elite class, the 
nomenklatura, relinquish much of their authority and 
affluence. Because they refused to give up power, Yeltsin 
encountered stern resistance as a principal agent of 
Gorbachev's reform effort.
This study found that Yeltsin attempted two rhetorical 
approaches during perestroika, between 1985 and 1987.
First, Yeltsin used a revolutionary persona in his initial 
endeavor to root out corruption and misuse of party power. 
With his radical persona, Yeltsin failed, as the 
nomenklatura's hold on power was exceptionally steadfast.
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Thus, Yeltsin faced censure and demotion in the Soviet 
political ranks. Second, following his reproachment, he 
developed a conservative persona to safeguard his political 
well-being. Accordingly, Yeltsin fell in line with 
Gorbachev's moderate approach to reform, a strategy more 
palatable to conservative forces in the CPSU than his 
confrontive style demonstrated in 1986. In short, during 
the initial years of perestroika, Yeltsin performed his 
duties in an environment that was not conducive to change. 
Therefore, he ventured to utilize and then abandoned a 
revolutionary persona in favor of a conservative persona.
The second exigence faced by Yeltsin concerned 
perestroika's breakdown, which altered the rhetorical 
situation in which he functioned. In 1989, Gorbachev's 
reform initiative encountered significant impediments. The 
nation's financial health continued to degenerate at a 
rapid pace. Because of an unfavorable economy, labor 
strikes erupted to protest the decline of the standard of 
living and the severe shortage of consumer goods. Further, 
as a result of glasnost and the freedom of speech promoted 
by the newly-formed Congress of People's Deputies, the 
number of protests in fringe republics escalated.
Estranged nationalities openly demonstrated against their 
subordinate status and for greater autonomy. In light of 
these deteriorating circumstances, the public expected 
meaningful changes. However, Gorbachev protected the
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eminence of the party. He avoided progressive policy 
decisions which entailed further decentralization and 
adopted more restrained measures. With this strategy, the 
Soviet president merely exacerbated tensions between 
political hardliners and an increasingly outspoken and 
reform-minded Soviet public.
In response to the demise of progressive perestroika, 
this study found that Yeltsin adopted a conciliatory 
persona. Because he was an elected representative in the 
Congress of People's Deputies in 1989, he enjoyed increased 
freedom to express his opinions. Thus, Yeltsin was 
contentious in his rhetorical attacks against the status 
quo. He resigned from the communist party and pursued 
reform not within the party, but within the Russian 
parliament. Despite his aggressiveness, he was cautious in 
conducting his affairs, as the CPD had little real power, 
and he wanted to maintain a working relationship with 
progressive members of the party. Therefore, Yeltsin 
publicly claimed that reform could occur within the party 
and the Soviet system. However, he warned that reform must 
occur quickly, as the condition of the USSR was dire.
Thus, he prodded dogmatic communists with predictions of 
impending danger and coaxed them to correct their course of 
action while they still had the opportunity.
The third exigence examined deals with Yeltsin's quest 
for the Russian presidency in 1991, which provided him with
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heightened, rhetorical license. After the bloodshed in 
Vilnius, Lithuania, the rhetorical situation changed; 
Gorbachev came under increasing scrutiny for his inability 
to take a decisive policy line. Evidence of his 
floundering included failure to accept responsibility for 
the Vilnius incident and continued vacillation about reform 
issues. Concurrently, the public became increasingly 
outspoken against the party's activities. For instance, 
protestors willfully ignored a March, 1991, ban on street 
demonstrations to march in support of Yeltsin. Several 
months later, the Russian presidential election gave its 
citizens a significant means with which to express their 
outrage.
Yeltsin responded to the troubled situation with a 
revolutionary persona, as the election provided him with an 
influential stage from which to voice his arguments. 
Frustrated with Gorbachev's continued reluctance to embrace 
change, Yeltsin lashed out. He campaigned on a radical 
platform which included promises of immediate economic 
reform, of improved living conditions for ordinary 
citizens, and of promoting Russian nationalism. Also, 
during his campaign, Yeltsin advocated taking decision­
making power out of the Soviet government's hands and 
placing it in the hands of the Russian parliament. He 
proclaimed that the era of communism's false hopes and 
dreams was over. Through increased sovereignty, Yeltsin
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argued that the republic of Russia could champion the needs 
and aspirations of individual citizens with representative 
government.
Finally, the fourth exigence examined was created by 
the August coup of 1991. Plotters of the takeover felt 
threatened by Yeltsin's success in the presidential 
election, by the possibility of Western incursion via 
Gorbachev's G7 negotiations, and by the impending loss of 
power outlined in the new Union Treaty. In response to 
these threats, the reactionaries apprehended Gorbachev, 
seized control of the Soviet government, and lined the 
streets of key cities with troops. However, the plotters 
bungled the coup's management, allowing Yeltsin to 
intercede. His rhetoric during this time of crisis was 
influential in ending the uprising and in administering the 
end of the Soviet era.
Yeltsin reacted to the coup with an unequivocally 
revolutionary persona. He denounced the coup by grounding 
his contentions in the "rule of law." This law, however, 
was not the same legality that guided the Soviet Union for 
decades. It was grounded in what Yeltsin called the 
rightful and citizen-supported development of the Soviet 
constitution. In Yeltsin's estimation, the constitution's 
development allowed for a revolution in political thought: 
the endorsement of decentralization and the abandonment of 
key Marxist-Leninist principles. Yeltsin eschewed
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communist thinking by claiming that state interests would 
no longer outweigh the rights and interests of individual 
citizens. In addition to this radical change in thinking, 
Yeltsin banned the communist party after the coup's 
collapse. He believed that eliminating this remnant of the 
past was necessary because he feared its continued 
influence. Further, Yeltsin argued that all authoritarian 
traditions must end to make way for the future of democracy 
in Russia.
The second research question posed at the beginning of 
this study was: How was Yeltsin's use of rhetorical
personae essential to the revolutionary process in Russia? 
Yeltsin's use of personae was essential for two reasons. 
First, Yeltsin's utilization of personae helped him 
preserve his political career by sensing and adapting to 
the limitations imposed by Russia's evolving rhetorical 
situation. Rhetoric is situational. In Bitzer's (1968) 
words, "...a particular discourse comes into existence 
because of some specific condition or situation which 
invites utterance" (4). Put differently, a rhetorical 
situation is a moment of crisis which requires a rhetor to 
sway an audience to accept one resolution over others. To 
be successful, the rhetor must tailor contentions to suit 
the disposition of the audience. In relation an audience's 
needs, desires, and inclinations, the rhetor must know his 
or her limitations.
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Yeltsin was able to sense his limitations; thus he was 
able to remain an influential factor in the republic's 
transformation. During the mid-1980s, Yeltsin's audience 
was not receptive to his radical messages, as those in 
power were in a comfortable position. Very few people 
openly challenged their power, and the process of 
democratization had not yet spawned avenues of formal 
dissent like the Congress of Peoples' Deputies. Put 
differently, for conservatives, no pressing reasons 
constituted a "crisis" in the same way Yeltsin was defining 
the situation. Consequently, Yeltsin's revolutionary 
arguments fell on unsympathetic and spiteful ears. To 
avoid reproach, he soon learned to anticipate audience 
response before fashioning a presentation style for his 
discourse. Thus, when faced with party hardliners as a 
reluctant, primary audience, his discourse was 
conservative. However, the scope of his audience grew 
after the 1989 parliamentary elections to include a more 
progressive voting population rather than the party. This 
population included common citizens who longed for reforms 
and for improvements in their standard of living. Thus, 
Yeltsin's discourse became increasingly conciliatory, as 
his constituency was receptive to moderate change. By 
adapting his rhetoric to the nature of the audience and the 
situational context, Yeltsin avoided detrimental 
confrontation to keep himself in a position of political
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influence. If he had not accomplished this task, the 
second Russian revolution might not have occurred the way 
it did or at all.
Second, in addition to the perpetuation of his 
political career, the use of personae helps explain how 
Yeltsin successfully fashioned his claims. Theoretically, 
each persona features a different rhetorical approach to 
negotiating a rhetorical situation. When a paradigm's 
power structure is firmly entrenched, the conservative 
persona is used to argue for the preservation of the status 
quo. However, when a need for reform is perceived, and 
when an audience is receptive to a mitigated criticism of 
the status quo, the conciliatory persona is appropriate. 
This persona is used to press for moderate change with 
premises grounded in reigning rules, laws, and practices. 
And when an audience discerns that a paradigm is on or near 
the brink of collapse, the rhetor stands in a position to 
use a revolutionary persona. This persona features 
inductive reasoning, as the rhetor seeks new principles by 
which a community conducts its affairs.
In practice, Yeltsin used each one of these 
argumentative approaches successfully. For instance, after 
his 1987 speech which invited party censure, he spoke 
within parameters set for him. Yeltsin repressed his views 
and used a conservative persona. In 1989, however, he had 
a new audience which was receptive to the idea of change at
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the Congress of Peoples' Deputies. Yeltsin's arguments 
were deductive in nature. That is, against the backdrop of 
his perception of Soviet laws development, he scrutinized 
the progress of reform. Whatever the circumstances were, 
Yeltsin seemingly figured out an appropriate manner to 
frame his arguments in such a way as to appeal to the needs 
and dispositions of his given audience.
IMPLICATIONS
By using rhetorical theory to help explain the 
successes and failures of Yeltsin in late-Soviet Russia, 
revolutionary theory is supplemented. This study suggests 
that patterns of rhetorical strategies exist which help a 
leader manage the process of revolutionary uprising. If 
Yeltsin had not used rhetorical personae in his promotion 
of change, he might have been neutralized and the 
revolutionary movement suppressed. In light of this 
study's perspective on the importance of rhetorical 
personae in negotiating crisis situations, a number of 
significant ideas may be gleaned.
First, this study suggests that scholars may speculate 
more clearly than before about how revolutionary leaders 
acquire command and influence. Many students of revolution 
have hypothesized about the levers of power leaders must 
pull to guide revolutionary movement but little about how 
leaders put themselves in position to pull those levers.
For instance, Hook (1967) contends that successful
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revolutionaries come to power by securing control over 
military forces, by positioning various social and 
political factions against each other, by pursuing control 
of social functions, and by eliminating opposition (167- 
68). Hook's observations are insightful, but they do not 
tell us a great deal about how revolutionary leaders 
maneuver themselves into stations of authority and perform 
their functions.
The study of rhetoric allows us to examine how leaders 
construct their public images. From this study's 
theoretical perspective, Yeltsin's use of rhetorical 
strategies for his rise to power was somewhat predictable. 
Like revolutionaries in science, Yeltsin presented his 
contentions shrewdly to avoid deunaging beneficial relations 
with his audience. When possible, Yeltsin invoked the 
status guo's own ideas, especially Gorbachev's, to frame 
controversial issues. At the same time, he gathered public 
support via press coverage to protect himself from party 
reprimands. Because he survived politically and built a 
popular base of support, Yeltsin was in a position to lead 
the revolution when the Soviet empire could no longer 
sustain itself. In short, Yeltsin's use of rhetorical 
personae was essential in stabilizing his position as an 
effectual leader.
With its rhetorical perspective, this study suggests a 
pattern of successful revolutionary behavior. Certainly,
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there is no way to predict a leader's specific actions. 
However, the examination of personae may help scholars 
anticipate the tactics used by a successful revolutionary 
to manage his or her circumstances and to argue for change.
A second implication of this study is that the 
examination of Yeltsin's rhetoric leads to the 
conceptualization of a new revolutionary role, the role of 
"rhetorical chameleon." In previous studies, scholars have 
suggested a number of perspectives for examining the 
behavior of revolutionaries. From studies of 
psychoanalysis, scholars hypothesize that revolutionaries 
are driven by repressed desires and consequential appetites 
for power. From studies of social, movements, scholars 
suggest that revolutionaries serve a number of functions, 
including ideologist, agitator, administrator. From 
studies of charisma, scholars contend that revolutionaries 
possess a kind of divine charm which derives power from 
outside of legitimate, established institutions.
Successful revolutionaries are also skillful managers 
of presentation. Yeltsin possessed a remarkable sense of 
adaptation. When faced with censure by the Politburo in 
1987, Yeltsin bowed in defeat by publicly supporting the 
party. Despite his words of favor, his true feelings were 
probably different. Nevertheless, he played a partisan 
role with a rhetorically conservative persona. When the 
rhetorical situation changed, however, Yeltsin adjusted.
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Gorbachev's advent of the Congress of Peoples' Deputies and 
of increased media coverage of state functions changed the 
rules by which Yeltsin played the Soviet political game.
In popular opinion, Yeltsin was able to find a handhold of 
power. In short, Yeltsin was a survivor who endured a wide 
range of changing circumstances. If Yeltsin's 
revolutionary behavior is telling, it is reasonable to 
believe that other revolutionary leaders might also play 
the role of rhetorical chameleon.
Third, this study offers scholars a fuller 
appreciation of the revolutionary process as "ordered 
chaos." Political theories recognize that revolution is 
more than mere revolt. For instance, in The Anatomy of A 
Revolution, Brinton (1952) argues that countergovernments 
can be "better organized, better staffed, better obeyed 
than that of moderates" (147). Nevertheless, a substantial 
element of uncertainty is associated with any form of 
transformation when old institutions have faltered, and new 
structures have not yet solidified. In this period of 
transition, Hagopian (1974) claims that radicals possess 
more freedom to fulfill their promises than conservatives 
and some moderates who wish to console as many interest 
groups as possible (199). Put differently, Hagopian 
believes that radicals are willing to play favorites to 
promote change. This idea of playing favorites may appear 
frenzied, but it might actually be represented as a
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revolutionary leadership's utilization of a complex of 
rhetorical strategies.
In the Russian revolution, Yeltsin used a different 
set of persuasive approaches to solicit support from 
various groups. Yeltsin walked a fine line between 
placater and antagonist to promote his agenda. For 
instance, he freguently accosted conservative Politburo 
member Yegor Ligachev for his efforts to curtail reform. 
Confronting Ligachev and other high-ranking, orthodox party 
members was a risky undertaking, but after 1987, Yeltsin 
sought protection. He shielded himself against party 
censure with stratagems including publicly-staged 
"alliances" with Gorbachev and other public-relations 
exploits. Yeltsin's rhetorical feats kept issues in the 
media's eye and away from the closed doors of Politburo 
meetings. In short, Yeltsin knew how, when, and where to 
present information so as to heighten his message's effect 
and to diminish the possibility of detrimental 
consequences.
With a rhetorical perspective on revolution, perhaps 
one can discern a certain kind of order in chaotic, 
political change. In all of the instability associated 
with the rise and collapse of institutions, a 
distinguishable endeavor is present— a pursuit to settle 
controversies in civic affairs. Of course, not all 
factions in the multitudes may agree on individual
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policies, resolutions, or future plans. However, whatever 
the questions and answers might be, rhetoric is at the 
center of negotiation. Its use seeks to adapt possible 
resolution to meet the dispositions of those involved in 
conflict. Thus, rhetoric may help provide some semblance 
of continuity in the process of transition and change.
FUTURE RESEARCH 
The events surrounding perestroika and the ensuing 
revolution surprised many Western observers. Prior to the 
1980s, Russian history was largely viewed as fully 
authoritarian. Notions including Rigby's concept of Russia 
as a "mono-organizational society" and the perceived 
tradition of "oriental despotism" led many to believe that 
the communist regime was somehow legitimate, and that 
Russians openly embraced oppression. These assumptions 
were not entirely true. Russia witnessed a number of 
instances of dissent in the twentieth century, including 
the fateful march led by Georgy Gapon in 1905 which became 
known as St. Petersburg's "Bloody Sunday"; the great 
literary protests of Andrei Sinyavsky, Yuli Daniel, and 
Boris Pasternak; and, after 1987, the striking wave of 
civic activism which involved over 60,000 independent 
associations and 15 million people (Petro 1994, 1). In 
light of these facts and others like them, perhaps the 
coercive power of Soviet communism was not as powerful as 
many once thought.
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Like the Bolshevik uprising, revolutions are not 
complete upheavals which witness immediate change. Rather, 
they are contingent periods of transformation which require 
negotiation and appeals for support. On the prospects of 
change in scientific revolutions, Max Planck once noted 
that conversion requires time. He states that a new 
paradigm does not "triumph by convincing its opponents and 
making them see the light, but rather because its opponents 
eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is 
familiar with it" (in Cohen 1985, 468). Radical change 
occurs slowly. The same is true in the political realm, 
as, for example, Robespierre and Saint-Just were removed 
from power for overexerting revolutionary tensions in 
France; and Lenin eased the pace of progress toward 
communism by introducing limited capitalism (i.e., NEP) 
during the early 1920s to avoid dissension in the Soviet 
Union's populace. If revolutionary change requires 
moderation and careful presentation to the public, we must 
assume that rhetoric plays a vital role in paradigm shifts.
To more fully understand the role of rhetoric in 
revolutions, further research must be accomplished to 
supplement this study. First, comparative investigations 
must be conducted to test the utility of rhetorical 
personae in different revolutionary movements. The method 
utilized in this study worked well to describe the events 
surrounding a relatively bloodless revolution. However,
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one must ask if thoughts concerning the rhetorical personae 
are applicable in settings that include noteworthy 
violence. Perhaps future studies could investigate 
Robespirre in the French revolution, Castro in the January, 
1959, Cuban uprising, or Lenin in the Bolshevik revolution.
Second, the results of this study may be used to 
temper existing and future models of revolution. As noted 
previously, scholars in the field of political science 
offer a number of serviceable explanations for the progress 
of revolutions. However, these interpretations may benefit 
from a consideration of the rhetorical perspective. By 
understanding the significance of rhetoric in revolutions 
more fully, researchers might be able to better comprehend 
and to anticipate what occurs during political 
transformation.
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